SRI LANKA: THE FAILURE OF THE PEACE PROCESS Asia Report N°124 – 28 November 2006 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................................... i I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. WAR AND PEACE ........................................................................................................ 2 A. AFTER INDEPENDENCE ...........................................................................................................2 B. 1983 POGROM .......................................................................................................................3 C. INDIAN INTERVENTION ...........................................................................................................4 D. KUMARATUNGA AND THE “WAR FOR PEACE” .........................................................................4 III. THE PEACE PROCESS 2002-2005.............................................................................. 5 A. CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT.........................................................................................................5 B. PEACE TALKS ........................................................................................................................6 C. THE ISGA AND INTERIM ADMINISTRATIONS ...........................................................................8 D. THE KARUNA DEFECTION ......................................................................................................8 E. THE TSUNAMI INTERLUDE......................................................................................................9 IV. UNRAVELLING OF THE PEACE PROCESS ........................................................ 10 A. THE PEACE PROCESS UNDER THE NEW REGIME..................................................................10 B. THE RETURN TO WAR ..........................................................................................................11 1. Trincomalee..............................................................................................................11 2. Mavil Aru .................................................................................................................11 3. Sampoor/Jaffna.........................................................................................................11 4. The failure of the military option...............................................................................12 V. PROBLEMS OF THE PEACE PROCESS................................................................ 13 A. INCOMPLETE PARTICIPATION................................................................................................13 1. Divisions within the Tamil community......................................................................13 2. Divisions in the Sinhalese community.......................................................................14 3. Exclusion of the Muslim community.........................................................................15 B. LACK OF STRUCTURAL REFORM ...........................................................................................16 C. LITTLE FOCUS ON THE ENDGAME..........................................................................................17 D. LIMITED INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT..............................................................................18 VI. THE NEW CONFLICT: PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES................................ 20 A. HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES ......................................................................................................20 B. THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS .................................................................................................21 C. THE MILITARY BALANCE .....................................................................................................22 VII. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 23 APPENDICES A. MAP OF SRI LANKA ............................................................................................................24 B. CHRONOLOGY OF THE PEACE PROCESS ...............................................................................25 C. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .......................................................................27 D. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ASIA...............................................................28 E. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES ...................................................................................31 Asia Report N°124 28 November 2006 SRI LANKA: THE FAILURE OF THE PEACE PROCESS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY After four years of relative peace, Sri Lanka has again which continued to kill and silence opponents, recruit plunged into military conflict between the government child soldiers and run the areas it controlled like a and the separatist Tamil group, the Liberation Tigers of totalitarian regime. The LTTE was also unable to articulate Tamil Eelam (LTTE). A 2002 ceasefire, negotiated with a clear vision of its future. Its dream of a separate state – Norway’s help, remains intact on paper but is flouted on reiterated by its leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran, in his 27 the ground with increasing regularity and frequent brutality. November 2006 annual speech – is unacceptable to the More than 2,500 people, many of them civilians, have Sinhalese, and to the major regional power, India, and been killed since January. Human rights abuses and its rejection of democratic methods makes its eventual political killings are carried out with impunity by both transition to pluralistic politics deeply problematic. sides. The humanitarian crisis in the north east is critical, with more than 200,000 fleeing their homes during the The renewal of conflict under the administration of year. Until attitudes change on both sides, the immediate President Mahinda Rajapakse makes any political prospect is for worsening violence. settlement more difficult. There is little evidence that either side can win militarily. Although the LTTE may The 2002 ceasefire ended twenty years of conflict, in have been weakened by internal splits and increased which as many as 70,000 died. But attempts to reach a international pressure on its fundraising among the political solution quickly ran into problems. Negotiations Tamil diaspora it remains a formidable military force, ground to a halt in mid-2003, when the LTTE suspended able to mount terrorist attacks throughout the island and its participation. Talks in February and October 2006 confront government troops in conventional battles. The failed to restart discussion of a political settlement, and conflict has spawned serious human rights abuses that on both sides military leaders now seem to be in the further undermine the goal of a peaceful settlement, and ascendancy. The initial peace deal was rushed through, the humanitarian situation has declined markedly, with with the government keen to capitalise on war-weariness thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) fleeing among the population. Although it stopped full-scale to avoid being caught in the fighting. military clashes, significant problems in the design of the process ultimately contributed to the renewal of conflict. The international community has a key role to play in restraining both sides and pushing for serious discussion The peace process was exclusively focused on two parties: of a political settlement. However, rather than engendering the government, then led by Ranil Wickremesinghe of the a new level of engagement, the resumed fighting has led United National Party (UNP), and the LTTE. President to frustration, with some donors and key players more Chandrika Kumaratunga and other key southern political reluctant to become involved. Sri Lanka more than ever elites were largely excluded from the process. Among before needs international engagement that is critical and Tamils, non-LTTE parties had no role; nor did the important sustained, focusing above all on immediate human Muslim community, which makes up some 7 per cent of rights and humanitarian concerns but with a longer-term the population. Much of the dynamic of the conflict is political view that seeks to renew a peace process taking within ethnic communities, and the failure of the peace into account the full complexity of the conflict. process to address this made a lasting peace more unlikely. This report, Crisis Group’s first on Sri Lanka, describes The process also relied too heavily on economic incentives the background to the conflict, its successive stages and and was undermined politically by opposition to the the present state of play, identifying the major problems government’s economic reform program. More significantly, that have plagued the peace process so far. It will be neither side had a clear idea of what the endgame might followed by a series of more specifically focused reports look like. Although the government promised an interim containing recommendations. administration in the north east, run by the LTTE, this did not take into account the nature of the rebel movement, Colombo/Brussels, 28 November 2006 Asia Report N°124 28 November 2006 SRI LANKA: THE FAILURE OF THE PEACE PROCESS I. INTRODUCTION dominated by Sinhalese politicians unwilling to make significant concessions to minority Tamils, has faced a brutal but very effective militant movement, which seeks