Policy Paper A Northern Agenda for an Open and Secure Europe Nordic-Baltic Perspectives on European Sovereignty and Strategic Autonomy | Niklas Helwig | Juha Jokela | Piret Kuusik | Kristi R aik | May 2021 Title: A Northern Agenda for an Open and Secure Europe: Nordic-Baltic Perspectives on European Sovereignty and Strategic Autonomy Authors: Helwig, Niklas; Jokela, Juha; Kuusik, Piret; Raik, Kristi Publication date: May 2021 Category: Policy paper Cover page photo: The sun sets over the Oresund Bridge between Sweden and Denmark, in Malmo, Sweden, on January 3, 2016. AFP/TT NEWS AGENCY/JOHAN NILSSON/SCANPIX Keywords: European strategic autonomy, European sovereignty, Nordic-Baltic region, European Union Disclaimer: The views and opinions contained in this paper are solely those of its authors and do not necessarily represent the official policy or position of the International Centre for Defence and Security or any other organisation. ISSN 2228-2068 © International Centre for Defence and Security Estonian Foreign Policy Institute 63/4 Narva Rd., 10120 Tallinn, Estonia [email protected], https://efpi.icds.ee I A Northern Agenda for an Open and Secure Europe I About the Authors Niklas Helwig Dr Niklas Helwig is a Leading Researcher at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs in Helsinki. His research interests include EU foreign policy and defence cooperation, German foreign and security policy, as well as transatlantic relations. He previously worked at the RAND Corporation and SAIS – Johns Hopkins in Washington DC, at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in Berlin, and at the Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels. He researched and taught at the University of Cologne and the University of Edinburgh, from where he received a double PhD (‘co-tutelle’). Juha Jokela Dr. Juha Jokela is the Director of the European Union research programme at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs. His recent projects have focused on the political dynamics in the EU, its reform agenda at the wake of Brexit as well as EU’s foreign and security policy. He has worked in the EU Institute for Security Studies as a Senior Associated Analyst and Senior Visiting Research Fellow, Advisor in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, and Research Fellow and Director of the Network for European Studies in the University of Helsinki. He is a member of the board of Trans- European Policy Studies Association (TEPSA). Piret Kuusik Piret Kuusik joined the Estonian Foreign Policy Institute at ICDS in March 2018. Her research focuses on the EU’s foreign and security policy, Franco-German relationship, Brexit and Nordic-Baltic region’s role in Europe and the world. She holds a BA in Politics with International Relations from the University of York, the UK, and a MA in International Security from Paris School of International Affairs (PSIA), Sciences Po Paris. During her master studies, she spent a semester at Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University in Washington D.C. Kristi R aik Dr Kristi Raik is the Director of the Estonian Foreign Policy Institute at ICDS since February 2018. She is also an Adjunct Professor at the University of Turku. Kristi has previously served inter alia as a Senior Research Fellow and Acting Programme Director at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs in Helsinki; an official at the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union in Brussels; and a Visiting Fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels and the International Centre for Policy Studies in Kyiv. Kristi has a PhD from the University of Turku. She has published, lectured and commented widely on European foreign and security policy. A Northern Agenda for an Open and Secure Europe II All these changes have contributed to a sense that Europe needs to be more capable of determining and defending its interests and values on the global stage, with partners whenever possible, but when necessary alone. This paper explores ongoing debates about ways to strengthen Europe’s autonomy from the perspective of the six Nordic-Baltic EU member states.1 It outlines the key issues for this group of countries in a number of fields, including defence, foreign policy, trade and industry, digital, and health. There are, of course, differences between the EU policies of the six countries, and they do not act or wish to be seen in the EU as a coalition.2 Finland Introduction stands out in the Nordic-Baltic group as the most committed to deepening integration in Until recent years, academic and policy debates all areas including defence, having largely left on European integration rarely addressed behind the historical constraints posed by its notions such as the autonomy or (even less) non-membership of a military alliance. The sovereignty of Europe. This changed with Baltic states generally seek to be adaptive to the launch of the European Global Strategy EU consensus (insofar as it exists) but at the in 2016, when strategic autonomy emerged same time their positions are most strongly as a much-disputed concept in the field of shaped by the transatlantic relationship European security and defence. More recently, and the indispensable role of the US in especially in response to Covid-19, the focus of addressing their existential security concerns. these discussions has shifted from the field of Sweden and, especially, Denmark have their defence to the economy, while encompassing own deep-rooted reservations regarding an increasingly broad range of issues and further integration, expressed in their non- becoming more global in scope. What started membership of the eurozone and Danish as a dispute over Europe’s vision for the opt-outs from not only the euro, but also the future, with a strong focus on the transatlantic Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), relationship and the dependence of European some aspects of Justice and Home Affairs, and security on the US, has to some extent turned EU citizenship. into a recognition of the urgent need to respond to global changes that surround Europe today, Unavoidably, these general positions are notably the rise of China and tightening great reflected in Nordic-Baltic attitudes towards power competition. The unique importance European strategic autonomy. Finland has of the transatlantic relationship for Europe been most forthcoming in several aspects of the debate, and the Baltic states This paper explores ongoing debates about have been most keen to stress that ways to strengthen Europe’s autonomy from the EU’s strategic autonomy must not weaken the transatlantic bond, while the perspective of the six Nordic-Baltic EU Sweden and Denmark have expressed member states limited support and outlined their own conditions for greater European sovereignty. The very concept of remains, but the pandemic exposed the strategic autonomy has been received with paralysing impact of US-Chinese rivalry on scepticism, especially by the Baltic states international cooperation, the weakening and Sweden. Yet the concept is not about to position of the US as a global leader, the increasingly assertive posture of China in 1 efforts to strengthen its global influence, and Denmark, Finland and Sweden; Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. 2 Piret Kuusik & Kristi Raik, The Nordic-Baltic Region in the Europe’s vulnerabilities stemming from global EU27: Time for New Strategic Cooperation Tallinn: Estonian interdependences. Foreign Policy Institute/International Centre for Defence and Security, 2018. A Northern Agenda for an Open and Secure Europe 1 disappear; hence it is important for the Nordic- context.5 Similarly, “strategic sovereignty” seeks Baltic states to be able to shape the ways in to avoid debates on transatlantic decoupling which it is further implemented. This paper and instead emphasises the need for the EU to seeks to contribute to the Nordic-Baltic and create vital capacities on a range of policies.6 European discussions on the EU’s strategic With regard to economic policies, the European autonomy by highlighting the shared interests Commission—alongside member states with of the six countries and proposing positions for liberal economic thinking, such as the Nordic- these and other like-minded countries to be Baltic countries—was concerned that strategic promoted together. autonomy might signal an overly protectionist international trade agenda. Instead, it The very concept of strategic autonomy has started using the term “open strategic autonomy”. The concept expresses on been received with scepticism, especially by the one hand the EU’s preference for the Baltic states and Sweden. Yet the concept free trade and, on the other, its aim to push distinct values and interests, is not about to disappear for example regarding greenhouse gas emissions or data protection standards. 1. Definitions Despite the discussion on semantics, it is important to recognise that strategic autonomy reflects an actual shift in the way The term “strategic autonomy” is not clearly that the EU and its member states adjust their defined and is contested in the European policies to a more competitive international debate. It is sometimes used interchangeably environment. Strategic autonomy does not with the concept of “European sovereignty”, imply a decoupling from alliances and the which gained prominence especially after rest of the world, but rather describes the president Emmanuel Macron’s 2017 Sorbonne ability to be self-determined in pursuing and speech. Some have argued that autonomy managing alliances and partnerships. It reflects is one condition for sovereignty, which also a constant process in which the EU is assessing 3 implies other state-like features. However, the and reacting to its external dependences. French interpretation of European sovereignty Hence, strategic autonomy can be defined as is very similar to what the term “strategic the ability of the EU and its member states to autonomy” seeks to convey, namely that manage their interdependencies with third Europe should develop capacities that allow it parties with the aim of ensuring the well- to act independently from other actors if the being of their citizens and implementing self- need arises.