POLITICAL PARTY FINANCE REFORM AND THE RISE OF DOMINANT PARTY IN EMERGING DEMOCRACIES: A CASE STUDY OF THAILAND By Thitikorn Sangkaew Submitted to Central European University - Private University Department of Political Science In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science Supervisor: Associate Professor Matthijs Bogaards CEU eTD Collection Vienna, Austria 2021 ABSTRACT The dominant party system is a prominent phenomenon in emerging democracies. One and the same party continues to govern the country for a certain period through several consecutive multi-party elections. Literature on this subject has tended to focus on one (set) of explanation(s) deduced from electoral model, but the way a certain party dominates electoral politics at the outset of democratization remains neglected. Alternatively, this thesis highlights the importance of the party finance model, arguing that it can complement the understanding of one-party dominance. To evaluate this argument, the thesis adopts a complementary theories approach of the congruence analysis as its strategy. A systematic empirical analysis of the Thai Rak Thai party in Thailand provides support for the argument of the thesis. The research findings reveal that the party finance regime can negatively influence the party system. Instead of generating equitable party competition and leveling the playing field, it favors major parties while reduces the likelihood that smaller parties are more institutionalized and competed in elections. Moreover, the party finance regulations are not able to mitigate undue influence arising from business conglomerates. Consequently, in combination with electoral rules and party regulations, the party finance regime paves the way for the rise and consolidation of one- party dominance. The findings also suggest that well-intended reformers need to take the more equalizing party finance regime into account if they want to tackle the issue of the dominant- party system in new democracies. CEU eTD Collection i ACKNOWLEDGEMENT Writing a thesis on the old topic from new perspectives appears a challenging task for me as a student. It is even more difficult during the COVID-19 pandemic and lockdown regulations. First and foremost, I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor, Matthijs Bogaards for his guidance and dedication throughout the process of writing the thesis. He drew me from focusing solely on country expertise to broader comparative perspectives, which ultimately result in this thesis. I also would like to thank Attasit Pankaew, my professor from Thammasat University, for providing the Thai election dataset, useful advice, and other support. Bordin Saisaeng from Mahidol University was the one who helped me to collect numerous published documents from Thailand. I am grateful to my family (including “T”) and friends for their support. Without these relevant persons, the thesis would not be that as it may. CEU eTD Collection ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction......................................................................................................................... 1 Chapter 1 Theoretical Background .................................................................................... 6 1.1 Dominant Party and Dominant Party System ............................................................... 6 1.1.2 Identifying Party Dominance ................................................................................. 6 1.1.2 Definition of Dominant Party System .................................................................... 8 1.1.3 The Approaches for One-Party Dominance............................................................ 9 1.2 Electoral Model ......................................................................................................... 12 1.2.1 The Explanatory Power of Electoral System ........................................................ 12 1.2.2 Electoral Rules and Dominant Party System ........................................................ 14 1.3 Party Finance Model .................................................................................................. 15 1.3.1 Defining Party Finance ........................................................................................ 15 1.3.2 The Effects of Party Finance................................................................................ 15 1.3.3 The Concept of Party Finance Regime ................................................................. 17 Chapter 2 Explaining Thai Rak Thai Party Through Electoral Lens ............................ 20 2.1 Party System and Electoral Reform under the 1997 Constitution ................................ 20 2.2 The Consequence of Electoral System on the TRT’s Dominant Party......................... 22 2.3 Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 28 Chapter 3 Explaining Thai Rak Thai Party Through Party Finance Lens .................... 29 3.1 Money Politics and Party Finance Reform under the 1997 Constitution ..................... 29 3.2 The Consequence of Party Finance Reform on the TRT’s Dominant Party ................. 31 3.3 Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 37 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 39 References.......................................................................................................................... 44 CEU eTD Collection iii LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES Figure 1: Effective Number of Parties in Thailand between 1988 and 2019 .......................... 2 Figure 2: Comparison of the TRT and DP’ Revenue from PPDF and Private Donations between 1999 and 2006 ....................................................................................... 35 Table 1: Election Indices in Thailand between 1996 and 2011 ........................................... 24 Table 2: Compared Parliamentary Seats with 5% and 1% Thresholds in the 2001 and 2005 Elections ..................................................................................................... 27 Table 3: Party Finance Data of the TRT and DP from 1999 to 2007 (in US Dollar) ........... 33 CEU eTD Collection iv LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS DP Democrat Party ECT Election Commission of Thailand ENP Effective Number of Parties MMC Multi-Member Constituency Plurality system MMM Mixed-Member Majoritarian system MMP Mixed-Member Proportional system PPDF Political Party Development Fund PR Proportional Representation system SMC Single-Member Constituency Plurality system TRT Thai Rak Thai party (Thais Love Thai) CEU eTD Collection v INTRODUCTION The emergence of a dominant party is not a new issue in new democracies. It has been considered a threat to the democratization process because one-party dominance reduces competitiveness, lacks alternation, blurs the line between party and state, encourages corruption and self-centered behaviors with an ineffective checking system (Boucek and Bogaards 2010, 3). Scholars conventionally argue that electoral system is responsible for the rise of party dominance (e.g., Boucek 1998; Greene 2007; Magaloni 2006; Arslantas et al. 2020). Alternatively, many empirical studies reveal that party finance contributes to party dominance, generates an uneven playing field, and sustains political corruption (Magolowondo et al. 2012; Gowda and Sridharan 2012; Williams 2000; Serra 2016; Mietzner 2015; Norris and Van Es 2016). Keeping parties away from the issues, party finance reform is introduced to limit contributions/expenditures, to require disclosure of financial flow, and to provide public subsidies (Norris and Abel Van Es 2016: 7). However, the specific ways in which party finance complement electoral model remains understudied. To bridge the electoral system and party finance explanations, this thesis selects the Thai Rak Thai party (TRT) in Thailand between 2001 and 2006 as a case study. Under the 1997 constitutional reform, the rise of TRT brought about a new type of political party, i.e., “a business-firm party” (International IDEA 2014, 94). It was founded and funded by the media mogul and billionaire Thaksin Shinawatra, won two consecutive landslide elections, and was then abolished in 2007 after a military coup. The TRT won almost half the CEU eTD Collection seats in the 2001 election, formed a coalition government with a few tiny parties, and 75 percent in the 2005 polls (Chambers and Croissant 2010, 6). Figure 1 illustrates that the effective number of parliamentary parties (ENPP) decreased considerably from 4.3 in 1996 to 1.6 in 2005 when the TRT could form a one-party government. This can be interpreted as less than 1 two parties that have relative strength in the parliament. It is no doubt that the TRT is obvious evidence of a dominant party. Figure 1: Effective Number of Parties in Thailand between 1988 and 2019 12 9.8 10 8 6.6 6.8 7.8 6.2 6 6.1 6.2 4.5 4.1 5.6 3.7 4 4.3 2.9 2.4 Effective Number of Partiesof Number Effective 3.1 2 2.8 2.6 1.6 0 1988 1992 1995 1996 2001 2005 2007 2011 2019 Election Years ENEP (votes) ENPP (seats) Sources: Chambers and Croissant (2010); the author's calculation1 In response to such a phenomenon, literature on contemporary Thai politics addresses two main competing explanations: electoral model and personalistic explanation. On the one hand, the electoral