2016 United States Supreme Court and Circuit Courts of Appeals Case Digest (As Covered in 2 Informer 16 through 1 Informer17) Table of Contents United States Supreme Court .......................................................................................... 3 First Circuit ..................................................................................................................... 9 Second Circuit ............................................................................................................... 20 Third Circuit .................................................................................................................. 29 Fourth Circuit ................................................................................................................ 35 Fifth Circuit ................................................................................................................... 42 Sixth Circuit .................................................................................................................. 49 Seventh Circuit .............................................................................................................. 65 Eighth Circuit ................................................................................................................ 85 Ninth Circuit ................................................................................................................ 125 Tenth Circuit ............................................................................................................... 132 Eleventh Circuit ........................................................................................................... 142 District of Columbia Circuit ........................................................................................ 147 Table of Contents United States Supreme Court Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. ___ 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016) After receiving an anonymous tip concerning narcotics activity at a particular house, a police officer conducted surveillance. During this time, the officer saw numerous visitors arrive at the house and then depart after being there for only a few minutes. Based on these observations, the officer believed the occupants of the house were dealing drugs. When one of the visitors, later identified as Strieff, exited the house, the officer detained Strieff and asked him what he was doing at the house. During the stop, the officer requested Strieff’s identification and conducted a record check through his dispatcher. The dispatcher told the officer that Strieff had an outstanding arrest warrant for a traffic violation. The officer arrested Strieff, and during the search incident to arrest found a bag of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. The State charged Strieff with possession of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. Strieff filed a motion to suppress the contraband, arguing that the evidence was not admissible because the officer discovered it during an unlawful Terry stop. Even though the prosecutor conceded the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Strieff, he argued the evidence seized from Strieff should not be suppressed because the existence of the valid arrest warrant attenuated the connection between the unlawful stop and the discovery of the contraband. The issue before the Court was whether the discovery of a valid arrest warrant was a sufficient intervening event to break the causal chain between the unlawful stop and the discovery of drug-related evidence seized by the officer. In a 5-3 opinion, the Court held that the evidence seized from Strieff was admissible because the unlawful stop was sufficiently attenuated by the pre-existing arrest warrant. The attenuation doctrine provides that evidence is admissible when the connection between unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote, or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance, so that “the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated,” (the right to be free from unreasonable seizures) “would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained.” First, the court determined the short amount of time between the unlawful stop and the search favored suppressing the evidence, as the officer discovered the contraband on Strieff’s person only minutes after the stop. Second, the court held the officer’s discovery of the valid arrest warrant was a critical intervening circumstance that was completely independent of the unlawful stop, which favored the State. Finally, the court found that the officer’s unlawful stop of Strieff was, at most, negligent, and not a flagrant act of police misconduct. For the court’s opinion: http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/15pdf/14-1373_83i7.pdf United States Supreme Court 3 ***** Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016) In this opinion, the Court consolidated three separate cases in which the defendants, Birchfield, Bernard, and Beylund were arrested on drunk-driving charges. Birchfield was arrested by a state trooper and advised of his obligation under North Dakota law to undergo blood alcohol concentration (BAC) testing. The trooper told Birchfield that if he refused to submit to a blood test, he could be charged with a separate criminal offense. Birchfield refused to let his blood be drawn, and the State charged him with a violation of the State refusal statute, a misdemeanor. Bernard was arrested and transported to the police station. There, officers read him Minnesota’s implied consent advisory, which stated that it was a crime to refuse to submit to a breath test to determine his BAC. Bernard refused to take a breath test and was charged with a violation of the State refusal statute. On appeal, Birchfield and Bernard argued the State refusal statues violated the Fourth Amendment. Beylund was arrested and taken to a hospital. The officer read him North Dakota’s implied consent advisory, informing him that if he refused to submit to a blood test he could be charged with a separate crime under the State refusal statute. Under these circumstances, Beylund consented to have his blood drawn. The test revealed a BAC of more than three times the legal limit. On appeal, Beylund argued his consent to the blood test was coerced after the officer informed him that refusal to submit to the blood test could result in his being charged under the State refusal statute. The Court accepted the cases and consolidated them for argument. The issue before the Court was whether motorists lawfully arrested for drunk driving may be convicted of a crime or otherwise penalized for refusing to take a warrantless test measuring the alcohol in their bloodstream. Because breath tests are significantly less intrusive than blood tests, and in most cases amply serve law enforcement interests, the court concluded that a breath test, but not a blood test may be administered as a search incident to a lawful arrest for drunk driving. The court added that, as in all cases involving reasonable searches incident to arrest, a warrant is not required in this situation. The court then applied this rationale to the three cases. First, Birchfield was prosecuted for refusing a warrantless blood draw; therefore, the court held the search he refused could not be justified as a search incident to his arrest, or on the basis of the implied consent. As a result, the court held Birchfield had been threatened with an unlawful search and reversed his conviction. Second, Bernard was criminally prosecuted for refusing a warrantless breath test. That test was a permissible search incident to Bernard’s arrest for drunk driving. Consequently, the 4 United States Supreme Court Fourth Amendment did not require officers to obtain a warrant before demanding the test, and Bernard had no right to refuse it. Finally, Beylund was not prosecuted for refusing a test. He submitted to a blood test after the officer told him that the law required his submission, and his license was then suspended and he was fined in an administrative proceeding. The North Dakota Supreme Court held that Beylund’s consent was voluntary on the erroneous assumption that the State could lawfully compel both blood and breath tests. The Court remanded Beylund’s case to the state court to reevaluate the voluntariness of Beylund’s consent given the partial inaccuracy of the officer’s advisory to him. For the court’s opinion: http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/15pdf/14-1468_8n59.pdf ***** Voisine v. United States, 579 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 2272 (2016) Voisine pled guilty to assaulting his girlfriend in violation of § 207 of the Maine Criminal Code, which makes it a misdemeanor to “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly cause bodily injury or offensive physical contact to another person.” Several years later, law enforcement officers investigated Voisine for killing a bald eagle and discovered that he owned a rifle. The government subsequently charged Voisine with possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). Armstrong pled guilty to assaulting his wife in violation of § 207 of the Maine Criminal Code. A few years later, law enforcement officers found six guns and a large quantity of ammunition when they searched Armstrong’s home as part of a narcotics investigation. Like Voisine, the government charged Armstrong under § 922(g)(9) for unlawfully possessing firearms. Voisine and Armstrong argued they were not prohibited from possessing firearms under § 922(g)(9)