1 FREEDOM OF RELIGION International Standards During the Commission’s 2014 reporting year, the Chinese gov- ernment continued to restrict Chinese citizens’ freedom of religion. China’s Constitution guarantees freedom of religious beliefs but limits protection only to ‘‘normal religious activities.’’ 1 This narrow protection contravenes international human rights standards. Arti- cle 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) recognize not only an individual’s right to adopt a religion or belief, but also the freedom to manifest one’s religion in ‘‘worship, observance, practice and teaching.’’ 2 The Chinese govern- ment continued to recognize only five religions—Buddhism, Cathol- icism, Islam, Protestantism, and Taoism. Groups wishing to prac- tice these religions were required to register with the government and were subject to ongoing government controls.3 Both registered and unregistered religious groups deemed to run afoul of state-set parameters continued to face harassment, detention, imprisonment, and other abuses, and the government continued to outlaw some religious and spiritual communities, including Falun Gong. Regulatory and Policy Framework During this reporting year, Chinese leaders continued to view re- ligion as an instrument to support government and Communist Party overall policy goals. In the 2014 government work report pre- sented during the 12th National People’s Congress, Premier Li Keqiang said that the government will ‘‘fully implement the Party’s basic policies for religious work to promote harmonious religious re- lations, and religious people and adherents will play an active role in the promotion of economic and social development.’’ 4 Wang Zuo’an, Director of the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA), wrote in a November 2013 article that, ‘‘[o]ur Party has consistently emphasized that religious work is a key component of the Party’s united-front work, and religious people are important targets of united-front work and a key component of the Party’s pa- triotic United Front.’’ 5 Wang stressed that ideological work must be carried out by using ‘‘guidance, enlightenment, and persuasion,’’ and religious adherents are to work with non-religious people to achieve the ‘‘Chinese dream—the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.’’ 6 SARA’s 2014 work plan also noted that in 2014, religious work should reflect the ‘‘resolute implementation of the Communist Party Central Committee and the State Council’s strategic deci- sions.’’ 7 The Chinese government continued to use laws, regulations, and policy measures to control religious practices in China, rather than protect the religious freedom of all Chinese citizens. During this re- porting year, SARA issued or amended a number of legal and pol- icy measures to implement the 2005 Regulations on Religious Af- fairs (RRA).8 These measures have added more clarity to ambig- uous provisions in the RRA, but also articulated more enhanced state control over religious activities. The SARA Measures on Ad- ministrative Licensing clarified RRA provisions concerning proce- VerDate Mar 15 2010 10:46 Jan 30, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6602 U:\DOCS\AR14RELIGION_FINAL.TXT DEIDRE 2 dures for issuing various administrative licenses to religious groups.9 The SARA Measures on Administrative Punishment pro- vided detailed procedures for imposing administrative punishments on religious groups and government employees that violate rel- evant laws and regulations governing religious activities in China.10 SARA also issued a guideline stipulating that government personnel will be held accountable for misconduct committed dur- ing administrative enforcement.11 While such a guideline poten- tially denotes a positive development, it remains to be seen wheth- er authorities will enforce it in practice. Buddhism (Non-Tibetan) This past year, the Chinese government and Communist Party continued to ensure that Buddhist doctrine and practice conformed to government and Party objectives in the non-Tibetan areas of China. [For information on Tibetan Buddhists, see Section V— Tibet.] In a speech delivered at the opening ceremony of a Chinese Buddhism scripture-reading seminar held in October 2013, Jiang Jianyong, the Deputy Director of State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA), reiterated the expectation that Chinese Buddhists ‘‘raise the banner of loving the nation and loving religion, and walk in the path of adapting to socialist society’’; and that the Chinese Buddhist community must ‘‘promote correct beliefs and correct con- duct, further strengthen the building of faith, [and] oppose [reli- gious] fanaticism and various heresies . .’’ 12 SARA’s 2014 work plan called for ‘‘intensified implementation’’ of the 2012 joint opinion, issued by 10 central government agencies, that regulates the management of Buddhist monasteries and Taoist temples.13 The 2012 joint opinion, in conjunction with the 2005 RRA, prohibits unregistered organizations and religious sites from conducting religious activities.14 For example, in February 2014, local authorities in the Xiang’an district of Xiamen city, Fujian province, amassed over 100 urban management officers (chengguan) to demolish an ‘‘illegally constructed’’ Buddhist temple, resulting in a violent clash between local residents and chengguan.15 In addition, on July 29, 2014, public security authori- ties in Zhuhai city, Guangdong province, reportedly raided Bud- dhist group ‘‘Huazang Famen’’ 16 and criminally detained 15 people, including its founder Wu Zeheng, for ‘‘using a cult to undermine implementation of the law, to commit fraud, rape, and other crimi- nal activities.’’ 17 According to a letter to the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture sent on behalf of Wu, the crackdown on ‘‘Huazang Famen’’ appears to be an ‘‘extension of China’s clampdown on so-called ‘evil cults.’ ’’ 18 Catholicism During the Commission’s 2014 reporting year, the Chinese gov- ernment and Communist Party continued to interfere with the reli- gious activities of China’s estimated 12 million Catholics, who are split more or less evenly between the state-controlled church and an underground Catholic community.19 The state-controlled church continued to deny Catholics in China the freedom to accept the au- thority of the Holy See to select bishops, and authorities continued VerDate Mar 15 2010 10:46 Jan 30, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6602 U:\DOCS\AR14RELIGION_FINAL.TXT DEIDRE 3 to harass Catholics who practice their faith outside of state-ap- proved parameters.20 HARASSMENT AND DETENTION OF CLERGY This past year, two prominent members of the underground Catholic clergy who had endured decades of government harass- ment passed away. In October 2013, Bishop Peter Liu Guandong— the retired head of the Yixian diocese in Hebei province and the key figure in setting up a conference of Catholic bishops loyal to the Holy See—died at the age of 94.21 Bishop Liu spent years in prison for his opposition to the state-controlled Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association (CPA) and had been living in hiding since 1997.22 Liu reportedly was buried at an unknown location.23 In March 2014, Bishop Joseph Fan Zhongliang, the head of the under- ground conference of Catholic bishops who was appointed the bishop of the Shanghai diocese by Pope John Paul II in 2000, died at the age of 95.24 Bishop Fan spent more than two decades in pris- on and labor camps, and his final years reportedly under ‘‘house ar- rest.’’ 25 Government officials turned down a request to hold a fu- neral for Fan at the city’s main cathedral, and allowed only a small service at a funeral home.26 Over 5,000 mourners and 61 priests reportedly came to bid farewell to Fan, but authorities denied some CPA bishops access to the funeral home.27 Bishop Fan’s presumed successor, Bishop Thaddeus Ma Daqin, continued to be confined at the Sheshan seminary,28 following his public resignation from the state-run CPA in July 2012.29 Authori- ties reportedly subjected Ma to political indoctrination three times a week for an unknown period of time.30 Overseas and under- ground Chinese Catholics requested that authorities allow Ma to preside over Bishop Fan’s funeral, but Bishop Ma was not present at the service.31 In addition, in early October 2013, two under- ground priests, Tian Dalong and an unknown priest, reportedly were detained for organizing adult catechism classes in Qinyuan county, Baoding municipality, Hebei province.32 Four lay adherents who helped the priests with their pastoral activities were fined 4,000 yuan (US$640) each.33 On May 30, 2014, authorities in Linchuan district, Fuzhou city, Jiangxi province detained under- ground priest John Peng Weizhao at an unknown location; Peng was appointed administrator of the Yujiang diocese by the Holy See in 2012.34 CHINA-HOLY SEE RELATIONS The Chinese government does not maintain diplomatic relations with the Holy See, and relations between the two sides have been strained since 2011 due to papal rejection of unilateral bishop ap- pointments made by the CPA.35 Despite the lack of formal ties, Pope Francis acknowledged in an interview that ‘‘relations exist’’ between China and the Holy See, and that he exchanged letters with President Xi Jinping.36 In August 2014, China permitted Pope Francis to fly over China for his visit to South Korea, marking the first time a pope has been allowed to do so since 1951.37 During flights to and from South