.', ',::(. ',I t·, No. 2 WINTI':R. 1!)G:; THE"1;MONIST'".1(': ::, ' .. , An International QuarterlyJO,uf!i,al o{ General Philosophical Inq THE MONIST FOUNDED 1888 JJY EDWARo C. HEGELER International Quarterly Journal o[ General Philosophical Inquiry Editorii'E~GE~E FREEMAN FOUNDED 1888 BY EDWARD C. HEGELER Editorial Board:~jt;:/ , <. "k~~~~ ·1 MONROE c. BEARDSLEy,;'-Swarthmore College LEWIS WHITE BECK)~f;;;.: University 0/ Rochester WILLIAM FRANKENA:~)f~f,University o{ Michigan RICHARD M. MARTIN>~,~,·;~.. Un~vers~ty o{ Texas ]OSEPH OWENS",::",., Umverslty o{ Toronto WILFRID SELLARS,.~i. Yale University CONTENTS ]OHN E. SMITH ' '~~.' Yale University GREGORY VLASTOS "';:~. princeton University U"~"1V\L TOPIC: Metaphysics Today . :~~:' ~> ~ { '; Advisory Editorial Bo.ara::· MARIO BUNGE, Univer;ityJojBuCTIOS Aires; RISIERI FRONDIZI. PAGE University 01 Buenos Aires; T. A. GOUDGE. University 01 rJ" ____ >_ J. HARTNACK. University ofAarhaus, Denmark; C. LEWY. N. FINDLAY University; GOTfFRIED MARTIN. Bonn University; WILLIAM KNEALE,' METAPHYSICS AND AFFINITY Oxlord University; N. A. NlltAM. Mysore University,India; 159 MATAO NODA. Kyoto University; HARALD OFSTAD. University 01 CHARLES HARTSHORNE Stockholm; CH. PERELMAN.' University 01 Brussels; RAYMOND POLIN,' PRESENT PROSPECTS FOR METAPHYSICS University 01 Paris; KARL R. POPPER, London School 01 Economics;., 188 FERRUCCIO ROSSI-LANDI, University 01 Milan; PETER F. STRAWSON, ," ALAN DONAGAN Oxlord University; GIORGIO TONELLI, Pisa University; HERMANN UNIVERSALS AND METAPHYSICAL REALISM 211 WEIN, University 01 Göttingen /. NORMAN MALCOLM . MEMORY AND THE PAST . Cover Portrait: P AU~',CAR~S 247 l'aul Carus. the first editor of THE MONIST. was born in Usenl>erg 'STEPHEN C. PEPPER Harz on July 18. 1852, and died in LaSalle. Illinois. on February 11. A PROPOSAL FOR A WORLD HYPOTHESIS After receiving his Ph.D. degree in philosophy and cla'ssical philology 267 Tübingen University in 1876, he taught briefly at the State Military , RICHARD TAYLOR emy at Dresden. In search" of. freedom ior expression of his independent CAUSATION views. he migrated first to England and then to the Uni ted S 287 he accepted the invitation of Edward C. Hegeler (who later father-in-Iaw) to edit the Open Court Magazine. a monthly journal primarily to comparative.religlon. In 1888 the Monist was established quarterlI journal of thephilo80phy of science. and Paul Carus ser editor 0 both joulllals andas editor of the Open Court Publishing pany until his death In 1919.;.: .' SUBSCRIPTION RATES: unä~d\'Staie~:.AnnUal (4 issues) $6.00 for' institution $4.00 for individuals; single·,eopies. $1.50. Other Countries: Annual (4issues) $6.60 for institutions. $4.60 for uals. single copies, $1.65. ,~ : . LA SALLE, ILLINOIS Checks should be made payable 10 THE 'MON IST and addrased lO THE 1807 Seventh Street, LaSallei Illinou. THE EDWARD C. HEGELER FOUNDATION Correspondence concemlng manwcrlPtJ. revlewa. and books for review .hould be 1963 addressed to Eugene Fr"~. Editor, The Monut, Box 268. Wilmette, Illlnol •• Publlshed Quarteri}, b}' tbe Edward C. HCieler Foundatlon Second Class Malling PrIvIleges Authorlzed at Chicallo, IlllnoiJ . THE MONIST, Vol. 47. No. 2 @ 1965 by the Edward C. Helleler.Foundation. LaSalle, IlllnoiJ • raINTED IN 1'11& UNITED fTATES 0. ANltaiCA 'j. 286 THE MONIST With the foregoing distinctions in mind, it can be-' seen that the qualitative categories and the conceptual,;:~ categories for the world hypo thesis being here developed '} are distinct sorts of predicates. The qualitative categories CAUSATION refer to qualitative properties of the world, the conceptual categories to conceptual properties. A full description of" the world in terms of either the qualitative or the concep-;' Metaphysicians, theologians and philosophers generally tual properties would be true, so far as our world thought of an efficient cause as something that pro­ sesis may be adequate, but the truth of the something. That which was produced, according to description would ultimately depend on the truth of ancient idea, was a new being. In the case the new qualitative one. ~ing was a substance-a soul, for example, or matter, or STEPHEN C. substance at all-then the causation of that being was UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA considered an act of creation. It is in this sense that God BERKELEY Was quite naturally thought of as the creator oE the world, and also, as its efficient cause. If, on the other hand, the new being was simply a modification of an existing sub­ stance, then there was no creation, in the strict sense, but only what Aristotle called generation. When a sculptor, for instance, fabricates astatue, he does not create any- , thing, but simply imposes changes upon what already ex­ 'jsts. Still, he does produce a new being-namely, a statue­ ':,even though this new being is only the modification of ~:La substance that al ready existed. This is the way Plato, in ;"frontrast to later Christian theologians, thought oE God's 'feIation to the world. God, or the demiurge, accorcling to idea, was the cause oE the world only in the sense that be converted chaos into a universe. He did not create the with which he began. , Now this original idea of an efficient cause had no connection with the ideas of uniformity, con­ or law. It was always supposed that, given the cause, effect must follow; but this was not usually under. to mean that, given the same cause, the same effect always follow. A particular sculptor, for example, 'If.: CAUSATION 2L-_ 20" THE MONIST was considered the efficient cause of a particular statue, of by theologians and philosophers as a being of such pow­ but it was not supposed that this sculptor could do noth· er that he can produce a world. This is essentially what ing but make statues. The necessity of an effect, given its was meant by calling God a "first cause"-namely, that cause, was thought to be a consequence of the power of the everything ultimately depends for its existence upon his cause to produce it, and not of any invariance between that power, whereas he depends upon the power of nothing cause and that effect. Thus, if a sculptor has the power to ;, except hirnself. It was in the same way that statues, tempI es make astatue, and exercises that power upon marble, and other human artifacts were considered the expression then the marble cannot help but become astatue; the of human power. The very movements of men and animals effect must follow, given its cause. Thus arose the idea, so were thought to be the expression of the power of such clcar to our predecessors but so obscure and implausible creatures over their own bodies, leading Aristotle to de­ to us, that a cause must be as great or greater than its cf· scribe animals as self-moved. When philosophers eventually feet; the greater cannot be produced by the lesser. It is came to analyze this idea of power wilhin the presupposi­ also this idea of the power of a cause to produce its effect tions of empiricism they became involved, of course, in which gave rise to the common distinction between acting enormous difficulties. The longest part of Locke's Essay and being acted upon, and the kindred distinctions be· is devoted to a tortuous and inconclusive discussion of it. tween agent and patient, activity and passivity. A sculptor Thomas Reid finally affirmed that the idea of the active acts in creating, or causing, astatue, but the marble upon power of a cause-as exemplified, for instance, in the power which he acts, or exercises his power, does not act; it is a of a man over his own voluntary movements-cannot be purely passive recipient of changes imposed by an active analyzed or defined at all, though it seemed to hirn per­ cause. fectly clear and intelligible. We thus find in this ancient idea of an efficient cause This is but an intimation of the importance that the two closely related concepts, that of power or efficacy, and idea of causal power once had in philosophy and metaphys­ that of necessity or compulsion, both of which concepts ics. It is seldom any longer referred to, being now assumed modern philosophers have been eager to eschew if they to be, at best, a derivative concept, with the result that can. The idea of efficacy is, of course, part of the very . much traditional metaphysics is simply incomprehensible etymology of "efficient cause." to modern students. Power.-An efficient cause was thought to produce its There is, however, one element in this notion of causal effect by virtue of its power to do so. Berkeley considered power or efficacy that has never been doubted, and is even this so obvious that he used it as an important argument still apart of everyone's conception of causation; namely, to prove that our ideas cannot be caused by other ideas, . that the power of an efficient cause never extends to things but must be produced by an active being. Ideas, he said, past. This priority of efficient causes to their effects is not, are altogether inert or passive things, without the power moreover, a me re convention of speech, but a metaphysical to cause anything. God, of course, has always been thought necessity. The power of a cause to produce an effect has a t: 290 THE MONIST CAUSATION 291 fixed temporal direction that results, not from the conno­ corne warmer, in a mann er in which it cannot be said that tations of words, but from its very nature as an efficient the stone, in becoming warmer, makes the sun shine cause. Nothing past is within the power of anything, either upon it. to do or undo. Aristotelians might express this by saying Areturn to the metaphysics 0/ causation. This ancient that the past contains no potentialities or real possibilities; idea of an efficient cause that I have very loosely sketched everything past can only be what it actually iso Things is generally considered by contemporary philosophers to :.".