CSIS _______________________________ Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street N.W. Washington, DC 20006 (202) 775 -3270 Access: Web: CSIS.ORG Contact the Author: [email protected] Iraq’s Evolving Insurgency Anthony H. Cordesman Center for Strategic and International Studies With the Assistance of Patrick Baetjer Working Draft: Updated as of June 23, 2005 Please note that this is part of a rough working draft of a CSIS book that will be published by Praeger in the fall of 2005. It is being circulated to solicit comments and additional data, and will be steadily revised and updated over time. Copyright CSIS, all rights reserved. All further dissemination and reproduction must be done with the written permission of the CSIS Cordesman: Iraq’s Evolving I nsurgency 6/23 /05 Page ii I. INTRO DUCTION ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ ..... 1 SADDAM HUSSEIN ’S “P OWDER KEG ” ................................ ................................ ................................ ......... 1 AMERICA ’S STRATEGIC MISTAKES ................................ ................................ ................................ ............. 2 AMERICA ’S STRATEGIC MISTAKES ................................ ................................ ................................ ............. 6 II. THE GROWTH AND C HARACTER OF THE INSURGENT THREAT ................................ ...... 10 DENIAL AS A METHOD OF COUNTER -INSURGENCY WARFARE ................................ ................................ 10 FAILING TO ADMIT THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM THOUGH MID -2004 ................................ ...................... 10 EVOLVING THREAT TACTICS AND PRES SURE ON GOVERNMENT FORCES ................................ ................. 11 POLITICAL , P SYCHOLOGICAL , AND INFORMATION WARFARE LESSONS ................................ ................... 13 LESSONS ABOUT METHODS OF ATTACK AND COMBAT ................................ ................................ ............ 18 IRAQI -US A SYMMETRIC INTERACTIO N AND NON -INTEROPERABILITY ................................ ..................... 24 III. THE EVOLVING NA TURE OF THE INSURGEN CY ................................ ................................ ... 25 AN UNSTABLE MIX OF THREATS ................................ ................................ ................................ .............. 25 THE UNCERTAIN CYCLES AND PATTERNS IN THE INSURGENCY ................................ ................................ 26 Uncertain Claims the Insurgency is Losing Ground ................................ ................................ ........... 27 Uncertain Trends in the Numbers ................................ ................................ ................................ ....... 28 THE LIMITS TO THE INSURGENCY ................................ ................................ ................................ ............. 34 THE CONTINUING THREAT ................................ ................................ ................................ ....................... 35 Estimates of the Size of Threat Forces ................................ ................................ ................................ 35 Comparisons of Threat and Iraqi Forces ................................ ................................ ............................ 36 THE MEANING OF COALITION VICTORIES AND INSURGENT DEFEATS ................................ ....................... 36 THE DOMINANT ROLE OF IRAQI SUNNI ARAB INSURGENTS ................................ ................................ ..... 38 BA’ATHISTS ,” E X-REGIME LOYALISTS AND /OR “S UNNI NATIONALISTS ”................................ ................. 39 Ba’athists, Non -Ba’athists, or Semi -Ba’athists? ................................ ................................ ................. 39 Guesstimates and the "Numbers Game" ................................ ................................ ............................. 41 The Crime Problem ................................ ................................ ................................ ............................. 42 The Intelligence and Security Problem ................................ ................................ ............................... 42 Inclusion versus Exclusion ................................ ................................ ................................ .................. 43 ISLAMIST GROUPS AND OUTSIDE VOLUNTEERS ................................ ................................ ....................... 44 The US State Department Assessment of Zarqawi ................................ ................................ .............. 44 Zarqawi Operations in 2005 ................................ ................................ ................................ ............... 46 Zarqawi and Suicide Bombings and Volun teers ................................ ................................ ................. 47 Zarqawi and “Weapons of Mass Media” ................................ ................................ ........................... 48 Zarqawi Ties to Bin Laden and Outside Sunni Islamist Groups ................................ ......................... 49 Zarqawi and Syria ................................ ................................ ................................ ............................... 50 SUNN I IRAQI NATIONALIST VERSUS SUNNI ISLAMIC EXTREMIST , OR DE FACTO COOPERATION ? ............ 51 THE UNCERTAIN STATUS OF THE SHI ’ITES ................................ ................................ ............................... 52 The Role of Moqtada al -Sadr ................................ ................................ ................................ .............. 53 The Role of Oth er Shi’ite Factions ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 54 Insurgent Pressure to Move Toward Civil War ................................ ................................ .................. 55 THE KURDS AND OTHER MINORITIES ................................ ................................ ................................ ....... 56 THE ROLE OF CRIME AND CRIMINALS ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 58 THE PROBLEM OF SYRIA ................................ ................................ ................................ ........................... 59 THE PROBLEM OF IRAN ................................ ................................ ................................ ............................ 62 IRAQI VIEWS OF THE THREAT ................................ ................................ ................................ ................... 64 INCLUSION VERSUS CONFLICT ................................ ................................ ................................ .................. 65 Shi’ite Resistance to Sectar ian Conflict ................................ ................................ .............................. 66 The Uncertain Role of Iraq’s Sunnis ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 66 INSURGENCY AND THE EFFECTIVENESS AND VISIBILITY OF IRAQI MILITARY , S ECURITY , AND POLICE FORCES ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ ..................... 69 Copyright CSIS, all rights reserved. All further dissemination and reproduction must be done with the written permission of th e CSIS Cordesman: Iraq’s Evolving I nsurgency 6/23 /05 Page iii Copyright CSIS, all rights reserved. All further dissemination and reproduction must be done with the written permission of th e CSIS Cordesman: Iraq’s Evolving I nsurgency 6/23 /05 Page iv Table of F igures Figure 1 ................................ ................................ ................................ ............................. 13 Illustrative Patterns in Targeting and Casualties (September 2003 -October 2004) ......... 13 Figure 2 ................................ ................................ ................................ ............................. 32 Approximate Number of Major Attacks Per Month: June 2003 -February 2005 .............. 32 Figure 3 ................................ ................................ ................................ ............................. 33 Approximate Number of US Killed and Wounded: June 2003 -April 2005 ..................... 33 Copyright CSIS, all rights reserved. All further dissemination and reproduction must be done with the written permission of th e CSIS I. Introduction The fall of Saddam Hussein would have exposed deep fracture lines in an impoverished Iraq, almost regardless of how it occurred. One key legacy of the British “divide and rule” tactics that formed the state was minority Arab Sunni rule over a state that had come to have an Arab Shi’ite majority of some 60% of the population, and Kurdish, Turcoman, and other minorities that made up another 20%. Iraq’s violent politics had further compounded these problems by bring a leader to power who never tolerated political dissent, and began the bloody purging and suppression of all organized political resistance when he took full power in 1979. Saddam Hussein’s “Powder keg” Iraq came to be ruled by a small, largely rural Sunni Arab elite that used the Ba’ath Party and the state to maint ain itself in power. Its economy remained