2 A Latin spring Jacob Groshek and Ingrid Bachmann Literature review The democratizing role of mass media Conventional wisdom suggests that mass media – and media diffusion – are important for public deliberation, and play an important role fostering and maintaining democracy and stable societies. Research from political science and mass communication also stresses the democratizing role on media. Both press freedom and press and speech freedom are credited with public debate on – and criticism of – government officials and their decision-making (e.g., Bennett, 1998) and from a normative point of view, mass media, and news media in particular, are expected to hold authorities accountable, contribute to public discourse, and provide citizens with the means to make informed decisions (e.g., Esser and D’Angelo, 2006; Grabe and Bucy, 2008; Norris, 2000; Habermas, 1989; Waisbord, 1996). Indeed, the diffusion of traditional mass media have been linked to the development of institutionalized democ- racy and nation-states (e.g., Anderson, 1991; Waisbord, 1996), and over the years, the introduction of new media technologies tends to be paired with a narrative that celebrates their potential for democratic growth (Groshek, 2009; Spinelli, 1996). One only needs to see the narrative regarding the Green Revolution in Iran – labeled a “Twitter revolution” – and the ousting of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt to realize this kind of narrative is pervasive and used in reference to Internet and mobile technologies, despite the lack of concrete evidence showing their democratizing potential. Indeed, the details of the links between media and democracy are somewhat unclear. Groshek (2012b), for instance, underlined the scarcity of empirical evi- dence supporting the idea that media are prerequisites of democratic growth. Results from his 1946–2003 time-series analysis of 122 countries showed that mass media are important, but not a universal requirement of democracy augmen- tation, and that the democratizing impact of media is greater in countries with higher sociopolitical instability. Furthermore, while the results supported the idea that media diffusion precedes – rather than follows – democratic growth, the impact also seemed to be reciprocal, with certain forms of mass media benefiting from increased democracy levels. After all, and as critical scholars have long 18 J. Groshek and I. Bachmann stressed, mass media reinforce the social, political, and economic structures within which they operate (Altschull, 1995; Gitlin, 1980). Conversely, past research has long established the positive relationship between media use for news and political engagement (e.g., Flanagin et al., 2006; Livingston and Markham, 2008; McLeod, Scheufele and Moy, 1999; Shah et al., 2005). Tradi- tional news media use, when there is trust in the information offered by media organizations, has been shown to foster discussion and engagement in civic and political behavior, especially voting behavior, in a “virtuous circle” – at least in Western democratic societies (Norris, 2000; see also Verba et al., 1995). Informa- tion is one of the key resources for mobilization and recruitment (Klofstad, 2007; Verba et al., 1995), and thus media provide knowledge to aid citizen participation. Along these lines, Internet optimists see in new technologies a democratizing force (e.g., Aouragh, 2008; Kahn and Kellner, 2004; Marmura, 2008), as the information about politics and engaging in public affairs is no longer an expensive or difficult to obtain commodity (Bimber, 2001; Tewksbury 2006). Recent evidence, however, has further suggested that the way in which citizens engage in public affairs is changing. Younger cohorts, for example, are not neces- sarily interested in traditional electoral politics or trust in institutions and authorities (Bennet, 2008; Dalton, 2008); their media consumption favors entertainment over information (Bimber, 2001; Shah, Rojas, and Cho, 2009), which may have a nega- tive effect on participatory behaviors (e.g., Putnam, 2000). New technologies and mobilization In addition to the traditional link between news consumption and participation, there is growing empirical evidence on the impact of new information and communication technologies on participation and public debate (e.g., Bouilianne, 2009). Online forms of communication such as blogs, social media. and user-generated content have allowed people to engage in activities – online and offline – aimed at influenc- ing government and policy (e.g., Gil de Zúñiga and Valenzuela, 2011; Bachmann et al., 2012; Rojas and Puig-i-Abril, 2009; Williams and Tedesco, 2006), and, for instance, social media are credited with organizing protesters in countries like Guatemala (Harlow, 2012; Harlow and Harp, 2011) and mobilizing individuals in Chile (Valen- zuela, 2012; Valenzuela et al., 2012). Further, following online news on politics has been found to increase both voting and online participation (Calenda and Meijer, 2009), and just seeking information in social networking sites showed to be a posi- tive, significant predictor of participatory behaviors (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2012). Those who embrace digital media are, indeed, involved in public affairs – just per- haps in different ways than traditional media users (Bachmann and Gil de Zúñiga, forthcoming; Shah et al., 2002). Cell phones and other mobile technologies are also part of this equation, as they can become effective political organizational tools (Hermanns, 2008). Suárez (2006), for instance, highlighted the impact of mobile messages in voter turnout in the 2004 Spanish general elections. Similarly, in a Colombian setting, Rojas and Puig-i-Abril found that using cell phones to mobilize and recruit contacts to support A Latin spring 19 social or political causes has a similar outcome to digital media use – offline participation – and Kim and Hopke (2011) concluded that mobile technologies foster social capital by supporting personal relationships and self-expression, espe- cially among younger individuals (see also Ito, 2005; Ling, 2008). Focusing on the 2011 Egyptian revolt, Groshek (2012a) found statistical sup- port for the idea that Internet and mobile phone diffusion was related to the ini- tiation of the revolt that led to Mubarak’s resignation – albeit personal interviews suggested skepticism among Egyptians that the revolt had been an Internet- facilitated event. This skepticism is shared by cyber-pessimist researchers, who argue that there is more hype than evidence on the democratizing capacity of new com- munication and information technologies (e.g. Morozov, 2011; Van de Donk et al., 2004), and point to the negative aspects of the Internet, such as surveillance and content control (e.g., Etling et al, 2010). Along these lines, in a multina- tional analysis of 72 countries Groshek (2010) concluded that Internet diffu- sion was not a specific causal mechanism of national-level democratic growth for the years 1994–2003. Youth bulges and democracies The changes within political behaviors and the media landscape are paralleled with the increasingly dominant role of younger generations in political action, especially in the so-called third wave democracies (Valenzuela et al., 2012; Zúquete, 2011). In this context, it is fitting to consider youth bulges and their importance in political upheaval and social instability. Youth bulges are large young cohorts – ages 15 to 24 – relative to the either the total or the adult population (Ginges, 2005; Urdal, 2004, 2006). While these young cohorts have been historically associated with political crises and social disorder (Goldstone, 1991, 2001), their willingness to participate in political transformation stems from their need to compensate and fix economic, political and/or social inequalities (Hart et al, 2004; Urdal, 2004, 2006). Youth-saturated societies are also likely to introduce strains on the labor market, the educational system, and other institutions (Hart et al., 2004; Urdal, 2006) and if the political and economic structures fail to meet their needs, these youth bulges have been shown to openly clash with the government – not necessarily in a violent fashion – as they are among more aggrieved individuals in a nation (Urdal and Hoelscher, 2009). Youth bulges can herald political transformations (Ginges, 2005), especially under condi- tions of economic stagnation (Urdal, 2004) or lack of political rights, such as the absence of democratic institutions, minority representation or self-governance (Urdal, 2006). Indeed, Urdal’s (2004) multinational analysis concluded that an increase in youth bulges of one percentage point is associated with an increased likelihood of unrest of around 7 percent. A state characterized by social and political insta- bility further fosters mass mobilization by the youth (Ginges, 2005; Urdal and Hoelscher, 2009). 20 J. Groshek and I. Bachmann Still, not all unrest connected to youth bulges is destructive, and a body of scholarship has positioned informed and mobilized youth as agents of develop- ment. Youth-saturated communities can engage in constructive forms of political activity – including activism, social change, and democratization (Hart et al., 2004). Poor and weak countries, however, may lack the institutions and resources to effectively channel anti-state grievances, which increases the risk of outbreak of conflict along political transformation (Hart et al., 2004; Urdal and Hoelscher, 2009). The Latin American experience Latin America includes more than 20 culturally