On behalf of GrandAriTour, Inc. Witness: Rashad Ismail Date: November 11, 2019 IN THE MATTER OF THE INQUESTS ARISING FROM THE 2.2 DEATHS IN THE MANCHESTER ARENA BOMBING BEFORE HON. SIR JOHN SAUNDERS FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF ROSHAD !SMAIL I, Rashad Ismail of GrandAriTour, Inc. ("Company"), c/o Myman Greenspan Fox Rosenberg Mobasser Younger & Light, LLP, 11601 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 2200, Los Angeles CA 90025, Attn: Aaron D. Rosenberg, Esq., provide this witness statement on behalf of Company and Ms. Ariana Grande-Butera ("Ms. Grande") in response to the request of Hon. Sir John Saunders, the Coroner for the Manchester Arena Inquests (the "Coroner") that Company received on September 19, 2019 (the "Request For Statements"). The Request for Statements asked Company to provide context to the relevant materials that Company provided to the Coroner and to explain the role of Company's and Ms. Grande's (collectively, "Artist") production team in respect of the security planning arrangements and the immediate aftermath of the bombing at the Manchester Arena (the "Venue") on May 22, 2017. 1 INQ025747_0001 I. SECURITY OBLIGATIONS 1. Live Nation Worldwide, Inc. ("Live Nation") was the promoter for Ms. Grande's "Dangerous Woman Tour" (the "Tour''), which included the concert that took place in Manchester at the Venue on May 22, 2017 (the "Manchester Concert"). As the promoter of the Tour, Live Nation was responsible for making arrangements to obtain the right to use each venue for the purpose of presenting the tour events, negotiating terms with each of the venues, and providing venue security in connection with each performance on the Tour. Pursuant to paragraph 6(a) of the agreement between Live Nation and Company which outlined each party's respective obligations, Live Nation was responsible for "overseeing, directing and implementing in a first class, professional manner all venue based logistics for each Tour Event such as, without limitation, (. .. 1 venue securitv. r. ..z." While the Artist team was responsible for its own personnel's as well as Ms. Grande's security, Live Nation was responsible for ensuring that the Venue itself and the patrons entering the Venue were kept safe. II. ARTIST SECURITY PERSONNEL The Artist team was well-staffed with security personnel to ensure the safety of Ms. Grande and Artist's personnel during the Manchester Concert. 1 . Ms. Grande's personnel involved in the provision of security in relation to the Manchester Concert include the following: a. I, Rashad Ismail, acted as Artist's tour manager during the Manchester Concert. My role as tour manager included managing logistics, travel, and budgetary elements of the Tour. I also acted as liaison between Artist and all other departments working on the Tour; b. Omar Abderrahman acted as the production manager. His roles included overseeing all areas of show production, including show elements, vendor and building correspondence relating to the Tour production/performance, and local labor. In 2 INQ025747_0002 addition, Mr. Abderrahman acted as the liaison between all departments in connection with the Tour; c. Robert Fontenot acted as the venue security director. Mr. Fontenot oversaw all areas of security on behalf of the Tour and Artist. Security staffing for the Manchester Concert was accomplished through a combination of Artist personnel and local personnel employed by the Venue, SMG, Showsec and/or Live Nation (the Venue, SMG, Showsec and Live Nation are collectively referred to herein as the "Venue Affiliates"). However, Mr. Fontenot did not have security jurisdiction over the entire venue; rather, the primary area that Mr. Fontenot oversaw at the Manchester Concert consisted of the stage, the area immediately surrounding the stage, the front of house "mix" area, and the backstage area. Security staffing and logistics in and around the concourses and the seating area were the responsibility of the Venue and Live Nation; d. Ricardo Hussey and Derek McKenzie performed personal security, close protection and advance security for Ms. Grande during the Manchester Concert; and e. Sean Fontenot performed in an administrative role in the security department. Ill.SECURITY PROTOCOL 1. In the weeks leading up to the Manchester Concert, there were multiple email and phone call exchanges between Artist's personnel (headed by Mr. Fontenot), personnel employed by the local promoter, Live Nation, personnel employed by the Venue's operator, SMG Europe ("SMG"), and personnel employed by the Venue's security provider, Showsec ("Showsec"). In addition, there was a meeting at the Venue on the afternoon of the Manchester Concert with local security-related staff of Live Nation, SMG, Showsec and Artist to review all security measures and procedures. 2. The purpose of the foregoing communications was to adopt a basic set of security protocols catered to the nuances of the Venue and that conformed with certain restrictions on Artist's security and other Tour personnel that were put in place by the 3 INQ025747_0003 Venue Affiliates. Artist's personnel attempted to incorporate security measures that they felt were necessary to preserve the safety not only of the Tour personnel, but also of the guests and patrons in attendance at the Manchester Concert. The Artist team requested the use of metal detectors and wands, canines, as well as mandatory searches of all customers entering the Venue. The Venue Affiliates would not agree to the wholesale implementation of these measures. Instead, the Venue Affiliates insisted on implementing a security protocol known as "dynamic risk assessment" (i.e. the practice of mentally observing, assessing and analyzing an environment while working, to identify and remove risk. The process allows individuals to identify a hazard on the spot and make quick decisions in regard to safety). The Venue Affiliates agreed to the following security procedures as their implementation of dynamic risk assessment protocol: (a) pat downs of all patrons (and if a bottleneck situation was created, then the Venue Affiliates' security personnel would switch random pat­ downs ), (b) checking all bags, (c) requiring large bags to be searched and held at the customer services desk, and ( d) prohibiting re-entry upon exit. Showsec personnel were responsible for determining which patrons should be subjected to such pat­ downs, and which bags were considered to fall within the "large bag" category. Artist's security personnel also requested police staffing at the Venue. The Venue Affiliates rejected this request. 3. As mentioned above, the Venue Affiliates would not accommodate all of the security measures requested by the Artist team. For instance, attached hereto as Exhibit A is a May 5, 2017 email from Mr. Rik Weightman's (Live Nation's UK representative) to Mr. Fontenot 1 in response to requests from Artist's production team for additional security measures at the Venue in addition to the Venue Affiliates' implementation of the dynamic risk assessment protocol. Mr. Weightman stated that customer searches with magnetic wands were not standard in some of the venues within the United Kingdom. In response to this email, Mr. Fontenot had further telephone conversations with the Venue Affiliates to insist on obtaining the magnetic wands, regardless of the cost. However, the Venue Affiliates denied the request, and pat down searches were instead implemented by the Venue Affiliates. I [INQ020175] 4 INQ025747_0004 4. Once the Venue Affiliates' security policies were established, Mr. Weightman filled out the document titled "Ariana Grande Local Show Information Sheet - Manchester: titled Ariana Grande Dangerous Woman Tour 2017", dated 22 May 20172, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit B (referred to herein as the "Security Advance"). The Security Advance summarizes security procedures for local staff deployment, protocol for concert attendees entering the venue, and provides an outline of accreditation to familiarize local staff. It is to be used by the security departments for quick reference on the date of the Manchester Concert. Prior to submitting the Security Advance to the Coroner to disclose to the so-called "Interested Persons" (as defined by the Coroner), a note was added by Artist's representatives to clarify that security measures and police presence are the responsibility of the Venue. As mentioned throughout this statement, the Artist's security personnel was not responsible for security staffing and logistics throughout the Venue and in and around the concourses and the seating area; this was the responsibility of the Venue Affiliates. 5. A more detailed security rider, map of security placement around the stage during the performance, and a sample pass sheet (collectively, "Security Package") was also circulated to all relevant security personnel of the Venue Affiliates and Artist. The security rider contains Artist's security policies, including the time that staff should be deployed, the number of staff to be deployed, and where they should be deployed (which is also clearly depicted by the map). The sample pass sheet outlines the different types of credentials and what type of access each pass/credential allows. A copy of the Security Rider is attached hereto as Exhibit C. 6. On the day of the Manchester Concert, the typical day-of-show security briefing was held at around 1 :30pm local time. Security protocol was reiterated, and, based on the assessment of the Venue Affiliates and the Artist team, it was determined that there were no imminent threats to the performance area, backstage area, parking area, and areas of Artist entry and egress. 2 [INQ020187] 5 INQ025747_0005 IV. EMERGENCY RESPONSE IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE BOMBING [Not relevant to Chapter 7] V. DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 1. In response to the Coroner's Request For Statements, all relevant Artist representatives and personnel who were involved and/or responsible for the Tour's security protocols during the Manchester Concert were contacted and were asked to provide any and all potentially relevant materials in their possession (e.g.