CORE Metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk Provided by PhilPapers The Inscrutability of Reference John Robert Gareth Williams Ph.D. thesis in Philosophy, University of St Andrews Submitted August 2005 Accepted November 2005 Abstract The metaphysics of representation poses questions such as: in virtue of what does a sen- tence, picture, or mental state represent that the world is a certain way? In the first instance, I have focused on the semantic properties of language: for example, what is it for a name such as ‘London’ to refer to something? Interpretationism concerning what it is for linguistic expressions to have meaning, says that constitutively, semantic facts are fixed by best semantic theory. As here developed, it promises to give a reductive, universal and non-revisionary account of the nature of linguistic representation. Interpretationism in general, however, is threatened by severe internal tension, due to argu- ments for radical inscrutability. These contend that, given the interpretationist setting, there can be no fact of the matter what object an individual word refers to: for example, that there is no fact of the matter as to whether “London” refers to London or to Sydney. A series of challenges emerge, forming the basis for this thesis. 1. What sort of properties is the interpretationist trying to reduce, and what kind of reductive story is she offering? 2. How are inscrutability theses best formulated? Are arguments for inscrutability effective in their own terms? What kinds of inscrutability arise? 3. Is endorsing radical inscrutability a stable position? 4. Are there theoretical virtues—such as simplicity—that can be appealed to in discrediting the rival (empirically equivalent) theories that underpin inscrutability arguments? In addressing these questions, I concentrate on diagnosing the source of inscrutability, map- ping the space of ways of resisting the arguments for radical inscrutability, and examining the challenges faced in developing a principled account of linguistic content that avoids radical in- scrutability. The effect is not to close down the original puzzles, but rather to sharpen them into a set of new and deeper challenges. Chapter list Anticipation 1 Chapter 1: The semantic project 8 Chapter 2: Reductive paraphrase 46 Chapter 3: Inscrutability theses 78 Chapter 4: Gavagai again 104 Chapter 5: Arguments for radical inscrutability 143 Chapter 6: Lexical semantic beliefs 198 Chapter 7: Good inference and context 219 Chapter 8: Eligibility 243 Recapitulation and concluding remarks 277 Appendix A: Is supervaluational consequence revisionary? 287 Appendix B: Completeness and compactness 298 Appendix C: Variables, abstraction and inscrutability 306 i Contents Acknowledgements vii Anticipation 1 Part I: The framework . 1 Part II: Arguing for inscrutability . 2 Part III: Against Radical Inscrutability . 5 Part IV: Avoiding Inscrutability . 5 I The framework 7 1 The semantic project 8 1.1 Semantic properties . 10 1.1.1 From truth-conditions to reference. 10 The source of the challenge I: autonomous explanation . 12 The source of the challenge II: wider explanatory projects . 13 The source of the challenge III: counterfactually robust connections . 15 1.1.2 The theory of reference and the theory of meaning . 16 Quine’s distinction . 16 Davidsonian truth-theoretic semantics . 18 Intensional semantics and modality . 19 Summary . 22 1.1.3 The relation to meaning . 23 1.2 The problem of intentionality . 27 Who faces the challenge? . 29 Head-first and word-first strategies. 31 1.3 Interpretationism . 34 Lewis’ convention-based interpretationism . 36 Global Descriptivism . 39 Davidsonian radical interpretation . 40 Flexibility . 43 2 Reductive paraphrase 46 2.1 The framework: theory-shadowing paraphrase . 47 Theory-shadowing paraphrases . 50 ii CONTENTS iii Summary . 52 2.2 Incomplete fictions and theories . 53 The puzzle of incomplete fictions . 53 Incomplete paraphrases . 58 2.3 Interpretationism as a quasi-fiction . 62 2.4 Parochial consequence and paraphrase . 68 (A) The paraphrase . 68 (B) Parochial interpretations . 69 (C) Applications: ** and consequence . 70 (D) Lagadonian languages . 71 2.5 Conclusion . 73 II Arguing for inscrutability 75 Introduction to Part II . 76 3 Inscrutability theses 78 3.1 A supervaluational treatment of inscrutability . 80 Multiply indexed semantics . 81 Delineations . 83 Semantic properties . 85 Inscrutability within supervaluationism . 86 3.2 A theory-shadowing treatment of inscrutability . 87 Fact.................................... 89 Formulating inscrutability of reference . 91 3.3 Object-language expressions of inscrutability . 93 3.4 Comparing the two accounts . 96 3.5 Concluding remarks . 100 4 Gavagai again 104 4.1 Quine on ‘gavagai’ . 105 4.2 Metaphysics and methodology . 108 4.3 Quine’s arguments for division inscrutability . 112 Quine’s argument . 112 Internal problems for the argument for division inscrutability . 113 4.4 Worms, stages, and undetached parts . 116 Worm theory . 117 Stage theory . 120 Dot theory . 122 The primitives . 123 4.5 Objections . 126 4.5.1 Tense and aspect within stage theory . 126 Digression: counting rabbits . 128 4.5.2 Predication and compounding . 129 Inconstancy within stage and worm theory . 130 CONTENTS iv The residual question . 132 Analogues in the worm case . 134 The Evans and Fodor cases revisited . 136 4.6 Conclusion . 140 5 Arguments for radical inscrutability 143 5.1 Permutation arguments . 147 5.1.1 Permutation arguments preserving truth-values. 148 Quantifier-free Predicate logic . 148 Quantifiers . 150 Recapitulation . 153 5.1.2 Permutation arguments preserving truth-conditions . 155 The framework (syntax): a pure categorial language . 155 The framework (semantics): single-indexed general semantics . 157 The permutation argument within single-indexed general semantics . 159 The permutation argument within double-indexed general semantics . 161 Derivative invariance results . 162 Inscrutability of existence. 164 5.1.3 Conclusion . 165 5.2 Indexical-inscrutability: a cut-and-shunt argument . 166 5.3 Two settings where the argument breaks down . 169 5.3.1 Structured propositions . 169 The framework: structured propositions as truth-bearers . 169 The standing of permutation results and the additional premiss. 170 Review . 174 5.3.2 T-sentences . 174 The framework: Davidsonian truth-theoretic semantics . 174 Review . 176 5.4 Model-existence arguments for inscrutability . 177 The theorem and Henkin’s proof (details delayed) . 177 Higher-order languages . 179 Matching truth-conditions. 181 5.5 Concluding remarks . 183 III Against radical inscrutability 184 Introduction to Part III . 185 The incredulous stare . 186 Ineffability . 190 Interaction with vagueness . 192 Inference . 193 Semantic beliefs . 194 CONTENTS v 6 Lexical semantic beliefs 198 6.1 The cognitive account of understanding . 200 The regression objection . 201 The cognitive conception elaborated . 203 6.2 Rational language use . 205 Lexical semantic beliefs . 207 Verbal rationality and lexical semantic beliefs . 209 6.3 Pseudo-semantic beliefs . 215 6.4 Conclusion . 218 7 Good inference and context 219 7.1 Deductive good-standing . 221 7.2 Validity for indexical languages . 223 Kaplanian validity . 224 Problems . 226 7.3 The modest proposal . ..