University of Alberta The United States Air Force and the Emergence of the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 1945 - 1954 by Christopher John Gainor A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History Department of History and Classics ©Christopher John Gainor Fall 2011 Edmonton, Alberta Permission is hereby granted to the University of Alberta Libraries to reproduce single copies of this thesis and to lend or sell such copies for private, scholarly or scientific research purposes only. Where the thesis is converted to, or otherwise made available in digital form, the University of Alberta will advise potential users of the thesis of these terms. The author reserves all other publication and other rights in association with the copyright in the thesis and, except as herein before provided, neither the thesis nor any substantial portion thereof may be printed or otherwise reproduced in any material form whatsoever without the author's prior written permission. Abstract In March 1954, the United States Air Force decided to give a high priority to developing an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM). This missile, when armed with nuclear warheads, became the central and defining weapon of the Cold War. Following the political controversy in the United States that resulted from the Soviet Union’s launch in 1957 of Sputnik, the first artificial satellite of the Earth, a number of historians strongly criticized the U.S. Air Force and the Administrations of President Harry S. Truman, who held office from 1945 to 1953, and President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who served from 1953 to 1961, for not moving more quickly on rocket and missile programs, which they argued allowed the Soviets to gain possession of the first ICBM before the United States. This study argues that the relatively limited power of early atomic weapons and the technical challenges involved in building long-range missiles were the most important reasons the United States government did not give ICBMs a high priority before 1954, rather than air force reluctance to give up crewed aircraft, as has been previously argued. Government policymakers and scientific and engineering experts were preoccupied in the late 1940s drawing up policies for nuclear weapons and developing bomber aircraft and aircrews capable of delivering nuclear weapons to the Soviet Union, and missiles to defend against Soviet bomber aircraft. In 1954 the advent of thermonuclear or fusion weapons with their enhanced firepower and small size caused experts and policymakers to move ahead with the development of America’s first ICBM, the Atlas. Instead of working back from the political controversy that followed the 1957 launch of Sputnik, as influential historical accounts of this period have done, this dissertation places the actions of Truman and Eisenhower Administration policymakers into the broad context of the technical, scientific, political and economic environment that existed from 1945 to 1954. In doing so, this study seeks to show how technological, political and social forces combined to lead to the creation of a new technological system, the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile armed with nuclear weapons, which became a key part of America’s nuclear forces. Acknowledgements The work of creating a dissertation involves many hours of solitary research, reading and writing for the author, but the work would never get done without the help of others. I am indebted to many people, both for making this dissertation possible and for making it far better than it would have been had I been left to my own devices. First and foremost I want thank my faculty advisor, Dr. Robert W. Smith, whose contribution began with encouraging me to pursue graduate studies at the University of Alberta. Throughout my work, Dr. Smith showed great wisdom and patience in keeping me focused on the essential points of my studies and then this dissertation. His critical attention to my work has vastly improved it. During my studies and later during the preparation of this dissertation, I was also assisted greatly by Dr. Susan Smith and Dr. David Marples. Also at the University of Alberta, I was helped by Dr. Frances Swyripa, Dr. Jane Samson, Dr. Heather Coleman, Dr. Rod Macleod, Dr. Ian MacLaren, Dr. Guy Thompson, Dr. Scot Robertson, Dr. Jan McEwen, Dr. Andrew Ede, and Dr. Rick Szostak. I would also like to acknowledge the staff of the Department of History and Classics, especially Lydia Dugbazah, and my fellow students, especially Katherine Zwicker, Brian Gold and Per Anders Rudling. My graduate studies were built on the foundation of my undergraduate studies in history at the University of British Columbia, under great teachers such as Dr. Chris Friedrichs. More recently I pursued graduate work in space studies at the University of North Dakota, with special thanks to Dr. Stephen B. Johnson, who introduced me to the topic of military missile and space programs. This study has also been informed by my work as an author, including my first book, Arrows to the Moon, on the Canadian and British engineers who built the CF-105 Avro Arrow in Canada before moving to key roles in NASA’s human space programs in the 1960s. Before I began my studies at the U of A, I was commissioned by Colin Burgess to write a history of rocketry and space exploration prior to the first human spaceflight in 1961 as part of the University of Nebraska Press’ Outward Odyssey series. My work on To a Distant Day: The Rocket Pioneers constituted my introduction to many of the issues that are covered here. The topic for this dissertation was suggested to me by Dr. Roger Launius, a former NASA chief historian now at the National Air and Space Museum of the Smithsonian Institution in Washington, D.C. Dr. Michael Neufeld, also of the NASM, provided a great deal of assistance and encouragement. As the external member of my thesis committee, his close and critical reading of my dissertation vastly improved it. I would also like to thank Dr. Asif Siddiqi of Fordham University, Dr. Bart Hacker of NASM, Dr. James R. Hansen of Auburn University, and Dr. Tom Saunders of the University of Victoria. I also want to thank the many archivists and librarians who helped me while doing their daily work. Much of the documentary evidence used in this study was obtained at the National Archives in College Park, Maryland. I also obtained papers at the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library in Independence, Missouri, the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library in Abilene, Kansas, and the U.S. Air Force Historical Research Agency at Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama. NASM provided me with some of the primary source material used in this study, as did the NASA History Office in Washington, where Dr. Steven J. Dick, John Hargenrader, Stephen Garber and Jane Odom were always happy to help. I made extensive use of the University of Alberta Rutherford and Cameron Libraries, the University of Victoria McPherson Library, the University of Washington Suzzallo and Allen Libraries, the University of British Columbia Library, the Library of Congress, the Greater Victoria Public Library, and the Vancouver Public Library. Many friends extended a helping hand, including Steve Pacholuk, Ken Harman, Barry Shanko, Sue Birge, Forrest McCluer, Martha Starr, Mary O’Donoghue, Rolf Maurer, and Tom Hawthorn. And finally, I thank members of my family, starting with my wife Audrey McClellan, whose contributions are incalculable. I am also grateful to members of her family, including Denise Thompson, Richard Bobier and their daughter Solomia, with whom I stayed in Edmonton; Sandra McClellan and Kirby O’Connor, who did many favours for me in Edmonton; and Audrey’s parents Norman and Kathy McClellan. My own parents Don and Toni Gainor were always ready with help and encouragement, my brother Mark Gainor made a generous contribution when I began my studies, and my sister Mary Gainor provided me with a home away from home in Edmonton. I greatly regret that won’t be able to share this dissertation with my dear brother Tim Gainor, who passed away just as I was moving from research to writing. Victoria, B.C. September, 2011 Table of Contents Abstract Acknowledgements Illustrations Acronyms Notes on Missiles and Terminology Introduction 1 Chapter 1: Air Power in the Atomic Age 18 Chapter 2: The Politics of Guided Missiles 54 Chapter 3: The Guided Missiles Committee 96 Chapter 4: The Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 139 Chapter 5: The Missile Czar 209 Chapter 6: The Atlas ICBM 243 Chapter 7: Sputnik’s Shadow 283 Chapter 8: Conclusions 318 Bibliography 330 Illustrations President Harry S. Truman 22 Model of the ‘Fat Man’ Bomb used against Nagasaki 24 B-36 prototype alongside the B-29 37 Gen. Curtis LeMay in the 1960s 46 Cutaway of German V-1 missile 59 Generals Carl Spaatz and ‘Hap’ Arnold 67 Army Air Forces Structure, 1946 74 Truman with air force leaders 82 Organization for National Security 92 Vannevar Bush 107 V-2 missile launch in 1946 109 Research and Development Board Organization Chart, 1948 112 Louis Johnson and President Truman 123 Thedore von Kármán and Clark Millikan 147 Rocket illustration from Dryden study in Toward New Horizons 152 MX-774 rocket 170 Launch of Snark missile 173 Launch of Navaho missile 184 Nike-Ajax air defense missiles 222 John von Neumann 247 Tu-95 bomber tracked by F-15 268 R-7 ICBM used for Sputnik-2 278 Gen. Bernard Schriever and Atlas ICBM 291 Acronyms AAF Army Air Forces (1941-1947) AEC Atomic Energy Commission ABM Anti-ballistic Missile AMC Air Materiel Command, USAF ARDC Air Research and Development Command, USAF ATSC Air Technical Services Command, USAF (Predecessor to the AMC) CIA Central Intelligence Agency FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States FY Fiscal Year GALCIT Guggenheim Aeronautical Laboratory, California Institute of Technology (JPL grew out of GALCIT) GMC Guided Missiles Committee HSTL Harry S.