Can the basic principles of rationality be defended rationally? Armando Cintora Gomez The London School of Economics and Political Science PhD Thesis in Philosophy UMI Number: U158694 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation Publishing UMI U158694 Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 I l-+(£S£S F 7 °li+ o rgs>»U«1 O F POLITICAL AND ^ *9> ^ ABSTRACT It is argued that if theories of rationality are to avoid logical difficulties (i.e., self referential inconsistencies or logical paradoxes), then these theories require a minimal dogmatism, that is, some basic presuppositions that are unjustifiable without intuitions, vicious circularity, or infinite regress. Thus, it is argued that if rationality is characterized as the search for justifications then a comprehensive rationality is in the end an impossible and self -contradictory task; while if rationality is characterized by the criticizability of any position, then a rationality that intends to be comprehensive leads to self-referential logical paradox. It is also argued that there are logical limits to the justifiability of the most basic scientific methodological rules and aims, that is, it is argued that to justify our various scientific methods and aims we are required to assume without a bona fide justification (i.e., dogmatically) some basic cognitive methods and goals. These conclusions are illustrated by exploring the theories of rationality of the Popperian tradition and the theories of scientific method of various naturalised scientific meta-methodologies, in particular, by critically examining the alleged justification of our scientific methods provided by ‘evolutionary epistemology’ and Laudan’s normative naturalism. 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS 0. Preface I. Is scientific rationality logically limited? II. Can a localist and descriptive naturalism avoid dogmatic foundations? 70 III. Can our cognitive faculties be given a biological legitimisation? 93 IV. Does Laudan's meta-methodology promise more than it can deliver? (Part I) 118 V. Does Laudan's meta-methodology promise more than it can deliver? (Part II: Laudan’s theory of scientific aims) 146 PREFACE In this thesis, I explore the logical limits of argument and its consequences for rationality in general and for scientific rationality in particular. The rational attitude is at its most basic a high valuation of argument as a justificatory or critical tool, and this high valuation of argument is something that cannot be rationally defended or criticized without assuming it. Hence, a belief in the rational value of argument has a dogmatic character, if by dogma we understand a presupposition without a non- viciously circular justification. On the other hand, all argument has some premisses, so that an argumentative justification can lead us into an infinite regress, a regress that can only be stopped circularly or dogmatically. And if probative circular arguments are to be avoided, because of their being viciously circular, then we are left with dogmatism as the only option left to stop the regress. This last claim is the main conclusion of this thesis, that is, the contention that we have to accept dogmatically some basic presuppositions of rationality, in general, and of scientific methodology in particular. The theory of rationality proposed by Popper in his ‘Open Society’ and the alternative proposal of W. W. Bartley are used to illustrate this unavoidable dogmatism in Chapter I. On the other hand, Chapter II is a general introduction to the naturalised tradition in epistemology and to some of the difficulties inherent in this approach. While the specific naturalised meta-methodologies proposed by ‘Evolutionary Epistemology’ and by Laudan’s ‘Normative Naturalism’ are discussed in Chapters III to V. Most (if not all) of any value in this thesis I owe to Professor John Worrall, my sincerest thanks to him for his patient and careful advice. I must also thank the Mexican tax-paying citizen who made possible my studies at LSE via several grants during the years 1992-97. 5 CHAPTER ONE IS SCIENTIFIC RATIONALITY LOGICALLY LIMITED? Human reason has this peculiar fate that in one species of its knowledge it is burdened by questions which, as prescribed by the very nature of reason itself, it is not able to ignore, but which, as transcending all its powers, it is also not able to answer. (Kant) The Humean predicament is the human predicament. (Quine) Two related problems will be introduced and clarified in this chapter through a historical examination of some influential formulations and answers. This chapter’s special attention is given to the formulation and the answers of the Popperian tradition to the two problems at hand. The questions to be examined are fundamental sceptical ones: the radical doubts about the logical possibility of rationally defending rationality itself; of reason being its own guarantor, in particular, I will delve into doubts about the logical possibility of rationally defending our most basic procedures of knowledge acquisition. These queries ask for a rational defence (or criticism) of our ultimate methodological presuppositions. What is being challenged is the possibility of rationality as a self-comprehensive activity, an activity without regress, dogmatism, vicious circularities, paradoxes or inconsistencies. 6 I THE PROBLEMS P I: Is rationality rational? Can rationality be self-justifying or 'comprehensive'? If not, is rationality defensible rationally, i.e. without regress, vicious circularities, logical paradoxes, or fideistic commitments? In particular, P2: Is scientific rationality rational? Can scientists be rational about, or defend rationally, their ultimate cognitive aims and rules of method? In other words, can the basic concerns of scientific rationality themselves be given a rational defence? If not, from what standpoint, other than that of mere prejudice or a viciously circular one, can we assess the ultimate cognitive aims and rules1 of science? Suppose, for example, that some scientific community espouses some methodological rules; the question then arises of what underwrites these rules. A sceptical answer to this question was given by Sextus Empiricus , who argued that if we would have a basis for saying how things actually are, we would require rules or criteria to select amongst conflicting appearances, criteria that would provide us with knowledge of reality. The sceptic would then probe these rules in their turn, and show (as Sextus does in the five tropes of ‘Agrippa’) how an infinite regress is started once we ask for warrants of these rules (my P2) so that there is no fixed point, ...from which to begin to establish anything, and suspension of judgment follows. (Sextus Empiricus.) The ‘dogmatist’ then either blocks the infinite regress with something, 1 The ultimate cognitive presuppositions of science are those cognitive principles and aims underpinning whatever framework of rationality one may propose for scientific rationality, principles such as modus ponens and some inductive mle, or scientific aims such as empirical predictability. 2 Quoted and discussed in Hookway, pp. 9-11. 7 ...assume[d] simply and without proof in virtue of a concession. (Sextus Empiricus) That is, the dogmatist stops the regress by assuming something on faith rather than on evidence. A third alternative is to stop the regress by arguing circularly, a move by which the justification of the methodological rule rests upon the same rule, or when the justification of the methodological rule depends on propositions whose warrant in turn depends upon the rule at issue. The problem of justifying our methodological criteria is especially important in periods of intellectual crisis, in periods of epistemic change, when there is no unchallenged criterion of knowledge. The fundamental question then arises of how to justify the basis of one’s knowledge; this problem of deciding on a criterion became important, for example, during the Reformation and its sequel (the period 1500- 1675), because the need arose of how to recognize religious truth (if any). Protestants proposed an alternative criterion of religious truth (“what individual conscience is compelled to believe on reading Scripture is true” ) to the orthodox Catholic one (the Church’s traditional authority as the judge of correctness of Bible interpretation and any other religious propositions) and then one had to choose between these two competing criteria. One had to identify the correct criterion, that is, one had to decide how to justify the basis of one’s knowledge. The search for a solution to conflicts between criteria leads to the trilemma already discussed by Sextus: ... in order to decide the dispute which has arisen about the criterion, we must possess an accepted criterion by which we shall be able to judge the dispute; and in order to possess an accepted criterion, the dispute about the criterion must first be decided. And when the argument thus reduces itself to a form of circular