THE UNIVERSITY OF IIULL A Study Of Avicenna's Concept Of The Soul In Relation To Those Of Aristotle And Plotinus being a Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the University of Hull by Md. Golam Dastagir ('B.51. :Hons., %.5l.) July 1997 SUMMARY A STUDY OF A VICENNA'S CONCEPT OF THE SOUL IN RELATION TO THOSE OF ARISTOTLE AND PLOTINUS by l\Jd. Golam Dastagir Avicenna's psychological accounts begin with the Aristotelian definition of the soul. With Aristotle he seems to accept the entelecheia view of the soul, which holds that the soul has no activity independently of the body. But he also accepts the immortality of the soul, which seems to be a non-Aristotelian trait. These two views seem to be divergent and contrary. Since Avicenna seems to accept these two apparently contrary views, it is a concern whether he maintains consistency in his system. In order to explore this, we shall take up a reconciliation methodology. The thesis investigates how Avicenna understands and applies Aristotle's entelecheia doctrine, and distinguishes his accounts of the non-rational souls (plant and animal) from those of the rational soul (human). A vicenna is seen to have understood the Aristotelian entelecheia doctrine in two different senses in order to hold two different views of the soul--as form and as substance. This thesis examines how he begins with the Aristotelian definition and framework of the soul and slips away from the fundamental themes of Aristotelianism, and accepts certain elements ofneo-Platonism by tracing as many divergences and analogies as possible between Avicenna's concepts and those of Aristotle and Plotinus. The thesis also explores whether A vicenna, by modifying the Aristotelian sense of the entelecheia doctrine, can derive substantial arguments for the immortality of the soul from the Aristotelian tradition. We endeavour to show that Avicenna, although he modifies the entelecheia doctrine in order to accommodate the immortality view of the rational soul and attributes it to some extent to Aristotle's philosophy, does not, indeed, find convincing argumentation in the Peripatetic tradition; rather, his arguments are derived from neo-Platonism, mainly from Plotinus. This involves him in reconciling both views, selecting the elements that best suit his overall position. Dedication To my late father, who passed away when I was an IS-month old baby, my mother who raised me, and my brother Mostafizar Rahman, who shouldered my upbringing 51 Church, a fJ'emp[e, or a ?(a 'ba stone, %e Qjlr 'aan, the 13i6[e, or a martyr 5 bone, 51[[ these and more my heart can toferate, Since my refigion now is LOVE afone (Yl6u{ Yl{a). ACKNOWLEDGEl\1ENTS I must acknowledge my debt to Gerry Wallace for his tireless and effective guidance in supervising my work at the University of Hull. It is my pleasant duty to thank him for his constant good advice and critical acuity throughout the period of my research. lowe a debt to Daniel R. M. Mariau in the Department of Theology at Hull, whom I have consulted from time to time for hours, discussing various problems. I must also express my gratitude and deep indebtedness to David Walker in the Department of Philosophy at Hull for his invaluable suggestions, comments, and constructive remarks, saving me from a number of seri9us errors in the parts of my thesis devoted to Greek philosophy. I am grateful to Professor Michael E Marmura of Toronto, who read a preliminary draft of a small part of my thesis and made some helpful suggestions in general. Parts of the later drafts of my thesis were read by Professor Seyyed Hossein Nasr of Washington University, who despite his very busy schedule, has been kind enough to make a host of invaluable suggestions and comments which have prompted me to make many improvements. I consulted him on some points of Avicenna's psychology about which I was confused, and he kindly helped me clarify them. I am greatly indebted to him. It is my pleasure to thank: Constantina of Toronto for supplying me with numerous materials on A vicenna. I am also appreciative of the assistance of Ronald Paterson (my ex-Supervisor), Paul Gilbert, Brenda Almond, Peter Lamarque, and Chris Glover of the Philosophy department and the staff of Brynmor Jones Library at Hull. I am also conscious of my debt to Pat Chandler and her mother in Thirsk for their constant encouragement and the former's enthusiastic help in reading the proofs of my thesis. My thanks also go to Kathryn, who had a quick look at the final draft. I must take the opportunity to thank my wife, Khwaja Kaniz Fatema (Bithi), and my little boy, Raheeb, for their co-operation and patience. Finally, lowe a debt of gratitude to the individuals of the Commonwealth Scholarship Commission in the United Kingdom and the British Council for their responsible role, and Jahangirnagar University, Bangladesh for permitting me to compete for a Commonwealth Scholarship and for granting me study leave to do this research. iv ABSTRACT Initially attracted to Aristotelianism, Avicenna touched on almost all aspects of Aristotle's philosophy. One of them is the problem of the soul (nafs), of which his accounts reflect both Aristotle's and Plotinus's views. Avicenna's psychological accounts begin with the Aristotelian definition of the soul. With Aristotle he seems to accept the entelecheia view of the soul, which holds that the soul is an actualisation of the body having life in it, that the soul has no activity independently of the body. But he also accepts the immortality of the soul, which seems to be a non-Aristotelian trait. These two views seem to be divergent and contrary. Since Avicenna seems to accept these two apparently contrary views, it is a concern whether he maintains consistency in his system. In order to explore this, we shall take up a reconciliation methodology, focusing on the hypothesis that he combines aspects or elements from the two divergent philosophical systems so as to produce an overall position which can be regarded as consistent. Like Aristotle, A vicenna, while talking about the vegetative and animal souls, holds a functionalist view of the soul, that the soul acts in association with the body; thus properly using the Aristotelian entelecheia formula. But he also holds the immortality of the rational soul, which he sees as a substance capable of subsisting by itself and functioning independently of the body, which suggests he cannot properly apply here the entelecheia doctrine. The thesis investigates how A vicenna understands and applies Aristotle's entelecheia doctrine, and distinguishes his accounts of the non-rational souls (plant and animal) from those of the rational soul (human). A vicenna is seen to have understood the Aristotelian entelecheia doctrine in two different senses in order to hold two different views of the soul-as form and as substance. This thesis examines how he begins with the Aristotelian definition and framework of the soul and slips away from the fundamental themes of Aristotelianism, and accepts certain elements of neo-Platonism by tracing as many divergences and analogies as possible between Avicenna's concepts and those of Aristotle and Plotinus. The thesis also explores whether Avicenna, by modifying the Aristotelian sense of the entelecheia doctrine, can derive substantial arguments for the immortality of the soul from the Aristotelian tradition. We endeavour to show that although there is a tendency to attribute the view of the immortality of the soul to Aristotle, it is inconsistentent, given the orthodox Aristotelian platform of the entelecheia doctrine, to hold the two views, which are in fact divergent. Avicenna, although he modifies the entelecheia doctrine in order to accommodate the immortality view of the rational soul and attributes it to some extent to Aristotle's philosophy, does not, indeed, find convincing argumentation in the Peripatetic tradition; rather, his arguments, we shall show, are derived from neo-Platonism, mainly from Plotinus. This involves him in reconciling both views, selecting the elements that best suit his overall position, and evidently in doing so he sets himself astray from the mainstreams of both Aristotelianism and neo-Platonism. v TABLE OF CONTENTS Acknowledgements ........................................................................................... iv Abstract .............................................................................................................. v Contents ............................................................................................................ vi Preface ............................................................................................................. xiii List of Abbreviations ..................................................................................... xiv INTRODUCTION Part I THE GENERAL BACKGROUND 1.1 The Transmission of Greek Philosophy amongst the Arabs ................... I 1.2 Avieenna in the Graeeo-Arabie Tradition ............................................... 6 1.3 The Variations in Terminology of the Concept of 'Soul' ..................... 11 1.4 THE FRAMEWORKS OF THE FACULTIES OF THE SOUL 1.4.1 The Attribution of Soul to Plants, Animals, and Humans: Greek & A vieennan Agreements ................................................ 16 1.4.2 Avieenna on the Divisions of the Faculties of the SouL ............ 19 1.4.3 Avicenna's Absorption of the Greek Frameworks of the Soul .............................................................. 21 Part II THE SUBJECT-AIATTER