Ex-Post Evaluation of the INTERREG III Community Initiative funded by the ERDF TASK 5: IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF A REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLE OF PROGRAMMES PROGRAMME: INTERREG IIIA ØRESUND (DENMARK – SWEDEN) EVALUATION REPORT elaborated by Dr. Kim Møller, Oxford Group (Denmark) Panteia and Partners: • EureConsult S.A. (Luxemburg) • Policy Research and Consultancy (Frankfurt / Germany) • GÉPHYRES EURL (Roubaix / France) • The Radboud University (Nijmegen / The Netherlands) Reference R20090293/30922000/LTR/CWI January 2010 This study has been financed by European Commission Directorate General for Regional Policy, Evaluation Unit. Quoting of numbers and/or text is permitted only when the source is clearly mentioned. INTERREG III ex-post evaluation. In-depth evaluation of the PROGRAMME: INTERREG IIIA ØRESUND (DENMARK – SWEDEN) Contents FOREWORDTU UT ......................................................................................................... 3 EXECUTIVETU SUMMARYUT ........................................................................................ 4 1TU UT INTRODUCTIONTU UT ................................................................................. 6 2TU UT RESEARCHTU INTEREST AND METHODOLOGYUT ........................................ 8 3TU UT IN-DEPTHTU ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS AND IMPACTS IN TERMS OF EFFECTIVENESS & THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC EFFECTSUT .......................... 9 3.1TU UT TU HE FINANCIAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROGRAMMEUT .......................................... 9 3.2TU THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROGRAMMEUT ....................................................... 16 3.3.TU UT PTU ROJECT-LEVEL CO-OPERATION UNDER THE PROGRAMMEUT ..................................... 24 3.5TU UT ATU NALYSIS OF FACTORS THAT DETERMINE THE CHARACTER OF THE PROGRAMMEUT ............ 42 3.6TU UT RTU E-CONSIDERING THE “DEPTH & INTENSITY OF TERRITORIAL CO-OPERATION”UT ............ 50 3.7TU UT MTU AIN FACTORS FOSTERING OR HAMPERING CROSS-BORDER CO-OPERATION UNDER INTERREG IIIUT ................................................................................... 54 4TU UT IN-DEPTHTU ANALYSIS OF RESULTS AND IMPACTS IN TERMS OF UTILITY AND EFFICIENCY – INTERREG IIIA ØRESUNDUT ................... 57 4.1TU UT TU HE EXTERNAL COHERENCE OF THE PROGRAMMEUT............................................... 57 4.2TU UT TU HE INTRINSIC PERFORMANCE OF THE PROGRAMMEUT ........................................... 60 5TU UT OVERALLTU FINAL CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONSUT .. 66 5.1TU UT OTU VERALL FINAL CONCLUSIONS ON THE IMPACT OF THE INTERREG III PROGRAMMEUT ..... 66 5.2TU SHORT- AND MEDIUM-TERM POLICY RECOMMENDATIONSUT ..................................... 69 5.3TU LONG-TERM POLICY RECOMMENDATIONSUT ....................................................... 70 ANNEXTU 1 UT TU REFERENCESUT ................................................................................... 72 ANNEXTU 1 UT TU REFERENCESUT ................................................................................... 72 ANNEXTU 2 UT UPDATEDTU DATA MATRICES AVAILABLE IN THE ØRESUND DATABASE BY SUBJECTUT..................................................................................... 74 R20090293.doc 2 January 2010 INTERREG III ex-post evaluation. In-depth evaluation of the PROGRAMME: INTERREG IIIA ØRESUND (DENMARK – SWEDEN) Foreword The ex-post evaluation of Interreg III comprises a number of tasks interactively and iteratively linked. One of the tasks is the in-depth evaluation of a sample of sixteen Interreg III programmes from all three strands. The expected outcome of these in-depth assessments is demanding (e.g. the evidence-based extrapolation of results from project and programme level to the Community Initiative). INTERREG III A Oresund programme has been in-depth evaluated as a part of the Strand A Category 3 of programmes: Programmes with less-favourable cross-border framework conditions, a very high or medium concentration of ERDF-support on INTERREG III “priority topics” and a high or medium level of depth & intensity of co-operation. R20090293.doc 3 January 2010 INTERREG III ex-post evaluation. In-depth evaluation of the PROGRAMME: INTERREG IIIA ØRESUND (DENMARK – SWEDEN) Executive Summary The vision of an integrated Öresund region between Denmark and Sweden dates long back and cross- border cooperation projects started more than 36 years ago. However, living the vision took a huge leap forward when the fixed link between Denmark and Sweden was inaugurated in year 2000. Before opening the Öresund Bridge a number of projects had been displayed as part of the INTERREG IIa program paving the way for quickly picking low hanging fruits as soon as the fixed link was in place. Low hanging fruits included first of all the Medicon Valley and the Øresund University. When the Öresund Bridge opened two different and contradicting events happened. First of all the Medicon Valley and the Øresund University took off as institutions and indicated the success of the regional integration. Second, not much else happened. Cross-border passing and regional integration developed much slower than expected. Only now, ten years later, the actual cross border interaction has reached the level of activity that was expected to display shortly after the inauguration of the fixed link. The Interreg IIIa programme was born out of this stop-and-go process. High hopes were associated with the integration in the region but the hopes fulfilled were initiated before the fixed link was established. Hopes born by the construction of the Øresund Bridge were only fulfilled at a far later point in time than expected. The success of the Interreg IIIa programme on the measure level is quite unquestionable. On the overall level all three priorities were overachieved and on the detailed level of sub-measures only one in 14 submeasures were not achieved or overachieved. Also with respect to the financial allocation over time it is fair to say that the Interreg IIIa program was a success in terms of adapting to changed priorities and realities of the region without loosing the original goals a sight. To which extent the Interreg IIIa program then actually had an impact that matches the resources spend is more difficult to assess. The methodological set-up for monitoring the implementation of the program was not strong on impact measures. Neither was the first level financial control implicating that by the conclusion of the program the Commission suspended its final payment to the Interreg IIIa program. Also the administrative set-up vis-à-vis the political steering of the program was critically debated. After the termination of the Interreg IIIa program efforts have been made correct the defaults of the first level financial control and to accommodate criticism with respect to the administrative set-up. What stands is the slow down of speed in reducing barriers to trade and commerce and the imbalance in political focus on integration between the Swedish and the Danish side of the region. Also the Interreg program is consider en “elite program” for public administration bodies limiting the involvement of private partners. The institutional and regulatory set-up in Denmark and Sweden is still so different that cross-border cooperation is hampered. Diverging national legal frameworks and lack of transperancy and coordination in fields such as cross-border taxation, social security, pension and unemployment benefits as well as civic rights limits the potential for a new lifestyle in the Region where companies can expand their R20090293.doc 4 January 2010 INTERREG III ex-post evaluation. In-depth evaluation of the PROGRAMME: INTERREG IIIA ØRESUND (DENMARK – SWEDEN) markets, job-seekers can take up working in the neighbouring country, families can start new lives on the other side and students can follow courses on more than one university. The short- and medium term policy recommendations based on the evaluation highlights: • Involvement of remote regions facilitated by specific marketing efforts, by favouring proposals involving remote parts of the region (on the prerequisite that all other requirements are met satisfactory) and by proactive efforts in raising awareness of specific project opportunities, • Involvement of the National Governments in e.g. analysis of the benefits of removing or reducing one or more of the barriers in question. • Priority to cross-border projects in the area of Health, Social Care, Police, Custom etc. In a long-term policy perspective the overall recommendation is to continuously analyze the development of the region and balance the integration of new topics with sustaining attention to old topics until the intended effects has been achieved. This sailing between Scylla and Carybdis takes political leadership and the first long term policy recommendation is to ensure as much political leadership as possible in the overall governance of future INTERREG programmes. From a long term policy perspective the INTERREG IIIa programme has been fairly well integrated with other regional programmes and activities. Securing national government support, however, has been and are still, lacking hampering the cross-border integration in areas such as diverging national legal frameworks and lack of transparency and coordination in fields such as cross-border taxation, social security, pension and unemployment benefits as well as civic rights. Political leadership in the governance of the INTERREG programmes is essential both to balance existing and new priorities and to secure national government