UvA-DARE (Digital Academic Repository) Reminders of duty: A Kantian theory of blame Scholten, M. Publication date 2016 Document Version Other version License Other Link to publication Citation for published version (APA): Scholten, M. (2016). Reminders of duty: A Kantian theory of blame. General rights It is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), other than for strictly personal, individual use, unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons). Disclaimer/Complaints regulations If you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please Ask the Library: https://uba.uva.nl/en/contact, or a letter to: Library of the University of Amsterdam, Secretariat, Singel 425, 1012 WP Amsterdam, The Netherlands. You will be contacted as soon as possible. UvA-DARE is a service provided by the library of the University of Amsterdam (https://dare.uva.nl) Download date:30 Sep 2021 Bibliography Allison, Henry. 1990. Kant’s Theory of Freedom. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ———. 2004. Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense. New Haven: Yale University Press. American Psychiatric Organization. 2013. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition. Washington DC: American Psychiatric Organization. ———. 1994. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition. Washington DC: American Psychiatric Organization. Arneson, Richard. 2007. “The Smart Theory of Moral Responsibility and Desert.” In Desert and Justice, edited by Serena Olsaretti. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 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