KNOW WHEN TO Hold ‘EM, KNOW WHEN to Fold ‘EM: A NEW TRANSFORMATION PLAN FOR THE NAvy’s SURfaCE BATTLE LINE Robert O. Work Thinking Center for Strategic and Budgetary Smarter Assessments About CSBA Defense csbaonline.org Know When to Hold ’Em, Know When to Fold ’Em: A New Transformation Plan for the Navy’s Surface Battle Line Robert O. Work Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments 2007 TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .......................................................................................................... I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................ III I. THE LONG AND WINDING ROAD: RETRACING THE DEVELOPMENT OF POST-COLD WAR PLANS FOR THE NAVY’S FUTURE SURFACE BATTLE LINE .................................................................... 1 A Rapid Fall From Grace ...................................................................................... 1 Planning Under Conditions of Scarce Resources and Uncertainty .................... 3 Impact of the Gulf War ......................................................................................... 4 A “Defining Battle” ......................................................................................... 6 The Immediate Postwar Naval Priority: Land-Attack ........................................ 12 The “Requirements School” Takes Over ........................................................... 15 When Budgets and Requirements Collide: Coming to Terms With a “300-ship Navy” .................................................................................................................. 20 Paying for the New “300-Ship Navy” ................................................................. 24 The Bull in the China Closet: the DDG-1000, aka the DD-21/DD(X) ................... 27 Time to Rethink the Current Transformation Strategy? ................................... 31 II. BACK TO THE FUTURE: PLANNING FOR THE POST-SECOND WORLD WAR SURFACE COMBATANT FLEET ........................................................................................................... 35 A Rapid Fall From Grace .................................................................................... 35 Planning Under Conditions of Scarce Resources and Uncertainty .................. 36 The Immediate Postwar Naval Priority: Anti-Submarine Warfare ..................... 37 When Requirements and Budgets Collide ......................................................... 39 A New Way Forward ........................................................................................... 42 Lessons for the Present? ................................................................................... 45 III. “FOLDING” THE DDG-1000/CG(X) ........................................................................... 49 Numbers Count, But Capabilities Matter ........................................................... 49 The Current Surface Battle Line: Second to None ............................................ 51 A Strong Hand, Getting Stronger ....................................................................... 56 The DDG-1000/CG(X): Time to Go “All In”? ........................................................ 57 The DDG-1000/CG(X): Or Time to “Fold”? .......................................................... 63 Betting on the Network ..................................................................................... 72 From TSBF to TFBN ........................................................................................... 79 Time to Throw in the Cards and Play a New Hand ............................................ 80 IV. “HOLDING” THE AEGIS/VLS FLEET ........................................................................... 85 A Critical Assumption ........................................................................................ 85 A Blind Bet ......................................................................................................... 87 Backing the Bet ................................................................................................. 88 Mid-life HM&E Upgrades............................................................................... 88 Mid-life Combat System Upgrades ............................................................... 89 An Additional Critical Requirement: A Battle Network Upgrade ................. 89 Crew-Reduction Measures ........................................................................... 96 A Sustained Follow-on Maintenance Regime ............................................... 97 The Importance of Being Earnest ................................................................ 99 But Can They Fight? .......................................................................................... 99 Ballistic Missile Attacks............................................................................... 99 Cruise Missile Attacks ............................................................................... 103 Attacks from Quiet, Air-Independent Submarines Operating in Noisy Littoral Waters ......................................................................................................... 105 Current Plans: Too Conservative a Bet? ......................................................... 108 But What About the Surface Combatant Industrial Base? .............................. 113 Adjusting to Low-rate Ship Construction ................................................... 114 Building BNRAM Prototypes ....................................................................... 116 Combining New Ship Construction and a BNRAM Program to Support the Transition to New LBNCs ................................................................................ 117 The Interim TFBN Battle Line .......................................................................... 120 Including the Allies .......................................................................................... 122 V. YOU’VE GOT TO KNOW WHEN TO HOLD ’EM, KNOW WHEN TO FOLD ’EM ...................... 125 GLOSSARY ..................................................................................................................... 129 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This report is an expansion of a Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments Backgrounder entitled Know When to Hold ’Em: Modernizing the Navy’s Surface Battle Line, dated September 20, 2006. It provides a broader, historical-based analysis of the Navy’s current plans to modernize and recapitalize its fleet of guided-missile cruisers, guided-missile destroyers, and general-purpose destroyers, and proposes a different transformation approach than the one now being pursued. I would like to acknowledge some of the many people who helped me in this effort. Several experts from Lockheed Martin either arranged for, or provided me with, briefings about the Aegis anti-air warfare combat system, the Mk-41 Vertical Launch System, Aegis ballistic missile defense capabilities, and Aegis Open Architecture. Among those who helped the most were: Paul Lemmo, Craig Quigley, Robby Harris, Ric Rushton, Bob Richie, Mac Grant, and Geoffrey Moss. I also received quite a bit of help and information from experts from General Dynamics. Karl Hasslinger arranged for me to take a tour of Bath Iron Works, and he accompanied me on the trip. A former member of the Office of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Karl constantly challenged my assumptions and conclusions, thereby helping me to better frame my arguments. While in Maine, Dugan Shipway, Tom Bowler, Mike Hammes, Bob Sprigg, and Andrew Bond were all gracious hosts, and answered my many questions about the yard, the improvements being made to the yard’s shipbuilding processes, and the DDG Modernization Program (Bath Iron Works is the planning yard for the program). They also mounted a spirited defense of the DDG-1000, the first new 21st century combatant. Dennis Stokowski, from General Dynamics’ Advanced Information Systems, was also instrumental in helping me to understand the technical aspects of open architecture. None of these fine people contributed to the final conclusions of this report, except to the degree that they answered my specific questions about existing or planned programs or capabilities. Indeed, I would guess that few, if any, would agree with my recommendation to stop building the DDG-1000 after two ships and to pursue instead a different transformation pathway for the Navy’s surface battle line. These conclusions were my own, as are any mistakes found in the report. i ii EXECUTIVE SUMMARY When hearing the term “ships-of-the-line”—warships that take their place in a navy’s line of battle—most think of old two- or three-deck sailing ships carrying large cannon batteries, or perhaps steam-powered, armored battleships. Since entering the age of jet aircraft, guided missiles, and nuclear-powered submarines, however, the US Navy’s “surface battle line” consists of battle force capable (BFC) surface combatants—large, multi-mission and focused-mission warships designed first to operate as part of a fast Carrier Strike Group. These include guided- missile cruisers (CGs), guided-missile destroyers (DDGs), and general-purpose destroyers (DDs). Battle force capable combatants are separate and distinct from legacy protection of shipping combatants (now known as frigates and guided missile frigates) and newer littoral combat ships, both of which are smaller, and less capable, focused-mission warships.