1. Introduction The idea for a proposal to study the socio-economic and spatial impacts of large infrastructure projects on the periphery of Bangalore arose within CIVIC in 2005. There was insufficient information regarding the 8 urban local self governments (ULSGs) surrounding Bangalore although it was known that the most rapid development was taking place there. CASUMM’s involvement in the project dates back to November 2006 when its members started discussions with CIVIC on how such a research study could be carried out. This was also around the time that the state government announced plans to create a Greater Bangalore Municipal Corporation (what came to be known as the Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike- BBMP) by annexing all the 8 urban local self governments (ULSGs) around the Bangalore Municipal Corporation as well as 110 surrounding villages. CASUMM and CIVIC agreed that this provided a timely opportunity to understand how the transition in governance was taking place on the ground from Gram Panchayat (GP), City Municipal Council (CMC), and Town Municipal Council (TMC) to BBMP, and the larger implications for decentralized governance and local democracy. The project titled “Urban Local Government, Infrastructure Planning and the Urban Poor” formally commenced in March 2007. Research Objectives In the project we seek to understand two key objectives: 1. To study provision of basic services and large infrastructure development in 3 peri-urban areas of Bangalore (Mahadevpura CMC, Kengeri TMC and Bellandur GP) to understand the process of provision of services and the spatial and socio-economic impact on different groups, particularly poor groups. 2. To explore (preliminary) implications the transition of governance (from CMC, TMC and Gram Panchayat respectively to BBMP) will have for provision of services and infrastructure in these areas as well as for the implementation of the 74th Amendment and decentralized governance. 1. Disparities in provision of large infrastructure and basic services: In the peripheral areas of Bangalore, as in all Indian cities, an overwhelming proportion of development is what is known as ‘unauthorized’ or unplanned – ie., where the land supply system operates outside of the planning permissions and legal tenure system necessary in a master planned area. What typically happens is that over time people pay property taxes and/or betterment charges, these areas are supplied with basic services upon pressure from local people via local politicians and municipal officials, and the areas are subsequently regularized. The pockets of development which are ‘planned’ are much fewer and include layouts developed by the Bangalore Development Authority (BDA), industrial estates developed by the Karnataka Industrial Areas Board (KIADB), large commercial complexes developed by large private developers often with land acquired through the KIADB etc. The different land supply systems in operation in the peripheral areas (master planned, gramthana, revenue sites, squatter settlements etc) have a strong bearing on the nature of and manner in which basic services are provided. “Each have a different history, bring together different stakeholders and are shaped by a particular political process” (Benjamin and Bhuvaneshwari 2001)1. The key objective here is to understand the disparities in the way that infrastructure and basic 1 See Benjamin et al (2001) Democracy, Inclusive Governance and Poverty in Bangalore Working Paper 26 Urban Governance, Partnership and Poverty University of Birmingham May 2001. services are planned, developed, financed, and delivered in (planned and unplanned) peripheral areas and its impact on people, particularly poor groups. Although information was collected on basic services in general (this included water supply, sanitation, solid waste management, power, roads, health, education, and the public distribution system), the research focused on 2 sectors: roads and water supply and dealt with the provision of local road and water services as well as larger cross-cutting infrastructure like the Outer Ring Road (ORR) and the Greater Bangalore Water and Sanitation Project (GBWASP). Key questions that were addressed included: What is the impact of large infrastructure projects planned and executed by centralized state level structures (i.e, parastatals) on different social groupings especially the poor? Who benefits most from this large infrastructure? How does large infrastructure differ from basic services infrastructure provided incrementally by local municipal funds? 2. Implications of transition in governance: The creation of the BBMP in January 2007 has greatly increased the size, population and area now included in the city of Bangalore. This impinges on basic services and infrastructure needs, (the transition to new/standardized) administrative systems like property tax and accounting, planning procedures and norms, and the additional finances required. It also has tremendous bearing on political systems of representation, local democracy, decentralized governance, and the transition from rural to urban forms of local self government (i.e, Gram Panchayat to BBMP). The study explores preliminary implications of this governance transition with regard to administration of basic services and infrastructure as well as for decentralized governance and local democracy. Research Methodology The study is framed conceptually by the links between land development systems, planning, and the nature and type of infrastructure provisioning. While the basic objective of the research is to study infrastructure and basic services, we pay close attention to the links between land and infrastructure because one cannot study infrastructure, particularly large infrastructure projects, without studying land, its ownership structure, land markets and impact on livelihoods. For any large infrastructure project, particularly road projects, land is critical. The role of the state is central in acquiring land and making it available to a host of new players- real estate developers, companies, home owners, entrepreneurs etc. But this is not empty space; the land is being occupied and used in a variety of ways. The choice to acquire the land for infrastructure and industrial development is a deliberate one privileging industrial development over agriculture, developers and companies over farmers and labourers. This is a course of action that faces considerable resistance from local groups who align themselves and use various strategies in an effort to negotiate a better position for themselves. Further, there is a strong connection between ownership of land and access to water. In the peri- urban areas of Bangalore, as in many cities, there is almost complete reliance on ground water for drinking and other purposes. While anybody can dig a bore well and gain access to ground water, to be able to pump up the water one needs a power connections which cannot be obtained unless one has proper land documents. A land document via a legal form of tenure thus gives a person land rights as well as water rights (to use and to sell). Links between land development, planning frameworks and infrastructure provisioning: The way in which land has been supplied (master planned legal tenures Vs customary ‘unauthorized’ tenures) has a strong influence on the type and quality of services and infrastructure provided. This is seen for instance in the nature and type of infrastructure provisioning that occurs in the 2 two institutional circuits of land development- one centred around local government and local land developers and the other centred around parastatal agencies and large developers in a planned setting (Benjamin et al 2001). Older, unplanned, and organically developing areas like villages and slums typically depend on local government to provide services. Investments are made from municipal funds incrementally, over time, in response to residents’ demands and are channeled via local politicians, local leaders, sanghas etc. Infrastructure provisioning in these organically developed areas does not depend necessarily on being ‘authorized’; often, services are provided on payment of property and other taxes with the understanding that they will be regularized over time. Infrastructure is thus provided based on demands articulated by residents. By contrast, master planned areas are a product of deliberate intervention by parastatal agencies to shape the pattern of land development, most typically through land acquisition (of village land for an industrial estate for instance), development and resale, and the provision of infrastructure. This raises land values bringing in larger real estate players and developers who cater to higher end customers (locals and migrants). Infrastructure provided is supply- side because it is provided up-front following which customers of the property are actively solicited. There are several critical differences between local services provision undertaken by the local government and large infrastructure provision undertaken by parastatal agencies. The former is closely tied to the local political process with politicians and local leaders having a crucial role in channeling and influencing service provision. This is in contrast to large infrastructure provision which not only operates in isolation from local political actors and the local political process but actually undermines it by bringing in a parastatal culture with its economic and political alliances consisting of large consultants,