INFORMATION TO USERS This manuscn'pt ha8 bem mpmâmd frwn the micrdilm master. UMI films trie text dimctly from the 0righ.l or copy sukniï. Thur, toms thesis and dissertation copies are in typewritsr f&œ, whik othws may be from any type of cornputer prinber. ln the unlikely event that aie author diâ not send UMI a compkbe manuscript and there am missing pages. these will be noted. Alio, if uuuthocized copyright material had do be ~emavud,a nat4 WM indicate ttie dektion- Photographs hduded in îhe original manud@ have bwn reproduoed xemgraphically in this copy. Higher qwlii 6' x 9" biack and Miephobgrephic prints are availsble for ony phoaoOraphs or illurtnbionr -ring in lhis cow for an additicmal cham. contact UMI dimdy bo order. Bell & Haiive(l Infomiation and Lemming 3QO North Zseb Road, AmA-, MI 48106.4346 USA DESTINES WITH GREATNESS OR DELUSIONS OF GRANDEUR? Causes nad Consequences of Prime Ministerial Interventions in Response to International Crises by DAVID J. MEREN, B.A. (fions.) A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fiilfillrnent of the requirements for the degree of: Master of Arts The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs Carleton University Ottawa, Ontario May 17,1999 O Copyright David J. Meren, 1999 National Library Biblioth&que nationale 1+1 of,,, du Canada Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bibliographie ÇeMces services bibliographiques 395 Wellington Street 395. nie Wellington Oîîawa ON K1A ON4 O(EewaON K1AûN4 Canada canada The author has granted a non- L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive licence dowing the exclusive permettant à la National Library of Canada to Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduce, loan, dismbute or sel reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou copies of this thesis in microform, vendre des copies de cette thèse sous paper or electronic formats. la forme de microfiche/film, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format élecîronique. The author retains ownership of the L'auteur conserve la propriété du copyright in this thesis. Neither the droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. thesis nor substantial extracts fiom it Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels may be printed or othenvise de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés reproduced without the author's ou autrement reproduits sans son permission. autorisation. This thesis examines Canadian foreign policy decision-making duruig crisis situations. It compares the interventions of three prime ministea in response to a crisis: (1) the Trudeau Peace Initiative, 1983-1984; (2) the Persian Gulf Crisis, 1990-1 991; and, (3) the humanitarian intervention in Zaire, 1996. Analysis of the cases suggests the necessity of broadening the concept of "cnsis" from the objectivist, neo-redist paradigrn. Such an approach holds inadequate explanatory power with regard to the liberal intemationalist tradition in Canadian foreign policy. Moreover, any explanation of prime mmisterid interventions in re(;ponse to crises must incorporate a discussion of domestic poiitical considerations, pressure fiom extemal sources, and subjective factors such as the perceptions and values of senior decision-rnakers. While prime ministerial interventions may be laudable and even possess certain advantages, they also promote deficiencies in the decision-making and policy- operationalizing processes. These can result in a foreign policy output that undemiines the objective that ongWy motivated the intervention. iii Ackno wledgements This thesis could not have been completed without the assistance of a large number of people. I owe an immense debt of gratitude to those individuals who have supported and encouraged me during my studies at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs and throughout the process that has produced this work. To my thesis supervisor, Dr. Harald von Füekhoff, your suggestions and comments were always helpful and insightfcui. 1 very much appreciated your easy approachability, encouragement, and sense of humour. Similarly, Dr. Brian Tomlin, my thesis advisor, thank you for providing me with your observations and helping ensure that I was on the right track. A speciai mention should also go to Dr. David Carment, who assisted me in thinking through my arguments in the earliest stages of my research. 1 also express my appreciation to those membea of the faculty at NPSIA with whom 1 had the privilege to study. 1 would like to thank those who assisted me in obtaining valuable sources of research. 1 am particuiarly gratefid to those individuals who allowed me to interview them, and who provided me with their insights on the subject matter of the thesis. 1 also express rny appreciation to Tara Graff in the office of Karen Redman, MP, for her assistance in obtaining information from the Library of Parliament. 1 must acknowledge the tremendous support and encouragement of my fiiends. My only regret at having completed the thesis is that it signals an end to what has been a very special time in my academic career, and that 1 will not have the opporhmity to see these people as ofien as 1 would otherwise wish. In particuiar, 1 would like to acknowledge my niends Robert Astroff, JO-Anne Bishop, Jessica Blitt (sorry about not using your suggested title!), and Kate Bryden (thanks for seeing me through my own crisis!). Ali provided me with unwavering support, encouragement and advice that proved invaluable throughout my research. 1 also owe a great deal of thanks to the rest of the gang, particdarly Chris Hynes, Coileen Hoey, Niall Cronin, Matthew Kerby, Georgette Elston, Laird Hinde, Jonathan Yendall and the rest of the NPSIA class of '97. Thanks to each and every one of you for the good times, laughter, assistance in procrastinating, your support, and most importantly, your fkiendship. You helped me keep a tenuous grasp on my sanity throughout my studies. 1 would also like to extend thanks to my fiends fiom London, Ontario, Shaun and Ji11 Lapenskie, who listened to my (nurnerous) rants, and whose support and encouragement were exceeded only by the fiequency with which they asked the ever- dreaded question: "Are you done yet?" 1 am convinced that it was desperation to avoid hearing this phrase one more time that &ove me to finaiiy complete this work. Finally, and most importantly, 1 have to extend a special recognition to my farnily - my sister Laura, and rny parents Marie and John Meren. Words simply can not convey how appreciative and thankful 1 am for having such a steadfastly supportive, encouraging family, not just durhg the writing of this thesis, but throughout my academic career. It is to them that I dedicate this work, with my love and deepest thanks. Tabk of Contents -. Acceptance Form .................. ..... ....... ..-......-..--........ ....... ................................................LL ... Abstract ........,..,..........~.............................................. .......................................... 111 Ac knowledgements. ... .... .. .... .. .. .... .... .. .. .. .. ... .. .. .. .. .. ... .. .. ..... ..-.-. iv TabIe of Contents .............. .-.... ..., ................................... ......... ............................... ..... ..vi List of Acronyms ...................................................-.-...-....-.-.---..-..............-.-.................k CWTERI - INTRODUCTIONwwo~~w~~~~~~ow~~~~~~~ooewoo~oooeoowoweoooooowowwww1 1.1 Introduction and Research Questions ........................................................ 1 1.2 Hypotheses .. ..... .. ... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .3 1.3 Methodology .. .. ... .. .. .. .. ... ......... -..-. .. .. .. .. -. .. .. -.... .. .. .. - 5 1.4 Case Study Selection.......................................................................... 1 1 C.TER2 - CRISES C~ADA)oooewwwwowowwowwwww.weowowo~wowwœooooowœowwwww16 2.1 introduction.................................................... .................................... 16 2.2 Crisis: Towards a Working Definition.................................................. 17 2.3 C~S~S(and Canada) .................. ..............-........................... .. .-m..-.........-.... 33 CHAPTER 3 - CHSIS DECISION-hUKlNG ~~~~~~~~~~~ow.oowowoowooooowwow~o~~~~~41 3.1 Introduction. ..... ....... ...... .............................. .................. ............................ 4 1 3.2 Crisis: Immediate Impact on Decision-Making ...................................... 42 3.3 The Relationship Between the Structure, Process and Output of Crisis Decision-Making..... .... .. .. ... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ... ........ .. .... ... 53 Consequences of Centraiized Decision-Making ................................ .... 62 vi (1) Infornation FaiIures ...................................................................... 65 (2) Grouprhink ..................................................................................... 67 (3) Newgroup Syn&ome ............. .. ...................................................... 71 (4) Leader Dominance .......... ..... ....................................................... 73 (5) Polirical MmipIation ........*...... ..... ... ...................................... 76 3.5 Conclusion........................ ........,. .... .......................................................... 78 Introduction ....................*............ .............*...........................................80 Case Studies ............................, ..,....,., ............................................. 80 Trudeau Peace Initiative. 1983-1 984 ......................................