Presidents Heydar Aliyev and Robert Kocharian with the three Minsk Group co-chairs and US Secretary of State Colin Powell at the Key West talks, April 2001. Source: Andy Newman/AFP/Getty Images The role of the OSCE “ It has to be a solution that works for the government of Armenia and the government of an assessment of international Azerbaijan, and the people of Armenia and the people of Azerbaijan.” Carey Cavanaugh, former US co-chair of the Minsk Group, mediation efforts commenting on talks in Key West, Florida, 2001 “ To underestimate the position of Karabakh is a major mistake.” Terhi Hakala, Roving Ambassador of Finland to the Volker Jacoby South Caucasus he Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) began to work on the Nagorny T Karabakh conflict in March 1992, soon after newly independent Armenia and Azerbaijan had joined the organization. This coincided with a unique historical moment in which the iron curtain had fallen and there appeared to be mutual understanding among the CSCE participating states that cooperation was better than confrontation. In this euphoria, it appeared that the Soviet Union’s successor states, especially Russia, could be included in a world system of equals. The CSCE took the first steps to transform itself into the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE – the name was changed only in December 1994) in an attempt to address issues of common interest in what may now appear a naive spirit of mutual trust and shared values prevailing over narrow national interests. Volker Jacoby worked as Assistant to With its regional remit the CSCE appeared better placed than the United Nations (UN) to deal with the Karabakh the Personal Representative of the conflict, although Armenia and the Karabakh Armenians OSCE Chairman-in-Office for the favoured the UN as a forum for resolution as its historical ‘friends’ France and Russia were members of the Security Nagorny Karabakh conflict 1998-99. Council. Azerbaijan, for the same reason, favoured the In 1999 he completed a PhD on involvement of the CSCE, of which its biggest ally Turkey was a member. It was also the strong conviction the politics of Armenia, and from of key state actors that a breakthrough was imminent 1999-2004 held different positions that led the CSCE to assume responsibility for mediation in the Karabakh conflict. within the OSCE Mission to Georgia. 30 Accord 17 When the CSCE initiated what was to become the agreed that multinational troops would be preferable ‘Minsk Process’, it was expected that a conference to only Russian ones, and in December 1994 the now would be held in Minsk, Belarus, as early as spring 1992 OSCE established a High Level Planning Group in where the details of a peaceful settlement would be Vienna, tasked with preparing the stationing of OSCE determined. The CSCE community believed that only peacekeeping forces in the conflict zone. technical details would need to be clarified, the groundwork having been worked out by a preparatory The US, at least from 1994, developed interests in the body: the ‘Minsk Group’ of eleven CSCE countries. region linked to the presence of oil in the Caspian However, as ever more problems surfaced, the basin and its agenda of diversifying oil production diplomatic preparatory body itself evolved into the and transportation while circumventing Iran. Tensions forum for negotiations, and the Minsk conference between Armenia and Turkey, a Minsk Group member was indefinitely postponed. The participating states state supporting Azerbaijan, mounted in the aftermath accepted this makeshift arrangement without dissent. of the Armenian occupation of Kelbajar in March 1993: Turkey declared a blockade on Armenia and admitted to supporting Azerbaijan’s army with military hardware. Establishing a role: national versus supranational agendas In mid-1993, the Swedish Minsk Group chair, By 1994, the CSCE confronted a twofold task: firstly, to responding to conflicts generated by the different mediate, facilitate and support a peaceful settlement of national agendas, moved to limit the circle of the Nagorny Karabakh conflict, and secondly to negotiate participants in the peace talks. Minsk Group players relations between its participating states and determine seen as less important would be informed but would the role of the CSCE and, specifically, of the Minsk Process not take part in the subsequent negotiations. After the within it. Particularly in the initial phases, frictions ceasefire Russia assumed a role as Minsk Group co-chair between key CSCE players complicated both agendas. with Sweden, and in 1997 a permanent ‘Troika’ of co-chairs, consisting of Russia, the US and France, was Russia has played a dual role as member of the Minsk formed. This was followed by an active period of Group and as a dominant regional actor. Russia has shuttle diplomacy to find a resolution, hampered by always had its national objectives in its ‘near abroad’ (the the fact that Minsk Group co-chairs are less likely to fourteen formerly Soviet republics, now independent act exclusively as individual mediators than as states), not necessarily shared by other members of the representatives of their respective states. The only Minsk Group. This contradiction manifested itself in OSCE body in place on the ground is the Personal Russia’s competing mediation efforts: it was Russia, and Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, a not the Minsk Group, which brokered the May 1994 post occupied since 1997 by Ambassador Andrzej ceasefire. The other CSCE participating states Kasprczyk of Poland. His mandate, however, does honoured this, but were reluctant to agree to sending not include negotiations. peacekeeping forces. However, all parties to the conflict The role of the OSCE: an assessment of international mediation efforts 31 The Minsk Process: issues, proposals Stepanakert. It was rejected by Azerbaijan on the grounds of the violation of its territorial integrity and and principles of the principles agreed by the OSCE at its summit in Once more stable working relationships had been Lisbon, December 1996, where Armenia had been established within the Minsk Group its discussions alone in rejecting a statement reiterating principles focused on Nagorny Karabakh’s status and security, as for a settlement stressing the territorial integrity of well as refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) Azerbaijan. Finally, President Robert Kocharian of and the problem of the once Azerbaijani-dominated Armenia and President Heydar Aliyev of Azerbaijan Karabakh town of Shusha. Between 1997 and 2001 four discussed a proposal based on an exchange of access options, representing different methodologies of to territory in 2001, though this never got as far as an resolution, were discussed. The first, referred to as the OSCE draft agreement. In the course of the domestic ‘package solution’, favoured talking about all issues, debates launched only after the talks, Aliyev reported including Karabakh’s final status, simultaneously to (and Kocharian denied) that it had involved Armenia achieve the optimum balance. Given the number of surrendering access to a strip of its southern district of issues on the table, this approach would offer more Meghri, offering Azerbaijan direct access to Nakhichevan, leeway for compromise. The package proposal in return for accepting Armenian control over the presented by the co-chairs in May-July 1997 consisted Lachin corridor connecting Karabakh with Armenia. of two agendas: ‘Agreement I’ on ending the conflict, including troop withdrawals, deployment of None of the proposals could bring the sides close to peacekeepers, return of displaced persons and security agreement on status by reconciling the needs of self- guarantees; and ‘Agreement II’ on Karabakh’s final determination with territorial integrity to the liking of status. The agendas were separate, as the 1997 OSCE all parties. Being founded on the Helsinki principles Ministerial Council reported, ‘to allow the parties to (named after the 1975 Helsinki Final Act of the CSCE), negotiate and implement each at its own pace, but the OSCE stands for the inviolability of the frontiers of with a clear understanding that at the end of the day all its participating states. Although the principle of outstanding issues will have to be resolved.’ Reactions territorial integrity is stipulated with a view to interstate in Baku and Yerevan were encouraging, but conflicts, how this aspect should be dealt with Stepanakert rejected it. regarding intrastate conflicts is determined only implicitly. The Final Act speaks of the right of peoples The so-called ‘step-by-step’ solution, proposed in to self-determination “in conformity…with…territorial September 1997, was premised on sealing Agreement I integrity of States”. This convinces some authors of the first before dealing with Agreement II, with the question OSCE’s inability to be neutral. The Helsinki principles, of the Lachin corridor linking Nagorny Karabakh with however, stipulate one important aspect: any decision Armenia moved to Agreement II. Nagorny Karabakh to alter frontiers must take place ‘by peaceful means would continue to exist in its present form until and by agreement’. Hence there is no contradiction agreement on final status was reached, but would gain between accepting the inviolability of frontiers and internationally recognized ‘interim status’. In principle being neutral at the same time, provided any agreement the step-by-step solution would build a constructive