The Qualitative Report Volume 7 Number 2 Article 4 6-1-2002 The Technicity Paradigm and Scientism in Qualitative Research Carol J. Steiner Jitter Philosophical Services, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://nsuworks.nova.edu/tqr Part of the Quantitative, Qualitative, Comparative, and Historical Methodologies Commons, and the Social Statistics Commons Recommended APA Citation Steiner, C. J. (2002). The Technicity Paradigm and Scientism in Qualitative Research. The Qualitative Report, 7(2), 1-28. https://doi.org/10.46743/2160-3715/2002.1981 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the The Qualitative Report at NSUWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Qualitative Report by an authorized administrator of NSUWorks. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Technicity Paradigm and Scientism in Qualitative Research Abstract This philosophical paper suggests that almost all academic research, including qualitative research, is conducted under the influence of a "technicity paradigm" which values objectivity, generalisability and rationality. This paper explores, from a Heideggerian perspective, the fundamental characteristics of research under the influence of technicity and discusses how these characteristics manifest in qualitative research. It includes a reflection on what qualitative research might be like if it could escape the influence of technicity and realise its potential for inclusive and relevant knowledge making. Keywords Heidegger, Phenomenology, Philosophy, Rationalism, Paradigms, Research Techniques Creative Commons License This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 4.0 License. This article is available in The Qualitative Report: https://nsuworks.nova.edu/tqr/vol7/iss2/4 The Technicity Paradigm and Scientism in Qualitative Research by + Carol J. Steiner The Qualitative Report , Volume 7, Number 2 June, 2002 Abstract This philosophical paper suggests that almost all academic research, including qualitative research, is conducted under the influence of a "technicity paradigm" which values objectivity, generalisability and rationality. This paper explores, from a Heideggerian perspective, the fundamental characteristics of research under the influence of technicity and discusses how these characteristics manifest in qualitative research. It includes a reflection on what qualitative research might be like if it could escape the influence of technicity and realise its potential for inclusive and relevant knowledge making. Key Words: Heidegger, Phenomenology, Philosophy, Rationalism, Paradigms, Research Techniques I. Introduction Qualitative research holds the promise of an escape from smug, exploitive, scientistic, reductivist research. It has the potential to restore respect for ontological integrity and to bring worldly engagement back into knowing. It has the capacity to replace esoterica with relevance. But does qualitative research deliver on its promise; does it achieve its potential? In too many instances, it does not. This is because, too often, qualitative research places the emphasis on research , which undermines qualitative reflection. Within the philosophical framework of Heideggerian phenomenology (Heidegger, 1954/1977a ), research is the arrogant hallmark of our modern existence under the influence of what Heidegger ( 1952/1977b ) calls "technicity" ( Technik in German). This paper explores some of the founding assumptions and values of the technicity paradigm, and explicates alternative assumptions and values that might characterise qualitative reflection (rather than research) influenced by Heideggerian phenomenology. Such an exploration is needed because even qualitative researchers still seem to be under the covert influence of technicity while they overtly reject many of the trappings of scientism and positivism. While there is no reason why qualitative researchers should abandon their technicity-influenced approach, I think their accounts of their work would be more internally consistent if they acknowledged the scientistic and positivistic tentacles that still have a grip on their thinking. This paper outlines the characteristics of research under the influence of the technicity paradigm and provides some examples of how such characteristics are manifest in qualitative research. It concludes with a picture of what qualitative research might look like if it were approached with a phenomenological attitude. II. RESEARCH IN THE EPOCH OF TECHNCITY According to Heidegger, we live in an epoch of technicity. At the root of the epoch of technicity lies a belief in rationality as a solution to almost every problem, but especially to problems of control (Heidegger, 1954/1977a , 1952/1977b ). The epoch of technicity is also characterised by scientism, specialisation and abstraction. Many of these characteristics are manifest in "research," a special way of making, acquiring and evaluating knowledge based on specialisation, efficiency of knowledge production (Heidegger, 1954/1977a ), and detachment of what is studied from its usual context so that researchers can focus on the area of special interest and be most efficient (Heidegger, 1927/1996 ). This detachment is the origin of abstraction. "Research," in a Heideggerian scheme, is the rigorous, institutionalised pursuit of certainty through rational, objective representation of experience. "Research" as a manifestation of the epoch of technicity is distinguished from "reflection" as a way of acquiring knowledge (Heidegger, 1954/1977c ). Reflection is "calm, self-possessed surrender to that which is worthy of questioning." (Heidegger, 1954/1977c , p. 180) In contrast, research involves the frantic accumulation of specialist data for its own sake, as the basis for expertise and for the power to control the territory defined as the specialist discipline. To facilitate this accumulation, research relies on agreed and controllable methods for accumulating and evaluating knowledge to permit division of labour and a faster aggregation of a body of knowledge valuable to the discipline (Heidegger, 1954/1977a ). These "methods" rely on and create the characteristics of research-driven knowledge making in the epoch of technicity: scientism, specialisation, abstraction and rationalism. A. Scientism Scientism characterises research in the epoch of technicity not just because people count and measure empirical phenomena but because, from their standpoint of belief in one people-centred scenario of knowledge production or another, an entire schema of operation emerges that determines their research. Heidegger ( 1954/1977a ) calls such a schema "the rule and law of science" and says science requires "binding adherence" to that rule and law. Kuhn ( 1970 ) calls this phenomenon "a paradigm." The rule of science refers to the prescription of a domain, a set of practices and an attitude to the world. These are the equivalents of such Kuhnian paradigm elements as world view, values, techniques, symbolic generalisations and exemplars. The law of science manages the match between the rule of science and the knowledge emerging from that rule, ensuring that the rule adjusts so that it is never too out of sync with what is known. Kuhn discusses the rule and law of science in terms of how "normal science" deals with minor anomalies between paradigm- sanctioned "facts" and emerging, contrary ones. "Normal science" is characterised as like- minded members of a discipline community engaging in a respectful struggle with competing ideas to resolve minor theoretical or methodological disagreements. The rule and law of science (paradigms) create a closed system of knowing that permits what Hacking ( 1992 ) calls "the self-vindication of science": whatever science discovers or proves emerges from and fits within its closed system of paradigm understanding which is self- certifying. What is certified is what fits the paradigm understanding. If the new knowledge doesn't fit, it is usually assumed that there was something wrong with the methodology that produced it, rarely with the paradigm understanding itself. We see this concern with getting the methodology right and operating within the agreed scenario of knowledge production in debates about what constitutes good qualitative research practice across many fields that use qualitative methods (e.g., Ackroyd, 1996 ; Drisko, 1997 ; Gordon, 1999 ; Orosz, 1997 ; Rennie, 1998 ). We also see the hunger for a defined rule and law to close the system of qualitative research in support for various methodological ideologies; for example, semiotics (Valentine, 1996 ); Husserlian phenomenology (Giorgi, 1997 ; Roberts, 1997 ); grounded theory (Goulding, 1998 ; Rennie, 1998 ); realism (Healy & Perry, 2000 ) and social constructivism (Hackley, 1998 ). Each of these research specialisms equally, by virtue of being underpinned by an ideology that excludes as much as it includes, falls prey to the scientism of the epoch of technicity. For example, the world of symbols studied by a semiotician would be a poor basis for theorising by a grounded theorist or Husserlian phenomenologist who must "bracket" (exclude) their preconceptions (King, 1994 , p. 27; Husserl, 1973 ), while to semioticians, people who believe in "things in themselves" probably seem to have only a crude and naïve appreciation of their own experiences. Social constructivists believe the realist world of absolute phenomena is unknowable (Collins, 1985 ), while realists wonder