DIVISIONS IN SUDAN’S RULING PARTY AND THE THREAT TO THE COUNTRY’S FUTURE STABILITY Africa Report N°174 – 4 May 2011 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................................... i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT: A FRONT SEEKING AN ISLAMIC STATE .......... 2 A. CREATING A SUDANESE IDENTITY ............................................................................................... 2 B. EXPANSION TO AN ISLAMIC FRONT .............................................................................................. 3 1. Infiltration of the security apparatus ............................................................................................ 4 2. Organisation and consolidation during Nimeri’s regime ............................................................. 4 3. Lost opportunity: The Koka-Dam Declaration ............................................................................ 5 4. The NIF frustrated: The third democratic period, 1986-1989 ...................................................... 6 5. The decision to take power .......................................................................................................... 7 III. THE SALVATION REGIME 1989-2000 ........................................................................ 8 A. PARALLEL SYSTEMS OF GOVERNANCE – THE NIF AND THE STATE .............................................. 8 B. THE POLITICAL ORGANISATION – THE NATIONAL CONGRESS .................................................... 10 C. THE SPLIT .................................................................................................................................. 11 IV. CORRUPTION OF POWER AND MONEY: THE SECOND DECADE OF THE “ISLAMIST” REGIME .................................................................................. 13 A. CENTRALISATION OF POWER ...................................................................................................... 13 B. THE SECURITY SERVICES ........................................................................................................... 14 C. FRUSTRATIONS AFTER THE APRIL 2010 ELECTIONS – COLLAPSE OF THE SHURA ........................ 15 D. REWARDS AND PATRONAGE ...................................................................................................... 17 1. The economy of the Islamists .................................................................................................... 17 2. Selective rewards ....................................................................................................................... 19 3. The federal governance system .................................................................................................. 20 V. NCP SURVIVAL IN THE WAKE OF THE SOUTH’S SECESSION ...................... 21 A. ANOTHER LOST OPPORTUNITY – THE CPA ................................................................................ 21 B. CHALLENGES FACING THE NORTH ............................................................................................. 22 1. A divided party lacking a coherent vision ................................................................................. 22 2. Manipulating the international community ................................................................................ 24 3. The savannah belt – the new South? .......................................................................................... 24 4. The need for reform ................................................................................................................... 27 5. What the international community can do ................................................................................. 29 VI. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 30 APPENDICES A. MAP OF SUDAN WITH 1956 NORTH-SOUTH BORDER ....................................................................... 31 B. GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND PERSONALITIES ...................................................................................... 32 C. GLOSSARY OF MAIN PARTIES, ORGANISATIONS AND ACTS .............................................................. 34 D. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .................................................................................... 37 E. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON AFRICA SINCE 2008 ..................................................... 38 F. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES ................................................................................................ 40 Africa Report N°174 4 May 2011 DIVISIONS IN SUDAN’S RULING PARTY AND THE THREAT TO THE COUNTRY’S FUTURE STABILITY EXECUTIVE SUMMARY When the South officially secedes, on 9 July 2011, the Bashir, Nafie and the security hardliners have concluded North’s problems will change little. The National Con- that the opposition parties are very weak and reject their gress Party (NCP) has not addressed the root causes of call for a more inclusive constitutional conference to draft Sudan’s chronic conflicts and has exacerbated ethnic a permanent constitution after the South secedes in July. and regional divisions. Facing multiple security, political, They think they have the situation in Darfur under control social and economic challenges, it is deeply divided over and discount the possibility of conflict in the transitional the way forward. Its security hardliners see these as minor areas of Southern Kordofan and the Blue Nile, believing issues, not imminent threats to their survival, and remain that those regions are divided, and their military forces are committed to a military solution to chronic instability. not an imminent threat to Khartoum now that the South is Others call for internal party reform – a “second republic” focused on other issues. They continue to pursue divide – to address the NCP’s problems but are giving little and rule tactics to prevent the emergence of a unified thought to resolving those of the country. The party has counterweight to NCP dominance of the centre. Taha and mobilised its security apparatus to suppress any revolts, more pragmatic allies are willing to negotiate with other has decided to end the debate about Sudan’s diversity and political forces but are undermined by the security hard- identity, remains committed to an Arab-Islamic identity liners. They also seemingly remain committed to the party’s for all Sudanese and keeping Sharia and is ready to sub- goal of imposing an Arab-Islamic identify on all of what divide key states to accommodate political barons. These remains of Sudan – an extremely divisive issue in a country are ad-hoc decisions that set the stage for continued vio- that still includes hundreds of ethnic and linguistic groups. lence that may not be containable and could lead to fur- ther fragmentation of the country. In the absence of accountability, the leadership enjoys ab- solute freedom and has institutionalised corruption to its Power is now increasingly centralised in a small clique benefit, in the process rewarding political barons who can around President Bashir. However, this centralisation is deliver their constituencies by giving them lucrative gov- not reflected in the armed forces. Concerned about a pos- ernment positions to maintain their loyalty. The governors sible coup, he and close associates have fragmented the of each state run their own patronage network within their security services and have come to rely increasingly on respective regions. personal loyalty and tribal allegiances to remain in power. Meanwhile, their party has been allowed to flounder, hav- Despite the seemingly successful conclusion of the 2005 ing long ago lost its strategic vision and policy coherence. Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the accord has Deeply divided and more concerned with staying in power, failed to resolve the issues that drive chronic conflict in the leadership more often reacts to events rather than im- Sudan. It was intended to lead to the “democratic trans- plements a well-thought-out national program. This is best formation” of the country. However, during its six year illustrated by the protracted, very public dispute between interim period (to end formally in July), the NCP resisted Nafie Ali Nafie (NCP deputy chairman for organisational meaningful implementation of many provisions, because affairs and presidential adviser) and Ali Osman Taha they would seriously threaten its grip on power. The op- (second vice president of Sudan) and the wildly diverging portunity to maintain Sudan’s unity and to establish a sta- statements made by party leaders in the run-up to the South’s ble, democratic state was lost. Not surprisingly, South- self-determination referendum. The recent dismissal from erners chose separation when they voted in January 2011. his posts of the formerly powerful Salah Gosh reflects di- visions within the NCP that have the potential to lead to The remainder of the country thus remains saddled with the party’s collapse or a coup. the “Sudan Problem”, where power, resources and devel- opment continue to be overly concentrated in the centre, Divisions in Sudan’s Ruling Party and the Threat to the Country’s Future Stability Crisis Group Africa Report N°174, 4 May 2011 Page ii at the expense of and to the exasperation of the peripher- ies. A “new south”