The EU’s Strategic Compass for security and defence Squaring ambition with reality Dick Zandee Clingendael Report Adája Stoetman Bob Deen The EU’s Strategic Compass for security and defence Squaring ambition with reality Dick Zandee Adája Stoetman Bob Deen Clingendael Report May 2021 Disclaimer: The research for and production of this report has been conducted within the PROGRESS research framework agreement. Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed, rests solely with the authors and does not constitute, nor should be construed as, an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence. May 2021 © Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’. Cover photo: EU Strategic Compass © The Clingendael Institute Unauthorized use of any materials violates copyright, trademark and / or other laws. Should a user download material from the website or any other source related to the Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’, or the Clingendael Institute, for personal or non-commercial use, the user must retain all copyright, trademark or other similar notices contained in the original material or on any copies of this material. Material on the website of the Clingendael Institute may be reproduced or publicly displayed, distributed or used for any public and non-commercial purposes, but only by mentioning the Clingendael Institute as its source. Permission is required to use the logo of the Clingendael Institute. This can be obtained by contacting the Communication desk of the Clingendael Institute ([email protected]). The following web link activities are prohibited by the Clingendael Institute and may present trademark and copyright infringement issues: links that involve unauthorized use of our logo, framing, inline links, or metatags, as well as hyperlinks or a form of link disguising the URL. About the authors Dick Zandee is Head of the Security Unit at the Clingendael Institute. His research focuses on European security and defence issues, EU-NATO, military forces and capability development, defence industry and other security topics. Adája Stoetman is Junior Researcher at the Security Unit of the Clingendael Institute. Her work revolves both around security and defence as well as strategic foresight. Her area of expertise is international security, with a specific interest in Latin America and the Dutch Caribbean. Bob Deen is coordinator of the Clingendael Russia and Eastern Europe Centre (CREEC) and Senior Research Fellow in the Security Unit of the Clingendael Institute. His research centres on international security issues and multilateral cooperation, with a particular focus on Eastern Europe, Russia, the Caucasus and Central Asia. The Clingendael Institute P.O. Box 93080 2509 AB The Hague The Netherlands Follow us on social media @clingendaelorg The Clingendael Institute The Clingendael Institute clingendael_institute Clingendael Institute Email: [email protected] Website: www.clingendael.org Contents Executive Summary 1 List of Acronyms 7 1 Introduction 9 2 The need for a Strategic Compass 11 3 What the EU should be able to do 16 4 What is needed to get there 29 5 How to better cooperate with NATO 45 6 Recommendations 52 Annex 1 Written contribution by Vice-Adm. (Ret.) Ben Bekkering 54 Annex 2 Written contribution by Michael Simm 60 Annex 3 Written contribution by Dr. (Hab) Renaud Bellais 66 Executive Summary The European Union (EU) is developing a Strategic Compass for security and defence, to be ready by March 2022. The first semester of 2021 is the phase of the ‘strategic dialogue’ with the member states and institutions of the EU, including the involvement of think tanks and other stakeholders. Commissioned by the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, the Clingendael Institute delivers its contribution to the strategic dialogue on the Strategic Compass by focussing on defining more precisely the military level of ambition of the EU and what it implies for capability development and the relationship with NATO. The EU faces a wider set of challenges and threats than ever before. In the global power rivalry between China, Russia and the United States, it is ‘Europe’ that runs the danger of becoming irrelevant and the object of great power actions rather than being a global actor. The arc of instability around Europe is unlikely to turn into an arc of stability. The challenges posed by state and non-state actors – the latter in particular in the southern neighbourhood – require the EU to respond to external conflicts and crises, to support partners to provide security for their own population and to protect the Union and its citizens – the three strategic priorities for the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as defined five years ago in the Implementation Plan on Security and Defence. While the EU has made progress in many areas – trade policies, partnerships, civilian crisis management – its military tools have remained weak as a result of a lack of political will and the absence of adequate military means. The Strategic Compass offers the opportunity to close the gap between ‘too much rhetoric’ and ‘too little action’ that have characterised the EU’s security and defence efforts so far. In recent years, new instruments have been created to improve European defence cooperation – such as the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund (EDF) – but these are what they are: without strategic direction instruments tend to become bureaucratic tools rather than the rails on which the train travels to its destination. In the Strategic Compass the EU has to define more precisely its military level of ambition and what it implies for capability development and partnerships. In short, the report tries to answer two questions: (1) what should the EU be able to do, and (2) what is needed to get there? The relationship with NATO has to be taken into account in answering these key questions. 1 The EU’s Strategic Compass for security and defence | Clingendael Report, May 2021 What should the EU be able to do? Parallel to the EU’s Strategic Compass, the Alliance is developing its new Strategic Concept. It offers a unique opportunity to ensure complementarity and to end the useless discussion on ‘either the EU or NATO’ – mainly fuelled by political agendas instead of practical arguments. Both organisations are much needed and, thus, the question is how the EU-NATO strategic partnership should be further developed. As the member states deliver the military capabilities, there is only one conclusion to be made: capability development in the EU also serves NATO as 21 European countries are members of both organisations. The US will continue to demand that Europe takes more responsibility for its own security and delivers a larger part of the NATO burden. Thus, the Strategic Compass should state what Europe is able and willing to do, while at the same time indicating that, in terms of military capabilities, this will contribute to a fairer NATO burden-sharing with the US. For the EU’s military level of ambition, the reality of available capabilities has to be factored in. Serious shortfalls continue to exist and limit the scope of the EU’s level of ambition with regard to the spectrum of operations – with shortcomings at the high end – as well as with regard to sustained deployment and geographical reach due to personnel and equipment shortages. Therefore, ambition has to be squared with realism. As capability development takes considerable time, the EU should make a distinction between the military level of ambition in the short term, from now to 2030, and the long term, that is beyond that year. Short term The Helsinki Headline Goal is outdated and is not related to the new 360-degree threat environment that the EU is facing in the 2020s and beyond. The broad range of crisis management operations as defined in the Implementation Plan for Security and Defence of 2016 is still valid as the basis for ‘what the EU should be able to do’ in the near term. Military operations for strengthening resilience have to be included for ensuring stable access to the global commons, including the protection of sea lanes of communication (SLOC), air reconnaissance and space. The EU should not establish a new quantitative Headline Goal as military operations will require tailor-made force packages. Instead, Strategic Operational Cases (SOCs) could be developed, describing the most likely geographical environment, the characteristics of the opponent and its way of operating and what EU forces or actions would be needed in response. The EU Battlegroups, but also new force packages, such as the proposed EU initial entry capability of around 5,000 military with all necessary enablers, have to be incorporated in these SOCs. For external operations the geographical focus should be on the southern neighbourhood and the Indian Ocean, with the possibility of demonstrating a 2 The EU’s Strategic Compass for security and defence | Clingendael Report, May 2021 maritime presence in the Pacific. Although there can be no formal division of labour, the comparative advantage of the EU – the ability to use the whole civilian and military toolbox – argues for the Union as the primary responsible organisation in crisis management, in particular in the southern neighbourhood, while NATO remains responsible for collective defence. Resilience has both an internal as well as an external dimension. Hence, the EU military level of ambition can no longer be limited to external operations that contribute to the resilience of neighbouring and partner countries. In contrast, the EU needs to actively engage in enhancing resilience among its member states. The Strategic Compass should define what the EU and its member states mean by resilience and its various elements. Article 42.7 (mutual defence clause) could be activated by an EU member state in case of armed attack, be it most likely consisting of cyberattacks or of other hybrid intrusion in member states’ domestic situation.