Justification and Application Remarks on Discourse Ethics J iirgen Habermas translated by Ciaran Cronin The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England Third printing,2001 First MITPress paperback edition, 1994 This edition © 1993 Massachusetts Institute of Technology. This English version includes three essays that were published in Erliiuterungen zur Diskursethik, © 1991 Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, Germany, and two additional pieces. The essay "To Seek to Salvage an Unconditional Meaning without God Is a Futile Undertaking: Reflections on a Remark of Max Horkheimer" was prepared for a festschrift in honor of Alfred Schmidt. The interview with Torben Hviid Nielsen was published in Die nachholende Revolution, volume 7 of Habermas'sKleine Polilische Schriften, © 1990 Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, Germany. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from the publisher. This book was set in Baskerville by DEKR Corporation and was printed and bound in the United States of America. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Habermas,Jii rgen. Justification and application : remarks on discourse ethics I Jiirgen Habermas; translated by Ciaran Cronin. p. em. - (Studies in contemporary German social thought) "Includes three essays that were published in Erlauterungen zur Diskursethik .. and two additional pieces"-T.p. verso. Includes bibliographical references and index. Contents: On the pragmatic, the ethical, and the moral employments of practical reason - Remarks on discourse ethics - Lawrence Kohlberg and neo-Aristotelianism - To seek to salvage an unconditional meaning without God is a futile undertaking - Morality, society, and ethics : an interview with Torben Hviid Nielsen. ISBN 0-262-08217-9 (HB), 0-262-58136-1 (PB) I. Ethics. 2. Habermas, Jiirgen-Interviews. 3. Habermas,Jiirgen­ Ethics. I. Habermas, Jiirgen. Erlauterungen zur Diskursethik. II. Title. III. Title: Discourse ethics. IV. Series. BJ 1114.H264 1993 170--dc20 92-36599 CIP Contents Preface VII Translator's Note IX Translator's Introduction x1 I On the Pragmatic, the Ethical, and the Moral Employments of Practical Reason 1 2 Remarks on Discourse Ethics 19 3 Lawrence Kohlberg and Neo-Aristotelianism 113 4 To Seek to Salvage an Unconditional Meaning Without God Is a Futile Undertaking: Reflections on a Remark of Max Horkheimer 133 5 Morality, Society, and Ethics: An Interview with Torben Hviid Nielsen 147 Notes 177 Index 189 Preface With this book I continue the investigations set forth in Moral Con­ sciousness and Communicative Action ( 1990). The background to the discussion is formed primarily by objections against universalistic concepts of morality that can be traced back to Aristotle, Hegel, and contemporary [ethical] contextualism. Going beyond the sterile op­ position between abstract universalism and a self-contradictory rela­ tivism, I endeavor to defend the primacy of the just (in the deontological sense) over the good. That does not mean, however, that ethical questions in the narrow sense have to be excluded from rational treatment. It is my hope that these essays reflect a learning process. This holds at any rate for the explicit distinction between moral and ethical discourses. It is worked out for the first time in the Howison Lecture [which appears here under the title "On the Pragmatic, the Ethical, and the Moral Employments of Practical Reason"] delivered at Berke­ ley in 1988 and dedicated to my daughter Judith. Since then it would be more accurate to speak of a "discourse theory of morality," but I retain the term "discourse ethics," which has become established usage. The "Remarks on Discourse Ethics" consutute the main text and derive from notes made during the years 1987 to 1990. They rep­ resent a confrontation with competing theoretical programs and are offered as a global critical evaluation of the relevant literature. viii Preface The discussions of the working group on legal theory that took place under the auspices of the Leibniz-Programm of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft contributed to clarifying my thoughts; I am indebted to the participants in the Thursday afternoon seminars. Translator's Note This book is a partial translation of Jiirgen Habermas's book Erliiu­ terungen zur Diskursethik (Frankfurt, 199 1). Chapters I, 2, and 3 cor­ respond, respectively, to chapters 5, 6, and 4 of the German text.* Chapter 4 is a translation of "Einen unbedingten �inn zu retten ohne Gott, ist eitel. Reflexionen iiber einen Satz von Max Horkheimer," which appeared in Matthias Lutz-Bachmann and Gunzelin Schmidt Noerr (eds.), KritischerMaterialismus. Zur Diskussion eines Materialismus derPraxis (Munich, 199 1), pp. 125- 142. Chapter 5 is a translation of "Interview mit T. Hviid Nielsen" from Habermas's Die Nachholende Revolution. Kleine Politische Schriften VII (Frankfurt, 1990), pp. 114- 145. It consists of Habermas's written replies to questions posed by Nielsen. An anonymous translation previously appeared under the title ''Jiirgen Habermas: Morality, Society and Ethics: An Interview with Torben Hviid Nielsen," in Acta Sociologica 33 (1990), 2:92- 114. Although it deviates significantly from the German version, I have benefited from it at a number of points and have adopted its title and critical apparatus. *Of the remaining three chapters of the German text, chapter I has appeared in translation as "Morality and Ethical Life: Does Hegel's Critique of Kant Apply to Discourse Ethics?" in Jurgen Habermas, MOTal Consciou.smss and Comunicative Action, trans. C. Lenhardt and S.W. Nicholsen (Cambridge, Mass., 1990), pp. 195-215, and chapter 3 as "Justice and Solidarity: On the Discussion Concerning 'Stage 6"' in Thomas Wren (ed.), The MOTa[Domain: Essays in theOn going Discussionbetween Philosophy andthe Socio.l Scimces, (Cambridge, Mass., 1990), pp. 224-251. To date chapter 2, "Was macht eine Lebensform rational?" has not appeared in English. Translator's Introduction Habermas's discourse theory of morality represents one of the most original and far-reaching attempts to defend a cognitivist, deontolog­ ical ethical theory in contemporary moral philosophy.1 His declared goal is to find a middle ground between the abstract universalism with which Kantian ethics is justly reproached and the relativistic implications of communitarian and contextualist positions in the tra­ c:lition of Aristotle and Hegel. In pursuing this theoretical project Habermas is rowing against the prevailing tide of skepticism con­ cerning the possibility of universally valid claims in ethics.2 In the present work he undertakes a comprehensive defense of discourse ethics against its critics, especially those in the neo-Aristotelian camp, and in the process develops incisive criticisms of some of the major competing positions. Since the precise nature and strength of Ha­ bermas's ethical claims have so often been misunderstood, this intro­ duction begins with a sketch of the argument on which discourse ethics rests. The second part addresses the main points of contention with several competing positions, with a view to situating Habermas's project in relation to important currents in contemporary Anglo­ American moral thought. My goal is to show that he has philosoph­ ically robust responses to the (often serious) theoretical concerns underlying the criticisms commonly brought against discourse ethics. I While self-consciously Kantian in its cognitivism and its commitment to a universalistic interpretation of impartiality and autonomy, dis- xii Translator's Introduction course ethics represents a sustained critique of the central role Kan­ tian ethics has traditionally accorded individual reflection. Kant argued that reflection on what is implicit in everyday moral experi­ ence and judgment shows tha� the autonomous exercise of the will unconditioned by extraneous empirical motives-and hence the spontaneous activity of a noumenal self unencumbered by such mo­ tives-is a necessary precondition of genuinely moral action. For human agents who are affected by sensuous desires and inclinations, to act morally is to act for the sake of duty alone, which translates into the requirement that I reflect on whether I can consistently will that every other agent should act on my maxim of action as though it were a universal law. Understood as an elucidation of the grounds of validity of moral principles and judgments, the categorical imper­ ative assumes that the meaning of moral validity can be adequately grasped from the perspective of an individual reflecting on his or her motives of action. Discourse ethics, however, is based on the conviction that, in the wake of the irreversible shift in philosophical concern from individual consciousness to language, monological re­ flection can no longer fulfill the foundational role accorded it by Kant. Once consciousness and thought are seen to be structured by language, and hence essentially social accomplishments, the deliber­ ating subject must be relocated in the social space of communication where meanings-and hence individual identity which is structured by social meanings-are matters fo r communal determination through public processes of interpretation.3 For Habermas, however, this paradigm shift does not license a devaluation of the role of rational autonomy in ethical thought as urged by Aristotelians and Hegelians who subordinate