CIDOB • Barcelona Centre for International for Affairs Centre CIDOB • Barcelona notesISSN: 2013-4428 internacionals CIDOB 91 PAKISTAN: BACK TO THE FUTURE? JUNE 2014 Emma Hooper, Senior Research Fellow Associate, CIDOB Pakistan faces a triple challenge: from the resurgence of militant t the start of 2014, mullahs in the capital to the power struggle inherent in the go- will affect Pakistan’s future a number of Paki- vernment-military relationship, the most recent chapter being the and will have international government’s entanglement with the independent media. stan’s leading ana- repercussions. Geopolitical Alysts identified what they Countries in the region are concerned that the Pakistani military factors of concern include the saw as the major challenges and political elite cannot maintain law and order in large parts of impact of any quid pro quo to facing the country: (i) extrem- the country. Further afield, fears over the vulnerability of the nuclear be expected by Saudi Arabia arsenal remain vivid in the West. ism and violence, (ii) weak for bailing out the Pakistani governance, (iii) the econo- Should Modi choose to revert to communalist politics, negative economy with its recent US$ my, and (iv) the imperative blowback on Pakistan is highly likely, including the creation of a 1.5 billion “gift”; the poten- of a changed foreign policy window of opportunity for non-state actors. tial implications for any ex- 1 towards the neighbours. A root problem is that all madrassahs of whatever persuasion have port of jihad from Pakistan to little or no government oversight, including on the content of what Syria that might be demand- Half way through 2014, and is taught there. ed in return; and the effects at the end of the first year of of regional relationships on The failure to develop a national narrative against militancy, the third Nawaz Sharif gov- coupled with the lack of a clear, mutually-agreed, operationalised the development of a united ernment, the attention is fo- strategy on the part of the army and government to combat terrorism stance against domestic mili- cused on two of these imper- and address governance issues, is perhaps the single most important tants within Pakistan. atives: extremism and gover- challenge for Nawaz Sharif to address. nance. Pakistan faces a triple One of the most vocal independent television stations, GEO, has Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif challenge in this regard: from been charged by a range of religious leaders with blasphemy. has been head of government the resurgence of militant three times. The last time In foreign policy terms, there are signs of a recognition by the army mullahs in the capital to the that the return of the Taliban in Afghanistan in any significant form round, he was deposed in power struggle inherent in would in all probability ultimately result in a Taliban(esque) gover- 1998 by a military coup led the government-military re- nment in Islamabad. by General Musharraf. How- lationship, the most recent ever, even those who con- The last time Saudi Arabia stepped in to support the martial law chapter being the govern- regime of General Zia ul Haq, Pakistan saw the rise of an overlay of sider that periods of military ment’s entanglement with the Wahhabi Sunni version of Islam that sowed the seeds of militant rule are a root cause of Paki- the independent media. How fundamentalism in the country, and radically changed the social fa- stan’s many problems, also these challenges play out bric of the country. regard the current judicial processes against Mr. Mush- arraf as overly-antagonistic. And the Pakistan army has a strong reputation of looking after its own. The jury is therefore still out on how this situ- 1. Jinnah Institute, January 1 2014: “Thought Leaders from Pakistan Identify Key Challenges for 2014”. ation may unfold. notes internacionals CIDOB 91 . JUNE 2014 1 When Mr. Sharif was elected in May 2013, questions were In Afghanistan, from next year, without the NATO pres- raised about how he may have changed, and how might the ence, militants will much more easily melt into Afghanistan new Nawaz “mellowed” in political terms by years of exile should the Pakistani army attack them. And it remains to be - in none other than Saudi Arabia, Pakistan’s financial bene- seen how Pakistan will react should India provide significant factor. Some, however, still see Sharif as having remained an military support to the Afghan National Army. Furthermore, “unreconstructed” politician –promoting the same policies, if the chips really go down in terms of blowback on Paki- the same ideas, the same choices of self-interest over national stan, it is only the army that will be capable of dealing with urgencies, the same tendency to promote the largest, most the militants. Greater political realism will be required in this populated province of the Punjab at the expense of the rest changed international context, both within the military and of the country, as a type of extension of the Sharif business by the government - and fast: the danger of a nuclear-pow- empire– (to wit, recent Punjab to Punjab commercial over- ered nation’s “descent into chaos”, as in the title of Ahmed tures to India by his brother Shahbaz, Chief Minister of the Rashid’s eponymous book, is still unfortunately present. Pakistan Punjab). Domestically, the effects of ongoing extremism and militant From the perspective of policies towards the neighbours, the violence experienced almost daily in one form or other in way in which this triangular relationship between the mul- Pakistan negatively impact on a number of critical factors lahs, the military and the media unfolds, and the consequent including social stability, socio-economic development, and institutional responses, has more than a solely domestic im- governance. But it is the failure to address extremism, mili- pact. Countries in the region are concerned that the Pakistani tant and sectarian violence that has led to a vicious cycle of military and political elite cannot maintain law and order in creeping radicalism, to a deeply disturbing extent. Indeed, in large parts of the country. Further afield, fears over the vul- the view of one analyst cited by the Jinnah Institute: “radical nerability of the nuclear arsenal remain vivid in the West. Islamic elements have as much - if not more - power over Paki- stani society than the state” - attributed in part to the lack of a coherent narrative against The way in which the triangular relationship between militancy. Not only there is still no overall political and the mullahs, the military and the media unfolds has more military strategy to combat Islamist extremism, what than a solely domestic impact policy there exists, is selec- tive, being soft on those who target India. The upcoming change of President in Afghanistan and the ar- rival of the “pro-business” (but rightwing) Hindu-nationalist conservative BJP government and its Prime Minister Naren- The Reappearance of the Militant Mullahs: Back to dra Modi in India, will also affect –and be affected by- the the Future? seemingly perennial circle of the military, the government and the madrassah radicals who have seen an upsurge in re- A worrying development is the recent public reappearance cent months in Pakistan. Sharif’s attendance at Modi’s inau- in Islamabad of the radical cleric Maulana Abdul Aziz, cou- guration and the pro-active handshake that the former ini- pled with the apparent lack of will on the part of the govern- tiated, was broadly speaking well received within Pakistan, ment to take steps against the (relatively small number) of holding out a new possibility of state to state rapprochement radical madrassahs. This raises disturbing spectres of the pro- with India, though this initial reaction was tempered follow- longed initial period of inaction over the occupation of the ing the Indian news conference on the content of the subse- Lal Masjid mosque in Islamabad, which subsequently led to quent discussions between the two heads of state. However, the “siege of the Red Mosque” in 2007 under the Musharraf progress on any front does not entirely lie in Sharif’s hands. government.2 The same apathy is being seen again this year: on March 3 a militant offshoot group (named the Ghazi Force While the prospect of economic cooperation with the Modi after Maulana Abdul Aziz’s brother Abdul Rashid Ghazi), is government offers Pakistan a much-needed opportunity to thought to have been behind a suicide attack in Islamabad bolster its own economy, this also depends on how things on March 3 this year, which killed –among others– a liberal- play out in India itself. There is an inherent danger that if Modi’s campaign pledge to reform India’s economy does not work out fast enough for him, the right wing of the party (including the Sangh Parivar) will take over the ideological 2. In 2007, Abdul Aziz and his brother Abdul Rashid led a band of students from the agenda – which is likely to be pro-nuclear, anti-Muslim, and Jamia Hafsa seminary and others in a campaign of moral policing in Pakistan’s capital - which resulted in them being charged with kidnapping, assault and abuse. hostile to Pakistan. Unfortunately, many analysts conclude The standoff with authorities also involved the issuing of several fatwas -religious that it is going to be extremely difficult for Modi to deliver edicts- against the military campaign targeting armed groups such as Tehreek- e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), declaring any soldiers taking part to be “non-Muslim”. A on the economy in the immediate future and thus meet the military operation finally took place, during which the seminary and adjacent Lal high demands of the constituency that voted him into power.