THE COUNTER-NARRATIVE: U.S. NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY TOWARDS PAKISTAN FROM FORD TO CLINTON by RABIA AKHTAR B.A., Punjab University, 1996 M.Sc., Quaid-i-Azam University, 1999 M.A., Eastern Illinois University, 2003 AN ABSTRACT OF A DISSERTATION submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Security Studies College of Arts and Sciences KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY Manhattan, Kansas 2015 Abstract Best known for being a ‘rollercoaster’ and a ‘marriage of convenience’, various scholars have tried to reflect upon the true nature of Pak-U.S. relationship under this banner. However, no matter how one examines this relationship one thing is certain –– the experience for both countries has been harrowing. After India settled for non-alignment early in the Cold War, Pakistan seized the opportunity and aligned itself with the United States in the East-West struggle and pledged allegiance to fight communism in Asia. But that was not the only motive –– Pakistan secretly hoped that an alliance with the U.S. would provide it security against India with whom Pakistan had an antagonistic relationship over their outstanding territorial dispute of Kashmir. When the U.S. did not rescue Pakistan as it had hoped for during its war with India in 1965 and sanctioned both countries with an arms embargo, Pakistan felt betrayed. From that period onwards, Pakistan’s list of grievances against the U.S. developed into a narrative of betrayal and abandonment fed by several episodes in their relationship during and after the Cold War –– a period in which Pakistan developed and tested its nuclear weapons –– duly exploited by Pakistani leaders as a tool for populist politics. This dissertation provides the first scholarly account of Pakistan’s narrative and tests its merit against the U.S. non-proliferation policy towards Pakistan under five administrations from Ford to Clinton and finds that Pakistan’s narrative of betrayal and abandonment is uneven and misleading with respect to the objectives and successes of U.S. non-proliferation policy. This dissertation uses multi-archival documents to offer a counter-narrative which argues that Pakistan, although a small state, was able to brilliantly maneuver its way through restricted spaces in its relationship with the U.S. in the past five decades to not only acquire a decent conventional capability through U.S. military assistance but also nuclear weapons due to the fickleness of U.S. non-proliferation policy. This research concludes that the compromises made by the U.S. to accommodate Pakistan and its inconsistency in enforcement of non-proliferation laws has implications for the efficacy and success of U.S. non-proliferation policy with prospective proliferants. THE COUNTER NARRATIVE: U.S. NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY TOWARDS PAKISTAN FROM FORD TO CLINTON by RABIA AKHTAR B.A., Punjab University, 1996 M.Sc., Quaid-i-Azam University, 1999 M.A., Eastern Illinois University, 2003 A DISSERTATION submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Security Studies College of Arts and Sciences KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY Manhattan, Kansas 2015 Approved by: Major Professor David Stone Copyright RABIA AKHTAR 2015 Abstract Best known for being a ‘rollercoaster’ and a ‘marriage of convenience’, various scholars have tried to reflect upon the true nature of Pak-U.S. relationship under this banner. However, no matter how one examines this relationship one thing is certain –– the experience for both countries has been harrowing. After India settled for non-alignment early in the Cold War, Pakistan seized the opportunity and aligned itself with the United States in the East-West struggle and pledged allegiance to fight communism in Asia. But that was not the only motive –– Pakistan secretly hoped that an alliance with the U.S. would provide it security against India with whom Pakistan had an antagonistic relationship over their outstanding territorial dispute of Kashmir. When the U.S. did not rescue Pakistan as it had hoped for during its war with India in 1965 and sanctioned both countries with an arms embargo, Pakistan felt betrayed. From that period onwards, Pakistan’s list of grievances against the U.S. developed into a narrative of betrayal and abandonment fed by several episodes in their relationship during and after the Cold War –– a period in which Pakistan developed and tested its nuclear weapons –– duly exploited by Pakistani leaders as a tool for populist politics. This dissertation provides the first scholarly account of Pakistan’s narrative and tests its merit against the U.S. non-proliferation policy towards Pakistan under five administrations from Ford to Clinton and finds that Pakistan’s narrative of betrayal and abandonment is uneven and misleading with respect to the objectives and successes of U.S. non-proliferation policy. This dissertation uses multi-archival documents to offer a counter-narrative which argues that Pakistan, although a small state, was able to brilliantly maneuver its way through restricted spaces in its relationship with the U.S. in the past five decades to not only acquire a decent conventional capability through U.S. military assistance but also nuclear weapons due to the fickleness of U.S. non-proliferation policy. This research concludes that the compromises made by the U.S. to accommodate Pakistan and its inconsistency in enforcement of non-proliferation laws has implications for the efficacy and success of U.S. non-proliferation policy with prospective proliferants. Table of Contents List of Figures ................................................................................................................................ xi List of Tables ................................................................................................................................ xii Acknowledgements ...................................................................................................................... xiii Dedication ..................................................................................................................................... xv Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 Chapter 1 - The Historiography of Pak-U.S. Alliance .................................................................. 24 The Cold War in South Asia ..................................................................................................... 24 Theoretical Interpretation of Pak-U.S. Alliance ....................................................................... 32 Small States’ Alliances With Big Powers ............................................................................. 32 Theoretical Interpretation of U.S. Non-Proliferation Policy .................................................... 39 Non-proliferation Sanctions .................................................................................................. 39 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 44 Chapter 2 - Making Sense Of Pakistan’s Narrative ...................................................................... 46 From 1947 to 1959: Beginning of The Alliance ....................................................................... 47 From 1959 to 1965: Fractures in the Alliance .......................................................................... 52 1965 Indo-Pak War and The U.S. Arms Embargo ............................................................... 59 From 1965 to 1972: Bhutto’s Nuclearization of The Pakistani Narrative ................................ 70 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 79 Chapter 3 - Ford Administration’s Non-proliferation Policy Towards Pakistan .......................... 81 Resumption of U.S. Military Supplies to Pakistan ................................................................... 84 Pakistan’s Nuclear Program ...................................................................................................... 94 Bhutto’s Nuclear Ambitions ................................................................................................. 95 The Franco-Pak Reprocessing Agreement ............................................................................ 98 U.S. Demarches to France and Germany On the Nuclear Deals with Pakistan .................. 107 The Origin and Rationale For The Symington Amendment 1976 .......................................... 113 The Symington Amendment and Pakistan’s Reaction ........................................................ 123 Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 132 Chapter 4 - Carter Administration’s Non-Proliferation Policy Towards Pakistan ..................... 135 Carter’s Non-Proliferation Policy ........................................................................................... 138 viii The Campaign ..................................................................................................................... 138 1977: Establishing Non-Proliferation Credentials .............................................................. 140 The FRG-Brazilian Nuclear Deal ......................................................................................