Correlation Differential Power Analysis Attack to Midori64

Correlation Differential Power Analysis Attack to Midori64

Research paper Correlation Differential Power Analysis Attack to Midori64 B. Khadem*1, H. Ghanbari2, A. Masoumi3 1 Assistant Professor, Faculty of Computer Engineering, Imam Hossein Comprehensive University, Tehran. 2, 3 M.S.C. in Secure Communication and Cryptography, Imam Hossein Comprehensive University, Tehran. Article Info Extended Abstract Background and Objectives: Today, Internet communication security has Article History: become more complex as technology becomes faster and more efficient, Received especially for resource-limited devices such as embedded devices, wireless Revised sensors, and radio frequency identification (RFID) tags, and Internet of Things Accepted (IoT). Lightweight encryption algorithms provide security for these devices to protect data against intruders. A complete understanding Lightweight encryption helps people find better ways to protect valuable information as Keywords: technology advances faster. But the limitation of using energy in lightweight IoT security block ciphers (LBCs) is one of the major challenges for ever-expanding IoT Lightweight cryptography technologies. Also, these LBC are subject to numerous attacks. Side-channel Differential power analysis attacks are among the most cited threats to these ciphers. In these attacks, attack the attacker benefits from a physical leak of the cryptographic chip to reach the cryptographic key. A type of side-channel attack is power analysis in Midori block cipher which the attacker reaches the key using the relationship between the power consumption of the chip during the algorithm running, data processing, and operations. Methods: A popular LBC that has been recently introduced in the IoT is Midori. In this paper, a differential power attack (DPA) to the Midori64 block cipher is designed. According to the proposed method, an attack on the S- boxes of the first round is done to obtain half of the master key bits. Then, the S-boxes of the second round were attacked to obtain remaining the master key bits. Results: The results confirmed that the key is ultimately obtained in this cipher by performing an attack, so the block cipher is not resistant to a DPA. With the low volume of computational complexity, we obtained the Midori block cipher key, which was considered secure, just by using 300 samples of the plaintext. Conclusion: Following the running of Midori64 on the AVR microcontroller of the Atmega32 model, the master key of Midori block cipher is discovered with 300 known texts. Furthermore, we obtained the master key with a smaller number of samples than the electromagnetic analysis attack. Introduction utilizing resources. Numerous studies have so far been conducted on energy-efficient LBCs [2-6]. Among the Recently, numerous security threats have emerged along available LBCs, the Midori exhibits the least power with advancements in IoT technologies [1], which makes consumption [7]. This feature multiplies the importance encryption as an important step to protect systems of evaluating the security of this block cipher. In the area against these threats. So, low power ciphers that can be of hardware security, any cryptography block cipher, used in IoT devices have attracted the attention of many including Midori, is subjected to many potential side- researchers. However, it is critical to use LBC, as we are channel threats [8]. In this attack, secret cryptographic encountering budget limitations in consuming power and Doi: B. Khadem, H. Ghanbari, A. Masoumi data (e.g., master key) are accessible by using the side leak analysis of the chip while performing encryption. These leaks include power consumption leaks, electromagnetic leaks, and algorithm running time leaks. This paper aims to investigate the security of the Midori block cipher against DPA, as well as information leakage from this block cipher during encryption operations. A. Literature review Following the emergence of the Midori block cipher and the investigation of some associated theoretical attacks [2], many studies have been conducted to analyses the security of this block cipher against potential attacks. The low power consumption of the Midori block cipher seems to be the main reason for researchers to work with this block cipher, as saving resources and power consumption is a critical factor to consider today. The first study on the power analysis attack to the Midori block cipher was conducted by Heuser et al. in 2017 [9]. They examined the resilience of a few other lightweight ciphers against power analysis attacks. For this, non- profiled and profiled side-channel attacks were arranged on the first, the last, or both rounds simultaneously. In the non-profiled attack on the first round of ciphers AES, ZORRO, Robin, LED, Midori64, Mysterion, KLEIN, Piccolo, PRESENT, PRIDE, RECTANGLE, and Skinny, no difference was observed between their 8x8 substitution boxes (S- boxes) in resisting against the power analysis attack. However, the 4-bit Midori64 and KLEIN S-boxes showed more resilience to power analysis attacks than the 8-bit boxes. The same attacks were performed using the profiled method and machine learning, and it is found that also, attacking 4-bit S-boxes is easier than 8-bit S- boxes. Fig. 1: Midori64 block cipher block diagram [2] There are many other researches in DPA, which some of them are described here. Carlet (2005) [11] found that If transparency order has sufficiently small value, then the S-box is able to In FSE 2005, transparency order was proposed by Prouf withstand DPA attacks without that ad-hoc modifications [10] as a parameter for the robustness of S-boxes to DPA. in the implementation be necessary (since these Prouf rewrote DPAs in terms of correlation coefficients modifications make the encryption about twice slower). between two Boolean functions. He exhibited properties Also he proved lower bounds on the transparency order of S-boxes (also called (n, m)-functions) relied on DPA of highly nonlinear S-boxes. He showed that some highly attacks. He showed that these properties were opposite nonlinear functions (in odd or even numbers of variables) to the non-linearity criterion and to the propagation have very bad transparency orders. criterion. To quantify the resistance of an S-box to DPAs, he introduced the notion of transparency order of an S- Fei et al. (2012) [12] proposed a statistical model for DPA box and studied this criterion with respect to the non- that takes characteristics of both the physical linearity and to the propagation criterion. implementation and cryptographic algorithm into Correlation Differential Power Attack to Midori64 consideration. Their model established a quantitative constructions in dimensions at most 8 and compared their relation between the success rate of DPA and a intrinsic resiliency against side-channel attacks. Finally, cryptographic system. The side channel characteristic of they performed several simulations of side-channel the physical implementation was modeled as the ratio attacks against the aforementioned constructions, which between the difference-of-means power and the confirm their theoretical approach. standard deviation of power distribution. The side channel property of the cryptographic algorithm was In hardware security, side-channel attacks pose a danger extracted by a novel algorithmic confusion analysis. because they illegally analyze the secret key in a Experimental results on DES and AES verified this model cryptographic device using the power consumption and and demonstrate the effectiveness of algorithmic electromagnetic waves generated during the device's confusion analysis. operation. One type of side-channel attack that uses electromagnetic waves is called electromagnetic analysis. Picek et al. (2014) [13] employed a novel heuristic For the first time, the Midori block cipher was attacked by technique to generate S-boxes with “better” values of the electromagnetic analysis in 2017, where the key got confusion coefficient in terms of improving their side- accessible using 18,000 samples by Yoshikawa et al. [7] channel resistance. They conducted extensive side who proposed a method of electromagnetic analysis. channel analysis and detect S-boxes that exhibit previously unseen behavior. For the 4 × 4 size they found In addition to hardware attacks, other attacks have been S-boxes that belong to optimal classes, but they exhibited reported on the Midori64 block cipher, some of which are linear behavior when running a CPA attack, therefore described here. preventing an attacker from achieving 100% success rate Gérault et al. (2016) [16] proposed a constraint on recovering the key. programming model to automate the search for optimal Parthiba et al. (2018) [14] presented the use of (in terms of probability) related-key differential Differential Cascade Pre-resolve Adiabatic logic (DCPAL) characteristics on Midori. Using it, they built related-key based adiabatic circuits for the implementation of distinguishers on the full-round Midori64 and Midori128, cryptosystems to prevent the DPAs on chips. The DCPAL and mount key recovery attacks on both versions of the 35.8 is an adiabatic logic, which incurs lower power cipher with practical time complexity, respectively 2 43.7 consumption and earns its application in the design of low and 2 . power cryptosystems. The property of power analysis Guo et al. (2016) [17] presented an invariant subspace resistance was demonstrated through the use of DCPAL attack on the block cipher Midori64. Their analysis implementation for an S-box. The S-box

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