Nationalism and Antisemitism in the Postnational Constellation: Thoughts on Horkheimer, Adorno, and Habermas Karin Stoegner.* and Johannes Hoepoltseder.** 1. INTRODUCTION Since the works of critical theory on antisemitism and the authoritarian personality in the 1940s, the close connection of nationalism to antisemitism has been broadly recog- nized not only by critical theorists but also by other philosophers, such as Hannah Arendt. This close connection has been analyzed in detail with regard to the develop- ment of the European nation-states in the 19th century (e.g., Massing 1959; Arendt 1951; Claussen 1994) as well as the history of the 20th century, where it found its culmination in the Shoah (cf. Horkheimer & Adorno 2002; Lepsius 1990). Yet, the end of the Shoah and the National Socialist regime marked the end of neither nationalism nor anti- semitism. The close intertwining of the two phenomena also persisted, for example in the manifold strategies of denial of memory and responsibility for the Nazi crimes.1 But also today, in times of economic crisis, patterns of antisemitism and nationalism are (re)activated and interwoven in simplistic explanations of the world that personalize social structures and attribute guilt and responsibility for socially induced problems to precast figures. It seems that, especially in post-Holocaust societies, exclusionary nation- alist identification cannot do without antisemitism, in whatever latent form, as this combination seems to meet the need for certainty, stability, and unambiguous belonging in crisis-ridden periods (cf. Stoegner, Bischof & Rajal 2011). In this paper we would like to highlight how the intertwining of nationalism and anti- semitism is theorized, especially in critical theory. In doing so, we will briefly refer to Habermas’ concept of constitutional patriotism and interpret it as a normative foil for what he calls a postnational identity. Against this concept we will contrast Horkheimer’s and Adorno’s analysis of nationalism as a founding moment of modern sociation. The aim is to tackle the question why nationalism persists in spite of the nation-state’s partial loss of its objective function at the political level (e.g., in the European Union) and also in the context of an increasingly globalized economy (cf. Sassen 2009; Sklair 2006). How- ever, we view contemporary nationalism not simply as a reaction to internationalization * Researcher, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary. ** Studied philosophy and political science at the University of Vienna. Antiquarian in Vienna. 1 This can be observed, for example, in the debates on nationalism and revisionism concerning the public exposure to the Nazi past carried out in the German media in the mid 1980s between Habermas and Ernst Nolte (Habermas et al. 1987), among others. 119 © KARIN Stoegner and JOHANNES Hoepoltseder, 2013 | doiKarin 10.1163/9789004265561_013 Stoegner and Johannes Hoepoltseder - 9789004265561 This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NCDownloaded 4.0 license. from Brill.com09/30/2021 12:21:06PM via free access 120 KARIN STOEGNER AND JOHANNES HOEPOLTSEDER and the fragmented modes of contemporary identification, that is to say, not as a mere antimodernist and reactionary strain. Instead, this paper focuses on the dialectics of social structures, with the aim of showing that they intrinsically provoke nationalism and antisemitism. Thus, nationalism belongs to the very form in which society is organ- ized. With this we come to the related question of antisemitism and how the close intertwining of both phenomena depends upon the same basic social structures. Thus, neither antisemitism nor nationalism are viewed as a unitary or static phenomenon, but rather as being conceived in their continuities and discontinuities. 2. HABERMAS’ CONCEPT OF CONSTITUTIONAL PATRIOTISM Let us start with Habermas’ concept of constitutional patriotism, which he began to develop in the course of the Historians’ Debate (Habermas et al. 1987) as a critical and cosmopolitical alternative to nationalism (see also Habermas 1987, 1992). With the term constitutional patriotism, Habermas tried to theorize the dissolution of the traditional close link of republicanism and nationalism (Habermas 1998: 116). The central statement suggests that the unquestioned need of belonging on the part of the individuals would be met by identifying with universal values rather than a country of origin. The love of one’s nation would then be based on the love of freedom and human rights for which this nation stood and would no longer recur onto essentialized and ethnicized moments (cf. Habermas 1998: 36ff., 1992: 642). What is important to note is that constitutional patriotism does not replace national identification of the citizens, but rather gives it a reconciled notion (cf. Fine & Smith 2003: 470). Habermas somehow wants to rescue the possibility and legitimacy of national identity for post-Holocaust Germany. Constitutional patriotism means a decoupling of national identification and nationalism on the cognitive and emotional level; it stands for a national feeling that is ripped of pathological nationalism and instead is founded on a form of civic solidarity and citizenship (Habermas 1998: 116). This concept has been widely accepted (cf. Delanty 2005; Beck 2003) but also criticized (Fine & Smith 2003; Claussen 2004). According to Detlev Claussen, Habermas’ argumentation in the course of the Historians’ Debate shows that he did not critically supersede the terms and categories of the revitalized nation-state with which his revisionist adversaries confronted him. Instead, he adopted them himself, though in a different manner. Thus Claussen criticizes that the national would also have displaced the social in Habermas. Instead of overcoming the principle of national identification in its consequent critique, Habermas would have tried to alter national identification and make something republican—a sound patriotic feel- ing—of it (Claussen 1994: 25ff.). This critique is in line with Adorno’s analysis of national- ism, which starts from the assumption that, due to a relentless dynamic between the two aspects, a clear demarcation of a “sound national feeling” from pathological nationalism is impossible. For Adorno the problem in any national feeling is that it is still founded on the (often blind) identification with the nation or group, in which the individuals find them- selves by chance (Adorno 1997b: 589).2 Thus, the very form of identification and collectiv- 2 In Meinung Wahn Gesellschaft, Adorno writes: “Gesundes Nationalgefühl vom pathischen Nationalismus zu scheiden, ist so ideologisch wie der Glaube an die normale Meinung gegenüber der pathogenen; unaufhaltsam ist die Dynamik des angeblich gesunden Nationalgefühls zum über- wertigen, weil die Unwahrheit in der Identifikation der Person mit dem irrationalen Zusammenhang von Natur und Gesellschaft wurzelt, in dem die Person zufällig sich findet.” (Adorno 1997b: 589) Karin Stoegner and Johannes Hoepoltseder - 9789004265561 Downloaded from Brill.com09/30/2021 12:21:06PM via free access ANTISEMITISM AND POSTNATIONALISM 121 ity formation that is also the basis of a so-called sound national feeling, or patriotism, per se bears exclusion of those considered as others. While for Habermas the term nationalism seems to be reserved for ethnic national- ism, his concept of constitutional patriotism very much resembles civic nationalism (cf. Fine & Smith 2003: 470). Meanwhile, Rogers Brubaker—like Anthony Smith (1995: 101) and Ulrich Beck (2003: 462)—points to the exclusionary force not only of ethnic national- ism but also of its civic variant. The civic model of nationalism, Brubaker writes (1999: 64), shows an extraordinary power of exclusion on the global level. While it is undoubt- edly inclusive in that it includes all citizens regardless of gender, ethnic background, religion, class, and the like, all which is not part of the nation is potentially excluded. On a global scale, citizenship is an immensely powerful instrument of social clo- sure…. Access to citizenship is everywhere limited; and even if it is open, in principle, to persons regardless of ethnicity, this is small consolation to those excluded from citizenship, and even from the possibility of applying for citizenship, by being excluded from the territory of the state. (Brubaker 1999: 64) But even within the nation-state’s borders, concerning those who are included as citi- zens, the civic model of nationalism implies the assertion of an internal homogeneity and thus the exclusion of the “other,” as Ulrich Beck argues with regard to the contradic- tion of citizen equality and social inequality in Western welfare states. Within the national paradigm, what does this equality rest on in western welfare states? It rests on the formal equality of the citizens: income differences between men and women, places of residence, etc. do not endorse differentiated citizen status. All the individuals of a nation have the same rights and duties; differentiated citizenship status is unacceptable. This legally-sanctioned citizen equality corresponds to the guiding nation-state principle of cultural homogeneity (language, history, cultural traditions). The national principles of inclusion and exclusion thus determine and sta- bilize the perceptual boundaries of social inequalities. (Beck 2003: 462) These methodological and epistemological reflections imply that the concept of constitu- tional patriotism still relies