Journal of Personality and Social Psychology Copyright 1996 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 1996, Vol. 71, No. 2, 364-374 0022-3514/96/S3.O0 Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement in the Exercise of Moral Agency Albert Bandura Claudio Barbaranelli, Gian Vittorio Caprara, Stanford University and Concetta Pastorelli University of Rome, "La Sapienza" This research examined the role of mechanisms of moral disengagement in the exercise of moral agency. Regulatory self-sanctions can be selectively disengaged from detrimental conduct by con- verting harmful acts to moral ones through linkage to worthy purposes, obscuring personal causal agency by diffusion and displacement of responsibility, misrepresenting or disregarding the injurious effects inflicted on others, and vilifying the recipients of maltreatment by blaming and dehumanizing them. The study examined the structure and impact of moral disengagement on detrimental conduct and the psychological processes through which it exerts its effects. Path analyses reveal that moral disengagement fosters detrimental conduct by reducing prosocialness and anticipatory self-censure and by promoting cognitive and affective reactions conducive to aggression. The structure of the paths of influence is very similar for interpersonal aggression and delinquent conduct. Although the various mechanisms of moral disengagement operate in concert, moral reconstruals of harmful conduct by linking it to worthy purposes and vilification of victims seem to contribute most heavily to engagement in detrimental activities. Psychological theories of moral agency focus heavily on selves. They do things that give them satisfaction and a sense of moral thought to the neglect of moral conduct. The limited at- self-worth. They refrain from behaving in ways that violate their tention to moral conduct reflects both the rationalistic bias of moral standards, because such behavior will bring self-censure. many theories of morality (Kohlberg, 1984) and the conve- In the face of situational inducements to behave in inhumane nience of investigatory method. It is much easier to examine ways, people can choose to behave otherwise, by exerting coun- how people reason about hypothetical moral dilemmas than to teracting self-influence. Anticipatory self-sanctions thus keep study how they behave in difficult life predicaments. People conduct in line with internal standards. It is through the ongo- suffer from the wrongs done to them, regardless of how perpe- ing exercise of self influence that moral conduct is motivated trators might justify their inhumane actions. The regulation of and regulated. conduct involves much more than moral reasoning. A theory of Social cognitive theory grounds moral agency in a self-regu- morality must specify the mechanisms by which people come latory system that operates through three major subfunctions. to live in accordance with moral standards. In social cognitive These include self-monitoring, judgmental, and self-reactive theory (Bandura, 1991), moral reasoning is translated into ac- subfunctions. Self-monitoring of one's conduct is the first step tions through self-regulatory mechanisms through which moral toward exercising control over it. Action gives rise to self-reac- agency is exercised. tions through a judgmental function in which conduct is evalu- In the course of socialization, moral standards are con- ated against internal standards and situational circumstances. structed from information conveyed by direct tuition, evalua- Moral judgment sets the occasion for self-reactive influence. tive social reactions to one's conduct, and exposure to the self- People get themselves to behave in accordance with their moral evaluative standards modeled by others. Once formed, such standards through anticipatory positive and negative self-reac- standards serve as guides and deterrents for action. People reg- tions for different courses of action. ulate their actions by the consequences they apply to them- Development of self-regulatory functions does not create an invariant control system within a person, as implied by theories of internalization that incorporate entities such as consciences, superegos, or moral principles as perpetual internal overseers of Albert Bandura, Department of Psychology, Stanford University; conduct. Self-reactive influences do not operate unless they are Claudio Barbaranelli, Gian Vittorio Caprara, and Concetta Pastorelli, activated, and there are many psychosocial processes by which University of Rome, "La Sapienza," Rome, Italy. self-sanctions can be disengaged from inhumane conduct The research reported in this article was supported by grants from the (Bandura, 1990, 1991). Selective activation and disengagement Spencer Foundation to Albert Bandura and from the Johannn Jacobs of internal control permits different types of conduct with the Foundation to Gian Vittorio Caprara. We thank Delbert Elliott for his same moral standards. Figure 1 summarizes schematically the assistance in the early phases of the development of the scale of moral four major points in the self-regulatory system at which internal disengagement. moral control can be disengaged from detrimental conduct. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Albert Bandura, Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Stanford, Self-sanctions can be disengaged by reconstruing the conduct, California 94305-2130; or to Gian Vittorio Caprara, Dipartimento di obscuring personal causal agency, misrepresenting or disregard- Psicologia, Universita Degli Studi di Roma, "La Sapienza," Via dei ing the injurious consequences of one's actions, and vilifying the Marsi, 78,00185 Roma, Italy. recipients of maltreatment by blaming and devaluating them. 364 MORAL DISENGAGEMENT 365 MORAL JUSTIFICATION MINIMIZING, IGNORING, PALLIATIVE COMPARISON OR MISCONSTRUING THE EUPHEMISTIC LABELING CONSEQUENCES Figure 1. Mechanism through which moral self-sanctions are selectively activated and disengaged from detrimental behavior at different points in the self-regulatory process. From Social Foundations of Thought and Action: A Social Cognitive Theory (p. 376) by A. Bandura, 1986. Copyright 1986 by Prentice-Hall, Inc. Reprinted by permission of Prentice-Hall, Inc., Upper Saddle River, NJ. A key set of disengagement practices operates on the con- only eliminates self-deterrents but also engages self-approval in strual of injurious behavior itself. People do not ordinarily en- the service of harmful exploits. What was once morally censur- gage in reprehensible conduct until they have justified to them- able becomes a source of positive self-valuation. selves the Tightness of their actions. What is culpable can be Self-sanctions are activated most strongly when personal made righteous through cognitive reconstrual. In this process agency for detrimental effects is acknowledged. The second set of moral justification, detrimental conduct is made personally of dissociative practices operates by obscuring or distorting the and socially acceptable by portraying it in the service of valued agentive relationship between actions and the effects they cause. social or moral purposes (Kelman & Hamilton, 1989; Kramer, Under displacement of responsibility, people view their actions 1990; Sanford & Comstock, 1971). People then act on a social as springing from the social pressures or dictates of others rather or moral imperative. In the transactions of everyday life, a lot of than as something for which they are personally responsible aggressive behavior gets justified in the name of protecting (Andrus, 1969). Because they are not the actual agents of their honor and reputation (Cohen & Nisbett, 1994). actions, they are spared self-censuring reactions. Hence, they Language shapes people's thought patterns on which they are willing to behave in ways they normally repudiate if a legiti- base many of their actions. Activities can take on markedly mate authority accepts responsibility for the effects of their ac- different appearances depending on what they are called. Eu- tions (Diener, 1977; Milgram, 1974). phemistic language thus provides a convenient tool for masking The exercise of moral control is also weakened when personal reprehensible activities or even conferring a respectable status agency is obscured by diffusion of responsibility for detrimental upon them (Bolinger, 1982; Lutz, 1987). Through sanitized conduct. This is achieved in several ways. Responsibility can be and convoluted verbiage, destructive conduct is made benign diffused by division of labor for a venture with different mem- and those who engage in it are relieved of a sense of personal bers performing subdivided aspects that seem harmless in agency. Laboratory studies have revealed the disinhibitory themselves but harmful in its totality (Kelman, 1973). Group power of euphemistic language (Diener, Dineen, Endresen, decision making is another common practice, one that enables Beaman, & Fraser, 1975). People behave much more aggres- otherwise considerate people to behave inhumanely. When ev- sively when assaulting a person is given a sanitized label than eryone is responsible, no one really feels responsible. Group ac- when it is called aggression. tion is still another expedient for weakening moral control. Any Behavior can also assume very different qualities depending harm done by a group can always be attributed largely to the on what it is contrasted with. By exploiting advantageous com- behavior of others. People behave more cruelly