NOTEs 1 INTRODUCTiON: DEVELOPMENTAL SOCiAL GOVERNANCE iN TRANsiTiON 1. Chaebol is a term (in Korean) for South Korean business conglomerate(s) that operates multiple corporations in diverse industries with tight ownership and management control by a fam- ily (Kang, M. 1996). Chaebol’s indiscreet borrowings from interna- tional lenders in the 1990s were mainly held responsible for the national financial crisis of 1997–1998 (Kong, T. 2000). 2. Social policy was for the first time formalized into the organiza- tional structure of the government during the Roh Moo-Hyun presidency as Roh had been harshly criticized for neglecting social policy concerns during the early phase of his term. He set up a new post of “the chief secretary of social policy” in the presidential office in 2004. 2 DEVELOPMENTAL LiBERALisM: THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE AND SOCiAL POLiCY 1. By then, it needs to be pointed out, the ownership of many com- petitive industries had rapidly been transferred into the hands of Western financial players to varying degrees. The survival of these Asian industries having become a shared stake to Western financial © The Author(s) 2019 169 Chang K-S, Developmental Liberalism in South Korea, International Political Economy Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-14576-7 170 NOTES capital, their posture suddenly turned so lenient on governmental support for business. 2. Kim Dokyun’s (2013) thesis on the “asset-based livelihood secu- rity system” touches on an interesting aspect of this entrepreneur- ial pact between the developmental state and its opportunistic citizenry. 3. In Pressian (9 November 2004), No Hoechan, a congressman from Democratic Labor Party, was quoted as saying “Ten million citizens poised to demonstrate, [do you] wish to be beaten to death?” after hearing from a minister of the Roh Moo-Hyun gov- ernment that about ten million people were in serious poverty already or immediately (http://www.pressian.com/news/article. html?no=28461). No was criticizing Roh for refusing political dis- cussion and negotiation for solving such problems in the parlia- mentary sessions. 4. Lee adopted an explicitly neo-developmentalist election campaign in 2007 which successfully ushered him into presidency. However, Lee’s developmental failure in his actual presidency led Park to camouflage herself through election pledges in 2012 for welfare state and economic democratization. Once elected, she did not bother to pursue these goals (or, in fact, any serious national agen- das) and instead ended up being impeached in 2017 for scandalous abuses of her office and authority for civil rights violation, coerced bribery, and so forth. Given the political propagandic contamina- tion of welfare state and economic democratization by Park, the next president, Moon Jae-In, has avoided formally referring to these catchwords either during his presidential election race or in his presidency even though his socioeconomic policy has appar- ently been focused upon them. 5. Moon’s approval rate began to stagnate from roughly one year after his inauguration. This was mostly due to sluggish socioeco- nomic conditions that, according to his opposition critics, were aggravated by the Moon government policy line in economic affairs (JoongAng Ilbo; https://news.joins.com/article/23131387) 6. This reflects an ironic liberal bias of developmental state research unconsciously reflecting bourgeois hegemony. Such bias is even liable for the deficiency in research on internal organizational and social characteristics of developmental bureaucracy. NOTES 171 7. For instance, Esping-Andersen 1990 categorized social policy regimes (welfare states) as liberal, conservative, and social demo- cratic. But none of these categories are sufficiently suitable to depict those Asian states whose social policies are neither wholly negligible in practical importance nor indistinguishable in fashion. On the other hand, many scholars have attempted to identify dis- tinct cultural and/or religious traits in Asian social policy regimes—a practice called by White and Goodman (1998) “wel- fare orientalism”. However, as Goodman and White appraised, such cultural categorization of Asian social policy regimes has failed to receive wide agreement. 8. Social democracy began to be chosen as the most favored system in many social surveys of ordinary citizens as well as opinion leaders. Such preference, however, did not translate into the electoral sup- port for progressive political parties and politicians. See Yang, J. (2017) for a succinct explanation of political, social, and ideologi- cal factors underlying the failure of labor-led social democratic politics. 9. See Song, H. (1997), Shin, K. (2015), Kim, Y. (1998), etc. 10. This does not deviate from Esping-Andersen’s (1999) own brief appraisal of East Asia. He noticed a mixture of conservative and liberal elements in East Asian social policies but predicted that the conservative nature would be strengthened along the maturation of various social insurances. 11. So far, the most serious criticism in this line was presented in the col- lective study led by Gordon White and Roger Goodman. On the basis of comparative examination of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, and mainland China, they arrived at the following unreserved conclusion (White and Goodman 1998: 15): We found ‘cultural’ explanations in terms of Confucianism and the like, whether indigenous or foreign, unhelpful in our attempt to under- stand the evolution of East Asian welfare systems. When measured against the strategic impact of basic political, economic and demo- graphic factors, ‘culture’, as presently portrayed at least, proved to be of residual explanatory value. While it is truism that welfare systems may reflect deep-seated elements of social structure and values, it is hard to establish this empirically and take analysis beyond mere asser- tion or analogy. 172 NOTES Such conclusion, however, should not contradict the importance of Confucian orders and values in private arrangements of care and pro- tection for most of ordinary citizens in the region (Chang, K. 2018). 12. Besides the German social situation associated with classic develop- mental statism, there is a substantial body of influential literature on interventionist social policies for facilitating capitalist industrial- ization in more liberal settings (e.g., Donzelot 1979). 13. In a series of studies adopting or elaborating the “resource curse” thesis (Auty 1993), many scholars argue that natural resource richness can present a political trap for underdevelopment because it induces state elite to cajole populace with immediate material gifts drawn from natural endowment and idle on long-term national economic devel- opment. This possibility is much higher under an undemocratic regime, which naturally feels less pressure for being pushed out for a poor economic performance. This is one way of explaining the differ- ent developmental outcomes of political authoritarianism between some East Asian and Southeast Asian countries. Most recently, how- ever, such differential appraisals of the two regions have been sub- jected to empirical refutations (e.g., Sovacool 2010). 14. Developmentally promulgated liberal policy was applied to the eco- nomic sphere as well. When certain industries were judged to be lacking international competitiveness and thus did not merit strate- gic policy support, the developmental state turned ruthlessly liberal, leaving them vulnerable to hostile market conditions. In fact, urging them to practically dissolve as soon as possible was another critical component of developmental statism as evinced by a serious of stra- tegic laws for facilitating industrial restructuring through swift real- location of public resources from declining to emerging industries under the rubric of saneopgujo godohwa (industrial structural upscal- ing). The state needed to turn liberal to declining industries in order to become developmental to emerging industries. Incidentally, industrial policy transition necessitated a social policy expansion for population in declining industries. 15. This may relate to Huntington’s (1968) thesis on the relationship between political authoritarianism and economic development in developing societies. However, at least in South Korea, the eco- nomic functional utility of political authoritarianism did not ­prevent forcefully organized social resistances and, ultimately, democratization from below. Such social counter-movements, in NOTES 173 turn, seem to have pressured state elite to perform hard and ear- nestly for economic development as a political counter-strategy. 16. See Kim Yeon-Myeong (1993) for a comprehensive analysis of the impacts of South-North Korean Cold War on social welfare in the two states. 17. As recently as in 2013, a social democratic party, named Tong­ hapjinbodang (Unified Progressive Party), was disbanded by a Constitutional Court ruling. During the presidential election in 2012, this party expressed extreme antagonism to Park Geun-Hye as a supposed political heir of her dictatorial father, Park Chung- Hee. Once elected, Park did not hesitate to exercise her political executive power in removing this party through one of the most controversial political cases in the Constitutional Court’s history. 18. It is undeniable that North Korea’s prior success in land reform and industrialization generated a formidable pressure for South Korea’s catch-up. But these two tasks were not ideology-specific, that is, exclusively socialist