Rebuilding the NPT Consensus October 16-17, 2007 Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) Stanford University Michael May, Editor P-5 Nuclear Doctrines and Article VI October 16-17, 2007 Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) Stanford University Foreword...............................................................................................................................5 Project Report: Can the NPT Consensus be Renewed?..................................................7 Introductory Comments........................................................................................................41 History NPT Article VI Origin and Interpretation…………………..……………………….…….45 Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr. The Origins of the NPT Article VI………………………………………………………...63 George Bunn National Statements America’s Nuclear Posture………………………………………………………………..69 Ambassador Linton F. Brooks Comments on Linton Brooks’ “America’s Nuclear Posture”……………………….….....89 George Perkovich Russian Nuclear Posture: Capabilities, Missions, and Mysteries Inside Enigmas……......95 Alexei G. Arbatov French Nuclear Policy Under Sarkozy: More of the Same? ..............................................123 Bruno Tertrais British Nuclear-Weapon Policy, Doctrine, and Outlook……………………………..…...137 Appendix: Abolishing Nuclear Armories: Policy Or Pipe Dream?..............................145 Michael Quinlan A South African Perspective on the Nuclear Postures of the Five NPT Nuclear Weapons States……………………………………………...………………………………….....151 Jean du Preez China’s Nuclear Posture and Article VI………………………………………………..173 Gu Guoliang Putting a Stop to Nuclear Madness………………..……………………………………187 Roddam Narasimha Nuclear Disarmament Steps Toward Nuclear Disarmament……………….…………………………………..199 Hans Blix The Instability of Small Numbers Revisited: Prospects for Disarmament and Nonproliferation…………………………………………………………………..…….217 Charles L. Glaser Comments on “Steps Toward Nuclear Disarmament” by Hans Blix and “The Instability of Small Numbers Revisited: Prospects for Disarmament and Nonproliferation” by Charles L. Glaser……… ……………………………………………………………….231 Roger Speed Nuclear Disarmament Verification: Issues and Possibilities………………………...….237 Paul C. White Thoughts on Verification of Nuclear Disarmament…………………………………….249 William H. Dunlop Appendices: Appendix 1: P-5 Conference Agenda…………………………………...………………253 Appendix 2: P-5 Conference Participant List…………..……………………….….…...255 Appendix 3: The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)…….…..259 April 8, 2008 Michael May Foreword This report and the contributed papers are the result of a project sponsored by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs with funding from the Flora Family Foundation and of an associated workshop held October 16–17, 2007, at Stanford University. The Center for International Security and Cooperation in Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, which carried out the project and hosted the workshop, expresses its gratitude to both. Workshop participants included experienced former statesmen and academics and others with extensive experience in nuclear weaponry and arms control at both the policy and technical levels. The contributed papers from the participants follow the Project Report. The workshop agenda is in Appendix 1. A list of participants can be found in Appendix 2. We are grateful for their attendance and contributions. Discussion during the two-day workshop was extremely rich and represented a number of informed and different points of view. In a number of places in our report, we refer to viewpoints presented by one or more participants, noting their names in parentheses. Unfortunately, we cannot hope to summarize all the important and relevant points made, and we apologize to those participants who may feel that a relevant contribution has been slighted. We refer the reader to the papers for a fuller picture of the various contributions. The three authors are solely responsible for the conclusions of the Project Report and any omissions. January 31, 2008 Can the NPT Consensus be Renewed? By Michael May, Martine Cicconi and Kristina Yang* I. Introduction The nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) embodies the view that the fewer the states that have nuclear weapons, the lower the numbers of nuclear weapons, and the less the reliance on nuclear weapons for security, the better the chance of avoiding nuclear war. It limits the number of state parties having nuclear weapons (NWS) to the five having them at the time the NPT entered into force in 1970. It also calls for “negotiations in good faith” to eliminate nuclear weapons entirely and indeed toward “a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”1 The treaty prohibits the NWS from transferring nuclear weapons or assisting non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) in acquiring nuclear weapons and prohibits the NNWS from acquiring nuclear weapons or receiving such assistance. It also provides for the acceptance of safeguards to verify fulfillment of treaty obligations; it preserves the right of all parties to civilian nuclear applications; and it obligates parties to “facilitate ... the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.” The NPT has not been observed to the letter but, in its essential provisions, it has been largely successful. Of the 185 parties, several ended nuclear weapon programs then under development. Four states (South Africa, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan) that had nuclear weapons abandoned them and joined the treaty as NNWS. Only one NNWS (North Korea) has exercised its right to withdraw from the treaty. Approximately a half- dozen NNWS parties did start nuclear weapon programs but then were convinced to * Michael May is professor emeritus (research) in the Stanford School of Engineering and a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI). He also is former co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation at FSI and director emeritus of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Martine Cicconi is a first-year student at Stanford Law School. In 2007, she earned a bachelor's degree from Stanford in political science with honors in international security studies. Kristina Yang is a Stanford junior majoring in economics and public policy. 1 The proposals for general disarmament have not been seriously discussed since the 1960s. In 1961, the United States submitted a plan for general and complete disarmament following calls for a new Geneva Disarmament Conference by the United Nations General Assembly. See U.S. Department of State, Publication 7277: Freedom from War: The U.S. Plan for General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World (Washington, 1961). The U.S. plan has never been withdrawn but has been largely ignored for more than four decades. abandon them. Four non-party states have nuclear weapons (India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan). The great majority of the NPT parties are in good standing with their obligations and responsibilities, and the NPT supports a number of beneficial bargains among its parties. At the same time, since the NPT entered into force, old challenges remain unresolved and new challenges have arisen. The world has changed since 1970. Outside the major powers as they existed then, technical capabilities have greatly increased, insecurities have not been resolved, and some threatened states inside and outside the NPT have resorted to nuclear weapon programs to alleviate those insecurities. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC), which was designed to provide a common response to threatened states, has failed to do so in key instances, for example, Iran when it was attacked in 1980 by Iraq. Furthermore, domestic politics in several states have supported acquiring or retaining nuclear weapons. The consensus underlying the NPT, while still alive and considered important, has been challenged in recent years by events such as the diffusion of nuclear and supporting capabilities. It also has been set back by the policies of both some of the NWS and some of the NNWS parties to the treaty and by the actions of states that are not parties to the treaty. The treaty itself places different obligations on different parties and the debate over just what those obligations entail and who has failed to meet them has been and remains contentious. A few points however are generally, albeit not universally, agreed. 1. While all the NPT member NWS have cut their nuclear arsenals or, in the case of China, kept them at a very low level, they also consider that, so long as nuclear weapons or superior threatening conventional forces remain in the world, their own nuclear forces constitute an essential element of their security. None has devised a clear road map to nuclear disarmament called for by the treaty in Article VI. 2. Four of the NWS—the United States, Russia, France, and the United Kingdom— have further broadened the application of nuclear deterrence to include state sponsors of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism, whether nuclear, chemical, or biological. 3. Several NNWS—including Iran, Libya, and North Korea—accepted aid to nuclear weapon programs in violation of Article II. This assistance came from the A.Q. Khan network, headed by the senior nuclear scientist of a non-NPT nuclear power. 4. Several NNWS hid these and other, possibly civilian but nevertheless