NOTES Introduction 1. This figure is a statistical projection established by the CVR. In collaboration with the Ombudsman’s Office, the International Red Cross, and other organisms, the CVR compiled a preliminary list of 7,168 victims of forced disappearance. Of these, the CVR was able to document 2,144 cases (CVR 2003: Anexo 5). 2. This is documented in the truth commission reports that were written after the dictatorships in each country. For Argentina, see the report of the National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons (CONADEP) entitled Nunca Más (Never Again) (1986). For Chile, see the report of the National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation (1991). 3. See the final reports of the UN-sponsored truth commissions in El Salvador and Guatemala (Commission on the Truth for El Salvador 1993; Historical Clarification Commission 1999). 4. Civil society refers to uncoerced collective action around shared interests, purposes, and values. While the institutional forms of civil society are, in theory, distinct from those of the state, family, and market, in practice, the boundaries between state, civil society, family, and market are often complex, blurred, and negotiated. 5. For Keane, for civil society to be civil, it must be based on the notions of tolerance, democracy, and civility (nonviolence), otherwise it is uncivil society. In Keane’s view, the chief obstacle to freedom and democracy is the abuse of state power; in this sense, civil society is central to democracy, since it is civil society that seeks to guarantee that state power is reigned in by horizontal and vertical forms of accountability. On uncivil society in Latin America, see Payne (2000). 6. With the exception of Red Fatherland, all the left-wing parties participated in elections in 1978 and 1980, and eventually Red Fatherland also joined the electoral process. 7. For excellent discussions of racism and the colonial mentality in the context of Peru’s internal conflict, see Flores Galindo (1988) and Manrique (2002). 8. With the exception of Colombia, though it could be argued that despite its democratic political system, political exclusion through the National Front pact and other methods, including political violence, contributed to the emergence of insurgent movements. See Gutiérrez and Rueda (2004). 9. In 1990, 32 percent of the national territory, which encompassed 49 percent of the population, had been declared in a state of emergency. In 1991, the respective numbers were 30 percent and 45 percent. In 1990, 10 of Peru’s 24 departments, including Lima, were fully under states of emergency. (Comisión Especial de Investigación y Estudio sobre la Violencia y Alternativas de Pacificación 1992:90–93). 10. This argument is made in McClintock (January 1989). 11. This is discussed in more detail in chapter eight. For a full discussion of this military project, see Rospigliosi (1996). 12. On the 1992 coup coalition, see Mauceri (1995). 13. See, for example, Lechner (1992) and Garretón (1992). 14. Tilly has noted that third world states are unlikely to replicate the European experience of state formation. Bright and Harding (1984) highlight state formation as a process rather than an outcome. 244 Notes 15. On the concept of failing states, see Foreign Policy/The Fund for Peace (2005); Rotberg (2003); Herbst (1996/1997); Zartman (1995); and Callaghy (1994). 16. Migdal (2001); Tilly (2003). 17. See, for example, O’Donnell (1993, 1998); Linz and Stepan (1996); Hagopian (1996); McSherry (1997); Aguero and Stark (1998); and Mendez, O’Donnell, and Pinheiro (1999). 18. Some scholars have argued that the forces of globalization—transnational forces such as international financial institutions, transnational corporations, and international capital flows—are resulting in a withering of the state (Strange 1996). Others have argued that global- ization alters the shape of the state but does not doom it to irrelevance (Evans 1997). 19. See, for example, the collection of essays by O’Donnell (1999). 20. In reference to insurgent politics, Tilly (1978) once termed this “multiple sovereignty.” Others have used the concept of “states within states” to refer to this dynamic of local or regionally based structures of authority and domination within the boundaries of a larger nation-state (Kingston and Spears 2004). Neither seems appropriate in the Peruvian case, since insurgent groups did not establish full territorial control in their zones of influence, but as I argue in chapters six and seven, the insurgents did carry out state-like functions designed to win local support and sympathy. 21. See, for example, Favre (1984); Degregori (1986); Berg (1986/1987, 1992); Manrique (1989); and Isbell (1992). 22. In a 1989 article, Peruvian historian Nelson Manrique pointed out the difficulty of writing about Shining Path. Those seeking to analyze and explain the emergence and expansion of Shining Path would inevitably need to examine local support for the insurgents, but, Manrique noted, raising such issues left analysts open to charges of being guerrilla sympathizers or worse. In the context of war, there is often little space for even scholars to engage in such research without being seen as “taking sides.” 23. There is ample literature on these issues, particularly in anthropology. See, for example, Campbell and Brenner (2003); Suarez-Orozco (2000); Sluka (1999); Nelson (1999); Nordstrom (1997); Warren (1993); and Nordstrom and Martin (1992). 24. Interview, Villa El Salvador (December 2002). 25. On racism in Peru, see de la Cadena (2000) and Manrique (1993). 26. For a history of the Peruvian human rights movement, see Youngers (2003) and Youngers and Burt (2000). 27. Few studies exist of victims’ and relatives of victims’ groups in Peru, which were largely mar- ginalized due to perceptions that they may be linked to Shining Path (Burt 1998). 28. See Degregori (1998); Degregori, Coronel, del Pino and Starn (1996); del Pino (1992); and Starn (1991). 29. This is neither a critique nor an indictment of that literature; it merely reflects the inherent difficulty pointed out by Nordstrom and Robben (1996:13) of writing about violence: any effort to impose order on the disorder of civil conflict through narrative formations is bound to result in an incomplete account of reality. 30. Nordstrom and Robben (1996:5). 31. See Tilly (1975) and Tilly, Tilly and Tilly (1975). 32. See Tilly (1985) and Stanley (1996). 33. Tilly (1978, 1997); Tarrow (1994). 34. Informants were chosen from two basic “types” of shantytown residents: those with leader- ship experience in some community organization (such as neighborhood associations, community kitchens, women’s club, or the “glass of milk” committees); and those who either participated in such organizations as rank-and-file members, or who had no organizational affiliation of this type. To protect the integrity of those interviewed, their names must remain anonymous. 35. Though political violence has waned considerably in Peru since this fieldwork was conducted, I remain bound by my promise of anonymity to these organizations, who were often attacked by both Shining Path and government forces. 36. This survey was carried out by IMASEN, S.A., in January 1994. 37. This involved 25 additional interviews, including some with members of Shining Path currently in prison, as well as community leaders who allegedly had ties to Shining Path. My report on Villa El Salvador was published, in edited form, in the Final Report of the CVR (2003, Vol. 5, Ch. 2.16) and can be found online at: <http://www.cverdad.org.pe>. Notes 245 One The Weak State 1. See, for example, Basadre (1978); Cotler (1978a); Burga and Flores Galindo (1981); and Flores Galindo (1988). 2. Burga and Flores Galindo (1981:91). 3. In effect, Velasco sought to impose a type of state corporatism. On the distinction between state and societal corporatism, see Schmitter (1974). On the corporatist nature of the Velasco regime, see Stepan (1978). For an analysis of the Velasco regime, see McClintock and Lowenthal (1983). 4. Stepan (1988) discusses the inevitable conflicts that arise when militaries govern directly, both with the larger society and within the military as an institution, that often compel sectors of the armed forces to move toward a transition process. For a discussion of the divisions within the Peruvian military during this period, see Pease and Cleaves (1983) and Mauceri (1996). 5. On the emergence of a “classist” labor movement, see Parodi (1986); Rospigliosi (1988); and Balbi (1989). For a discussion of how classist ideologies translated into the barriadas, see Stokes (1995). 6. Oficina Nacional de Estadística, Cuentas Nacionales, as cited in Cotler (1983:21). 7. See Thorp and Bertram (1978); McClintock and Lowenthal (1983); and Mauceri (1996). 8. Richard Webb, cited in Pastor and Wise (1992). 9. While business was pleased at the procapital tone of the Belaúnde administration and eager to regain the ground lost under Velasco’s reformist regime, labor was militantly opposed to the administration. The regime’s modest attempts to mediate capital and labor interests through the creation of a National Tripartite Commission floundered when the government was unable to persuade business or labor to accept its income and price proposals. The commission fell apart, business lost confidence in the government, and state-capital-labor relations deteriorated. See Pastor and Wise (1992) and Mauceri (1996). 10. Between 1980 and 1983, manufacturing output dropped by nearly 20 percent, and idle capacity in industry rose to over 50 percent (Reid 1985). 11. Private sector gross capital formation fell from 18 percent of GDP in 1980 to 12 percent in 1985, while foreign direct investment hit an all-time low of negative $89 million in 1984 (Pastor and Wise 1992). 12. Heterodox programs were also attempted in newly democratic Argentina under Raúl Alfonsín and Brazil under José Sarney; as in Peru, they resulted in economic recession and dramatic levels of hyperinflation.