Two Arguments Against the Particular Content Reading of Nicolas Malebranche’s ‘General Volitions’ In the Treatise on Nature and Grace, Malebranche states that the idea of God “includes two attributes absolutely necessary to the creation of the world: an unlimited wisdom and an irresistible power,” and that “His power is nothing other than His will.” 1 Having identified God’s power with his volition, Malebranche goes on to discuss God’s actions (the manifestations of his power) in terms of ‘general’ and ‘particular volitions.’ God acts by general volitions when “He acts in consequence of the general laws which He has established,” and by particular volitions when “the efficacy of His will is not determined by some general law to produce some effect.” Given these definitions, it is natural to ask what the relation is between God’s action, volition, and the laws he established. Steven Nadler, in his paper “Occasionalism and General Will in Malebranche,”2 identified two different accounts of the relation in question, differing primarily over the nature of God’s general volitions. On one account, God’s general volitions are simply identical with the general laws (and so themselves make no references to particular objects), while on the other account, to speak of God acting by general volitions is to speak of God acting by volitions with particular content (i.e. ones which do make references to particular objects) which are themselves in accordance with the general 1 Traité de la nature et de la grace (1680), volume 14 of the Oeuvres complètes de Malebranche (André Robinet, ed., Paris: J. Vrin, 1958-67). Throughout, I use the translation by Thomas Taylor: Treatise on Nature and Grace, in Malebranche: Philosophical Selections, Steven Nadler, ed., Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company (1992). All page references to the Treatise are to the translation. 2 Journal of the History of Philosophy 31 (1993), pp. 31-47. Reprinted in The Rationalists: Critical Essays on Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, Derk Pereboom, ed., Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers (1999), pp. 343-62. All pages references will be to the reprinted version. laws established by God. Nadler goes on to argue for the latter reading. Recently, Andrew Pessin has published a series of articles supporting Nadler’s position.3 Pessin acknowledges that the text does not consistently lend itself to one reading over the other,4 but holds that Nadler’s reading is nevertheless more plausible. My aim in this paper is to provide two new arguments against the reading advocated by Nadler and Pessin. The first rejects an assumption active both in how they see certain passages from Malebranche supporting their reading and in how they see aspects of their reading as being necessary if Malebranche is to be read as coherent. This assumption, I argue, would probably not be accepted by Malebranche, and is implausible in itself. The second and shorter argument deals with Malebranche’s solution to the problem of evil. While both Nadler’s and Pessin’s reading and the reading they reject are able to make sense of this solution, I argue that the latter is superior insofar as the solution is intended to offer consolation to those affected by evil. I 3 “Malebranche’s Doctrine of Freedom/Consent and the Incompleteness of God’s Volitions,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 8(1) (2000), pp. 21-53; “Malebranche’s natural theodicy and the incompleteness of God’s Volitions,” Religious Studies 36 (2000), pp. 47-63; “Malebranche’s Distinction Between General and Particular Volitions,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 39 (January 2001): pp. 77- 99. 4 Partly in response to Andrew Black (“Malebranche’s Theodicy,” Journal of the History of Philosophy, 35 (January 1997), pp. 27-44), who points out the inconsistency of Nadler’s reading with Malebranche’s describing the laws of nature as themselves efficacious and with Malebranche’s emphasis on the small number of divine volitions. Pessin offers a useful schematization of the debate, in terms of the content of the volitions.5 (GC) is the reading he and Nadler attack, while (PC) is the reading they advance: (GC): A “general volition” for Malebranche is one whose content is general: a “particular volition” is one whose content is particular. (PC): All divine volitions have particular contents, but a “general volition” is one in accord with general laws, while a “particular volition” is one not in accord with general laws.6 While Pessin goes some to some length the specify what is involved in general vs. particular content, for this paper it will be sufficient to think of general content as involving universal quantification over objects and times in the form of laws (e.g. “moving bodies tend to continue their motion in a straight line”,7 which could be recast in quantificational terms) and particular content as involving no universal quantification but only reference to particular objects and times. On (GC), then, when Malebranche distinguishes between general and particular volitions, he is making a distinction of volitional content. On (PC), by contrast, Malebranche is distinguishing what Pessin calls ‘nomic’ from ‘anomic’ volitions, where both types of volitions have particular content. What does have general content, on (PC), are the laws with which general volitions are in accord. Pessin acknowledges that a number of passages in Malebranche seem to support (GC) directly, but he contends that a number of others strongly support (PC). A close 5 Bringing in the notion of the content of a volition allows the debate to present volitions as statements (e.g. “Let it be that…”), but it is worth noting that it is not clear that Malebranche would grant that every one of God’s volitions could be adequately reflected in a statement. I do not consider here how this issue might affect the debate. 6 Pessin, “Malebranche’s Distinction…” pp. 77-78. 7 Treatise, p. 261. consideration of two of the latter will reveal an assumption under which both he and Nadler are working: I say that God acts by general wills, when he acts in consequence of general laws which he has established… God acts by particular wills when the efficacy of his will is not determined… by some general law to produce some effect.8 Pessin, while acknowledging that a reading of this passage in accordance with (GC) is possible, contends that it shows how Malebranche directly links nomicity with general volitions and anomicity with particular volitions in just the way (PC) claims. But Pessin intends the passage to support the overall picture of general volitions (PC) provides, with particular divine actions being the result of particular volitions in accordance with general laws (Nadler quotes this passage for the latter purpose9).10 This latter intention is more clearly evident in Pessin’s quotation of a series of passages in which Malebranche describes God’s relation to laws as one of submission, obeyance, observing, etc. 11 What seems to support (PC) in such passages is the implication that, as Nadler puts it, “God is, by means of… individual acts of will, simply executing or following through the laws instituted at creation.”12 I think that it would be a mistake for the proponent of (GC) to deny that Malebranche is committed to particular 8 Treatise, p. 263-64. Quoted in Pessin, “Malebranche’s Distinction…” p. 79. 9 Nadler, “Occasionalism…” p. 354. 10 In fact, merely citing this passage in support of the connection between general/particular volitions and nomicity/anomicity would hardly be evidence for (PC) over (GC). For a proponent of (GC) would grant that Malebranche is making such a direct connection in that any divine volition with general content is itself a general law, and God only acts by particular volitions when the general volitions (i.e. the laws) are insufficient for some end. On the development of Malebranche’s position on explaining when God acts by particular volitions see p. 94 of Denis Moreau, “Malebranche on Disorder and Physical Evil: Manichaeism or Philosophical Courage?” in The Problem of Evil in Early Modern Philosophy, Kremer and Latzer eds., Toronto: University of Toronto Press (2001), pp. 81-100. 11 One clear example is “men should know that God is so much the master of nature that if He submits to His established laws, it is rather because He so desires than by an absolute necessity,” Treatise, p. 262. Quoted by Pessin, “Malebranche’s Distinction …” p. 81. 12 Nadler, “Occasionalism…” p. 354. Since Nadler goes on to say, for the sake of consistency with divine immutability, that particular divine volitional acts need not themselves be temporal, it seems that he should also ultimately recast the language about the laws being instituted at creation. divine actions that are in accordance with general laws. For when two billiard balls bounce off one another, this is a particular event, and since for Malebranche God is the only true cause, there must be a sense in which it is correct to say that the bouncing is a particular divine action. But what Nadler and Pessin assume, without any real argument, is that any particular divine action requires a corresponding volition with particular content. Nadler simply states (in the course of denying that God’s volitions themselves have to be temporal, as opposed to just having temporal content), All that is required [by (PC)] is a one-to-one correspondence between temporal events and divine volitions, such that for each event x (physical or mental) there is an individual volition (with a particular content) in God causing that event to occur when it does (“Let it be the case that x at t)… But note, God still wills particular events that occur in time, and not just general laws.13 Pessin identifies the assumption and provides some motivation for it, though he seems to think it too obvious to require detailed support: we’re concerned with God’s practical volitions, those that are causally efficacious.