1428 EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS February 3, 1986 EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS HOW TO DECIDE ABOUT shape of a first-generation defense has borne warheads. In addition, by cheating on STRATEGIC DEFENSE begun to emerge, there have been more spe­ the SALT treaties they seem to have cifics for the critics to criticize, and it has amassed from 2,500 to five thousand addi­ become even more difficult for the layman tional ICBM-launchable warheads. Add HON. DUNCAN HUNTER to assess whether SDI is a sound idea or a 2,500 submarine-based warheads and 1,500 OF CALIFORNIA hopeless boondoggle. The SDI debate has on top of intermediate-range missiles aimed IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES threatened to deteriorate into a blinding at Europe, and the Soviet attack force num­ Monday, February 3, 1986 blizzard of technical criticisms and counter­ bers between 12,000 and 15,000 warheads, charges that exclude the lay citizen from according to a 1985 National Intelligence Es­ Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I would like to one of the most pressing pubic decisions of timate. The Soviets are adding to the total recommend to my colleagues this excellent the century. Yet the decision whether to go every year. beyond mere research must be made soon, article by Lewis Lehrman, chairman of Citizens SINKING SUBMARINES for America, and Gregory A. Fossedal, a probably this year. If SDI is feasible and we do not go forward soon, the Soviets could The U.S. has ten thousand warheads of its fellow at the Hoover Institution. These gentle­ deploy a defense before we do, achieving own, but this does not mean the Soviets men provide a commonsense approach world domination with their unanswered would have to hit ten thousand targets. The toward understanding the need for strategic system. This, then, is the time to ask what warheads are packed into a much smaller defense and offer clear explanations of many the several years of debate have taught us number of missiles, bombers, and subma­ of the questions surrounding this issue. With about the feasibility, and advisability of rines, so that the entire deterrent arsenal of the pending decision on SDI funding ap­ strategic defense. the United States and Europe-air bases, proaching this spring, I am sure this article will The first and most important issue is: Is missile silos, submarines, and command and be helpful to my colleagues. the need to switch to a defensive strategy control centers-is contained in about four pressing enough to justify the potential thousand targets. The Soviets need only two [From the National Review, Jan. 31, 19861 risks? The present system of offensive deter­ or three warheads to attack a target with How To DECIDE ABOUT STRATEGIC DEFENSE rence-MAD-has forestalled nuclear con­ confidence. The arithmetic is not reassur­ The idea of a "space shield," a largely flict for forty years. Indeed, it could be ing. space-based defense against nuclear attack, argued that MAD has averted the conven­ The standard response to this arithmetic was unknown to most Americans before tional superpower conflict that would prob­ is that no matter how many accurate President Reagan tentatively endorsed it in ably have erupted without its balance of ICBMs the Soviets acquire, two legs of our a speech in March 1983. Yet the debate over terror. Perhaps, but those who make this ar­ deterrent triad, our missile submarines and the space shield, quickened by the fires of gument ignore the hidden corollary: The our bombers remain invulnerable. The subs presidential politics in 1984, has been so balance of terror "balanced" the Soviet are hidden at sea, and some of the bombers fierce that the argument has already gone Union, a regional power with no genuine are on alert at all times. In reality, however, through several generations. In the first allies, and few allies of any sort beyond Eur­ both subs and bombers look like losers in an round, going back several years before the asia, into superpower status. It is precisely accelerating race of technologies. Reagan speech, strategic-defense advocates the possibility of mutual destruction, com­ A submarine isn't invisible. It leaves a mostly concerned themselves with selling bined with the Soviets' reputation for indif­ number of signatures as it travels through the basic strategic concept: that defense ference to the suffering of their own people, the water. Disturbances in the ocean's inter­ could enhance deterrence while holding out that has made the USSR the strategic equal nal waves, manifested on the surface, are the hope of making nuclear missiles obso­ of the numerically, geographically, economi­ the most apparent, and can be read by syn­ lete, whereas mutual assured destruction cally, and technologically superior West. It thetic aperture radar already tested by the <MAD> obliged us constantly to expand our was MAD, largely, that froze the West into Soviets. Subs create a warm-water plume nuclear arsenal merely to maintain the bal­ inaction as the Russians expanded into and also chum cold water from the ocean ance of terror. Some advocates, notably Cuba, Central America, Africa, and the floor: both disturbances are detectable from Lieutenant General Daniel 0. Graham­ Middle East. space. Other potential signals are radiation head of the High Frontier project, which MAD, moreover, has been deteriorating and effects on plankton and other marine launched SOi's public career-did make spe­ since the advent of the high-accuracy ICBM life. cific suggestions about the outlines of a fea­ capable of destroying enemy missiles in The oceans are vast. Continuously track­ sible strategic defense. And the Defense De­ their silos. In the days of bombers and low­ ing such signals is something neither side partment had been engaged for some years accuracy, low-payload missiles, there was can yet do. But with better computer proc­ in research aimed at producing usable stra­ little doubt that in the event of a first essing to fit scraps of satellite pictures into tegic-defense weapons. But, for the most strike, a substantial portion of the defend­ a coherent picture of the oceans, and with part, in the eyes of SDI advocates SDI was a er's nuclear arsenal would survive well after some honing of the techniques used to rec­ strategic concept, not a system. the attack was confirmed, assuring a coun­ ognize signatures, the Soviets may achieve Nevertheless, as the concept was publi­ terattack. MAD had some credibility be­ constant monitoring of our subs. Presiden­ cized, it was subjected to an intimidating cause mutual destruction was assured. Nei­ tial science advisor George Keyworth warns storm of highly specific, if also scattershot, ther side had a true first-strike capability, that the explosion of a modern nuclear war­ criticisms by a number of scientists. Some of the capability to destroy the other's offen­ head in the water within a hundred miles of these scientists were clearly politically moti­ sive arsenal on the ground. a submarine will destroy it. vated, some sincere. But they had a common With the advent of the high-accuracy, As for our bombers, only about one-fourth approach, which was to find concrete weak­ high-payload ICBM, the first strike became to one-third are likely to be on alert before nesses <laser satellites wouldn't be powerful a theoretical attainable goal, against which an attack; the rest would be vulnerable to a enough, ICBMs could be protected, comput­ the only defense was to multiply targets, quick strike. Those that survive would run ers smart enough to aim space weapons i.e., more ICBMs. In one sense the freeze­ into the best air-defense system in the couldn't be built, etc.) in defense systems niks are right. The arms race is fiercer, world: The Soviets have nationwide radar that did not yet exist even on a drawing more frightening, and potentially more de­ coverage, more than 2,500 supersonic inter­ board, unless on the drawing boards of the stabilizing than it was twenty years ago. ceptor planes, and more than ten thousand critics. When multiplying targets is the only way to surface-to-air missiles, fiilanced by an SDI advocates counterattacked-Robert sustain deterrence, the arms-race treadmill annual budget of perhaps $10 billion. Mili­ Jastrow was a standout here-showing accelerates. In the current environment, two tary reformers such as Gary Hart have many of the criticisms to be ill-considered or terms under a negligent President could pointed out the inability of our B-1 bomber irrelevant. And the technology itself has ad­ give the Soviets enough of a lead to tempt forces reliably to penetrate this Soviet de­ vanced, outrunning some of the criticisms. them into a first strike. Indeed, the current fense. But as potential SDI technologies have ma­ situation is dangerously tempting. The Sovi­ Nor will cruise missiles or "Stealth" bomb­ tured and as a consensus on the probable ets admit to having six thousand ICBM- ers necessarily solve the problem. Cruise e This "bullet" symbol identifies statements or insertions which are not spoken by a Member of the Senate on the floor. Matter set in this typeface indicates words inserted or appended, rather than spoken, by a Member of the House on the floor. February 3, 1986 EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS 1429 missiles fly low in an attempt to skim under lasers. No nuclear exchanges in space. We more rapid than many SDI advocates ex­ Soviet tracking radar. But the Soviets, ac­ destroy enemy missiles by throwing "rocks" pected. A few years ago, a group of scien­ cording to Soviet Military Power, already at them, in most phases so-called "smart tists critical of strategic defense published a have at least two fighter planes equipped rocks" that guide themselves to final paper, under the sponsorship of the Union with "look-down, shoot-down" radar for tar­ impact.