Saudi Arabia as a Peace Peddler? The Limits of Riyadh’s Influence over © 2019 IAI Israeli–Palestinian Diplomacy by Jørgen Jensehaugen Renewed talk and anticipation of President Trump and his special advisor Trump’s so-called “ultimate deal” Jared Kushner’s close relationship with ISSN 2532-6570 for Israeli–Palestinian peace is a Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin reoccurring theme in the media. While Salman is only the most recent example doubts persist as to the imminent of this function. Much like previous unveiling of a Trump plan, it is clear that examples it is highly doubtful whether a key dimension of his approach rests the Saudi role in the now defunct “peace on the role of Saudi Arabia as a partner, process” will be what makes Trump’s and a potential peace peddler. This is peace plan viable. a highly problematic and erroneous assumption by the Trump team. In 1973, in response to the US decision to resupply Israel with arms during the Saudi Arabia has no direct stake in Yom Kippur war, Arab oil producing the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. The states, chief among which stood Libya kingdom does not border the Palestinian and Saudi Arabia, instituted an oil territories, and while Jerusalem is of embargo against the US and other large symbolic importance to Saudi countries backing Israel during the Arabia it is Jordan which represents war. This shocked US decision-makers the Islamic waqf of the Haram al-sharif. into realising that Arab interests had Despite this, Saudi Arabia has been to be taken seriously. In the years that engaged in the conflict as a middle followed Saudi Arabia became a go-to man due to its combined alliance with country for US policy-makers. the United States, its massive oil wealth and its prominent position in the Arab In the early phases of President Jimmy world. This role is not new, but it is one Carter’s intense peace negotiations, which has few successes to show for. which culminated in the Egyptian– IAI COMMENTARIES 19 | 03 - JANUARY 2019 19 | 03 - JANUARY IAI COMMENTARIES Jørgen Jensehaugen is Senior Researcher at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). 1 Saudi Arabia as a Peace Peddler? The Limits of Riyadh’s Influence over Israeli–Palestinian Diplomacy Israeli peace of 1979, President Carter to the 1967 lines, the establishment of used Saudi Arabia as a back-channel a Palestinian state with its capital in mediator between the United States East Jerusalem and a “just solution to and the PLO.1 At the time the US refused the Palestinian refugee problem to be to engage directly with the PLO until agreed upon in accordance with U.N. the PLO accepted UN Security Council General Assembly Resolution 194”. In (UNSC) resolution 242, but having return, all the Arab states vowed to no direct channels to the PLO it was establish peaceful normalised relations © 2019 IAI difficult for the US to mediate such an with Israel. The initiative was thus in acceptance. The Carter team, like the line with all the UN parameters of how subsequent Reagan one, hoped that the conflict should be solved. Saudi Arabia could deliver not only on moderating the PLO itself, but also on In theory this was what Israel had been moderating the Arab confrontation calling for since 1948, apart from the states. point on the Palestinian refugees. The peace initiative was re-endorsed by the Carter was disappointed – Saudi Arabia Arab League in 2007 and 2017. Israel, ISSN 2532-6570 simply lacked the ability to influence however, has never accepted the Arab the PLO at this time and it would peace initiative and it has thus been take another decade before the PLO shelved, like so many peace proposals accepted UNSC Resolution 242 and the before it. As it turned out Saudi Arabia US could open direct contact with the had no real leverage vis-à-vis Israel, and organisation. In the end it was not Saudi as long as Israel refused to accept the Arabia which made the PLO change its proposal there was little the kingdom stance, but rather developments within could do other than re-endorse it at the Palestinian national movement. regular intervals. The most famous example of Saudi In February 2007, Saudi Arabia also peace promotion is the Arab peace made an attempt at intra-Palestinian initiative of 2002, and its precursor reconciliation between Fatah and the 1981 Fahd plan.2 Tellingly, the Hamas. The resulting 2007 Mecca Arab peace initiative is often referred agreement set out to stop the to as the Saudi initiative. As an violence between the two groups and Arab initiative, supported by the establish a Palestinian national unity Arab League, it is remarkable in its government.3 What looked like an moderation. It calls for a two-state initial success, with the establishment solution based on Israeli withdrawal of such a Palestinian government on 17 March 2007, unravelled three months later. Since then the two parties have 1 Jørgen Jensehaugen, Arab-Israeli Diplomacy been at loggerheads. under Carter. The U.S., Israel and the Palestinians, London, I.B. Tauris, 2018. 2 Arab peace initiative adopted at the Arab League summit in Beirut on 28 March 2002, https://gu.com/p/ktth; Fahd Plan, 7 August 1981, https://uniteapps.un.org/dpa/dpr/unispal. 3 Mecca agreement, 8 February 2007, https:// nsf/0/5FB09709F4050B8985256CED007390D8. ecf.org.il/media_items/1197. IAI COMMENTARIES 19 | 03 - JANUARY 2019 19 | 03 - JANUARY IAI COMMENTARIES 2 Saudi Arabia as a Peace Peddler? The Limits of Riyadh’s Influence over Israeli–Palestinian Diplomacy These examples raise the question: “off the table”, having given it to Israel, does Saudi Arabia really carry the and his decision to defund UNRWA, type of influence towards the Israeli– attempting to also take the Palestinian Palestinian conflict its wealth and refugee issue off the table. Based on regional gravitas suggests? this alone it is blatantly obvious that the Palestinians will reject the deal. While there is no doubt that Saudi Arabia is a significant regional actor, The Trump administration has not even © 2019 IAI it is highly questionable whether this talked to the Palestinian leadership since translates into it being an important its Jerusalem declaration in December player in the Israeli–Palestinian arena. 2017. This declaration set off a negative While the fault of the diplomatic spiral of events in which the PLO broke failings listed above clearly does not contact with the US administration to lie with Saudi Arabia as such, what which Trump responded vindictively is interesting is the insistence of the by closing the PLO office in United States that Saudi Arabia can act Washington. This means that not only as a peace peddler despite evidence to is there no line of communication, but ISSN 2532-6570 the contrary. the formal structures for reopening communication have been removed. Notwithstanding all the differences In essence, then, Saudi Arabia has between Trump and Carter, one been handed the task of being the thing they have in common is that Palestinian proxy vis-à-vis the United they are attempting to solve the States. In this, they are being asked Israeli–Palestinian conflict without to shove the Trump plan down the negotiating with the Palestinians. throat of Mahmoud Abbas’ Palestinian Instead they have insisted on using the Authority. The idea being that if we Saudis to act on their behalf. The Saudis cannot sell our peace proposal to the have been willing to take on this role Palestinians, we can sell it to the Saudis because it is a cheap way to strengthen to sell it to the Palestinians. ties with Washington. This US policy of side-lining the Palestinians in the This is not only difficult because the diplomacy of the Arab–Israeli conflict Palestinians insist that they must is a longstanding US tradition.4 The past represent themselves, but also because two decades has been the exception. the Saudis are a house divided. In a famous interview in The Atlantic We know very little about the exact the current Saudi (de facto) leader content of Trump’s “ultimate deal” apart Mohammed bin Salman supported from his decision to take Jerusalem Israel’s right to exist alongside a Palestinian state. His only quid pro quo was vague: “We have religious concerns 4 Kathleen Christison, Perceptions of Palestine. Their Influence on U.S. Middle East Policy, about the fate of the holy mosque in Updated ed., Berkeley, University of California Jerusalem and about the rights of the Press, 2001; Jørgen Jensehaugen, “The Fatal Palestinian people.”5 He later added that Flaw in Trump’s Plan for Middle East Peace”, in The Washington Post, 24 July 2018, https:// wapo.st/2LHNEcm. 5 Jeffrey Goldberg, “Saudi Crown Prince: Iran’s IAI COMMENTARIES 19 | 03 - JANUARY 2019 19 | 03 - JANUARY IAI COMMENTARIES 3 Saudi Arabia as a Peace Peddler? The Limits of Riyadh’s Influence over Israeli–Palestinian Diplomacy the Palestinians should agree to discuss Trump’s proposal or “shut up”.6 Unlike the Crown Prince, Saudi King Salman has reassured the Palestinians that the kingdom continues to support the Palestinian position.7 While Trump’s peace plan lacks © 2019 IAI credibility – if it is ever made public – the question of the Saudi position is intriguing, and increasingly so after the Khashoggi murder has made the kingdom less palatable to many US decision-makers. Will Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman play the part which the White House expects of them, that is pressure the Palestinians ISSN 2532-6570 to accept the proposal, or will the kingdom once again push its own initiative from 2002? The first option will please the United States but ensure a break with the Palestinians, whilst the second will be supported by the Palestinian but create friction with the US.