No. 153 25 July 2014 russian analytical digest www.css.ethz.ch/rad www.laender-analysen.de NORTH CAUCASUS ■■ANALYSIS The North and the South in the Caucasus—Separated or Interlinked? 2 By Uwe Halbach, Berlin ■■ANALYSIS Religious Identity and Conflict in Dagestan 5 By Manarsha Isaeva, Berlin ■■STATISTICS Victims of the Conflict in the North Caucasus 2013 8 ■■ANALYSIS Russian Cossacks in Service of the Kremlin: Recent Developments and Lessons from Ukraine 9 By Tomáš Baranec, Tbilisi ■■FURTHER READING Caucasus Analytical Digest 13 Institute for European, Research Centre Center for German Association for Russian, and Eurasian Studies Institute of History for East European Studies Security Studies East European Studies The George Washington University of Zurich University University of Bremen ETH Zurich RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 153, 23 September 2014 2 ANALYSIS The North and the South in the Caucasus—Separated or Interlinked? By Uwe Halbach, Berlin Abstract While the North and South Caucasus are often considered as separate regions, there are in fact many link- ages between them. This article examines the cleavages that divide the overall Caucasus region and the many factors that transcend the north–south line. A Region of Divisions over this territory was a trigger for intensified security In the post-Soviet period, international conferences on cooperation between Georgia and the U.S. after 2002. Caucasian affairs examined South Caucasus topics such Other North–South interfaces are marked by state as unresolved separatist conflicts, competition over pipe- borders between the Russian Federation and a neighbor line routes or domestic political developments along state like Azerbaijan that are dividing settlement areas a spectrum spanning from the “Rose Revolution” in of ethnicities like the Lezgins. In the early years of its Georgia to the dynastic transfer of presidential power independence, Azerbaijan was exposed to Dagestan in in Azerbaijan. When they addressed the North Cauca- the North Caucasus with a Lezgin national movement sus, the main focus for a long time was on Chechnya. on both sides of the border developing separatist ten- Analysis followed a fault line between the northern and dencies. Later on, Azerbaijan was a main destination for southern halves of the Caucasus, legitimized by consid- Chechen refugees during the first and, even more, dur- erations of geography, history, as well as by the differ- ing the second war in Chechnya. With the expansion ence of status between independent states and “federal of jihadist networks in the eastern part of the North subjects” within the larger Russian Federation. Inter- Caucasus, another challenge was emerging for the only national institutions had access to the South Caucasus Muslim country in the South Caucasus. with its three independent states, but only very limited entrée to the North Caucasus, where developments are The North Caucasus: Russia’s “Internal deemed Russia’s internal affairs. It is hard to consider Abroad” and a Zone of Violence the Caucasus as a consistent region, given its numerous For about 15 years the external perception of the North internal cleavages, not only in terms of the North–South Caucasus was largely confined to Chechnya, which division, but also within its sub-regions. became the pars pro toto for the whole of the region. Since at least 2005, however, the diffusion of instability Interfaces between North and South and violence went far beyond this one republic. Russia’s Caucasus location between its own “internal abroad” in the North Despite these multiple cleavages, there are interdepen- Caucasus and its “near abroad” in the South Caucasus is dencies calling a strict separation into question. From marked by a contradiction: Russia is claiming influence the beginning of the post-Soviet period there have been in its “zone of privileged interests” in the South Cau- crucial interfaces between both parts of the Caucasus. casus, but it can hardly cope with diverse challenges to Georgia’s breakaway territories—Abkhazia and South security and stability in its own “internal abroad” in Ossetia—belong to such interfaces. Both entities shifted the Caucasus. With Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Rus- away from the South Caucasus to the Russian North sia took over two military protectorates and claimed to Caucasus in terms of self-identification, trade and traf- provide them independence and security. At the same fic. Armed non-state actors like the Confederation of time Russia is obviously not able to guarantee a suffi- Caucasian Peoples intervened from the North Cauca- cient degree of security, stability, let alone good gover- sus into Georgia and participated in the Abkhazian con- nance to its own federal subjects in the Caucasus. flict during its war phase in 1992–1993. This connec- For a long time security deficits across the region tion between Abkhaz, Circassians (Adyge) and other were interpreted as having emanated from the conflict ethnic groups of the North Caucasus against Georgia on Chechnya. In April 2009, Moscow lifted Chech- mobilized broader parts of this “region” before Chech- nya’s designation as an anti-terrorism operation zone. nya’s conflict with Russia became the regional focus of Only a few months later, however, President Medve- ethno-political action. About ten years later Georgia’s dev declared that the entire North Caucasus consti- Pankisi Gorge at the border with Chechnya emerged as tutes Russia’s primary domestic challenge. In a report another crucial interface in the context of Russia’s sec- from June 2010, the Council of Europe also character- ond Chechen war. Georgia’s temporary loss of control ized the situation there as the most sensitive within its RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 153, 25 July 2014 3 large membership zone. More or less the entire North precarious security situation, and provoked negative Caucasus has emerged as Russia’s precarious “internal reactions in the Russian public, which increasingly dis- abroad” and a zone of violence. Ramazan Abdulatipov, likes subsidies for the Caucasus. Recently Khloponin since 2013 Dagestan’s head of republic, once posed a rhe- resigned as the Russian President’s representative in the torical question asking why post-Soviet Russia had not North Caucasus Federal District. His project of attract- dedicated a day of commemoration to the end of the ing investment and business into the region had not met Caucasus War in 1864 as it had done for other events in the Kremlin’s expectations about pacifying the region. the fatherland’s history. His answer was clear: “Because He was replaced by the commander of the joint forces the war is still going.” May be not open war, but inter- of the Russian Interior Ministry’s troops in the North national security analyses ascribe a state of permanent Caucasus, Sergei Melikov, a Tabasaran—i.e. member of low intensity conflict to the region. an ethnic group close to the Lezghis in Dagestan. This Manifold factors are used to explain this degree of replacement symbolizes a shift back to the siloviki and instability. They include Islamist insurgency, inter-eth- the central role which Dagestan is currently playing in nic tension, border disputes, a dramatic lack of good North Caucasian affairs. governance, and numerous social-economic problems of poverty at Russia’s periphery. Violence here is not Challenges for, and Responses from, the confined to underground forces fighting under the slo- South gan of jihad. The state organs, both federal and local, Instability and violence in the North Caucasus is chal- are practicing counter actions which are far away from lenging Russia, but it also affects the South Cauca- any rule of law. In November 2011 Dagestan’s capi- sus, where Georgia is most and Armenia least exposed tal saw its largest civil protest for many years. An esti- to developments at Russia’s Caucasian state periphery. mated 2,500 people took to the streets of Makhachkala How do neighbors in the South Caucasus react to this to object to growing police abuse. Organizations that challenge? monitor human rights in the North Caucasus suggest Baku’s foreign and regional policy is based on a prag- that practically all kidnappings today are connected to matic relationship with Moscow, notwithstanding the authorities. Russia’s close security and economic partnership with After the end of the first Chechen war in 1996, the Armenia. This pragmatic approach has its impact on outstanding ethno-nationalist separatist movement in Azerbaijan’s policy toward the North Caucasus, which the North Caucasus was more and more transformed is different from Georgia’s approach to this arc of cri- into a Jihad using trans-ethnic Islamist appeals. When sis. Dagestan is the focal point for Azerbaijan’s rela- Doku Umarov, the last underground President of the tions to its northern neighborhood in terms of economy Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, announced a “Cauca- and security. Around 70 percent of the goods turnover sian Islamic Emirate” in October 2007, this ideological between Azerbaijan and Russia comes from the cross- transition was completed. It is hard to discern exactly border co-operation with Dagestan. With the formu- how many fighters this “Emirate” has at its disposal. lation of a political and developmental strategy toward But there is no question that it is a main actor of insur- its new North Caucasus Federal District Russia began gency in the region. Chechnya is more and more losing to involve Azerbaijan, as the economic heavyweight in its central position in this underground structure. The the South Caucasus, into its own troublesome Cauca- new emir after Doku Umarov’s death last year—Ali Abu sian periphery. Both sides agreed upon border delimi- Muhammad, an Avar theologian from Dagestan—is the tation. A process of engaging Azerbaijan in the North first non-Chechen at the top of this virtual Islamic state. Caucasus culminated in October, 2011, with Khlopo- In 2010 Russia reacted to the challenge from its nin’s visit to Baku with the goal of increasing the inter- internal abroad in the Caucasus with a new adminis- est of Azerbaijani investors in long-term investments in trative arrangement.