View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by St Andrews Research Repository The Metaphysics of Agency Markus Ernst Schlosser Submitted for the Degree of Ph.D. in Philosophy August 21, 2006 Abstract Mainstream philosophy of action and mind construes intentional behaviour in terms of causal processes that lead from agent-involving mental states to action. Actions are construed as events, which are actions in virtue of being caused by the right mental antecedents in the right way. Opponents of this standard event-causal approach have criticised the view on various grounds; they argue that it does not account for free will and moral responsibility, that it does not account for action done in the light of reasons, or, even, that it cannot capture the very phenomenon of agency. The thesis defends the standard event-causal approach against challenges of that kind. In the first chapter I consider theories that stipulate an irreducible metaphysical relation between the agent (or the self) and the action. I argue that such theories do not add anything to our understanding of human agency, and that we have, therefore, no reason to share the metaphysically problematic assumptions on which those alternative models are based. In the second chapter I argue for the claim that reason- explanations of actions are causal explanations, and I argue against non-causal alternatives. My main point is that the causal approach is to be preferred, because it provides an integrated account of agency by providing an account of the relation between the causes of movements and reasons for actions. In the third chapter I defend non-reductive physicalism as the most plausible version of the standard event- causal theory. In the fourth and last chapter I argue against the charge that the standard approach cannot account for the agent’s role in the performance of action. Further, I propose the following stance with respect to the problem of free will: we do not have free will, but we have the related ability to govern ourselves—and the best account of self-determination presupposes causation, but not causal determinism. ii Declarations I, Markus Schlosser, hereby certify that this thesis, which is approximately 98.000 words in length, has been written by me, that it is the record of work carried out by me and that it has not been submitted in any previous application for a higher degree. Date: 30/02/07 Signature of candidate: Markus Schlosser I was admitted as a research student in September, 2002 and as a candidate for the degree of Ph.D. in philosophy in September, 2003; the higher study for which this is a record was carried out in the University of St. Andrews between 2002 and 2006. Date: 30/02/07 Signature of candidate: Markus Schlosser I hereby certify that the candidate has fulfilled the conditions of the Resolution and Regulations appropriate for the degree of Ph.D. in philosophy in the University of St. Andrews and that the candidate is qualified to submit this thesis in application for that degree. Date: 30/02/07 Signature of supervisor: Sarah Broadie In submitting this thesis to the University of St. Andrews I understand that I am giving permission for it to be made available for use in accordance with the regulations of the University Library for the time being in force, subject to any copyright vested in the work being affected thereby. I also understand that the title and abstract will be published, and that a copy of the work may be made and supplied to any bona fide library or research worker. Date: 30/02/07 Signature of candidate: Markus Schlosser iii Acknowledgements I would like to thank Sarah Broadie, Allan Millar, Robert Kane, Alfred Mele, Jonathan Lowe, John Haldane, Simon Prosser, James Harris, Peter Clarke, David Archard, Zoë Payne, and audiences at seminars and conferences at the Universities of St. Andrews, Madrid, Austin, Glasgow, Edinburgh and Hertfordshire for their helpful comments and replies. I am especially grateful to my supervisor Sarah Broadie for her comments, advice, and encouragement. Research for this thesis was funded by a Postgraduate Research Grant from the Austrian Ministry of Education (2002-2004), an AHRC Postgraduate Award (2003- 2005), and a S.A.S.P. Scholarship from the University of St. Andrews (2005-2006). A slightly different version of the first part of the section ‘The Causal Exclusion Argument’ (Chapter 3) was first published as ‘Causal Exclusion and Over- determination’, in Di Nucci & McHugh (eds.) Content, Consciousness and Perception: Essays in Contemporary Philosophy of Mind, London: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2006. iv Contents INTRODUCTION.........................................................................................................................................1 CHAPTER ONE: AGENTS AND THEIR POWERS .............................................................................6 SOME PRELIMINARIES ON BEHAVIOUR AND ACTION ................................................................................6 Self-Movement and Internal Causes...................................................................................................10 REDUCTIONISM AND NON-REDUCTIONISM ABOUT AGENCY ..................................................................14 The Standard-Causal and the Agent-Causal Model..........................................................................18 Reductionism and the Agent ...............................................................................................................20 Reductionism and the Self...................................................................................................................24 AGENT-CAUSATION..................................................................................................................................25 The Traditional Model ........................................................................................................................27 Clarke’s Integrated Model of Agent-Causation.................................................................................29 The Case for Agent-Causation from Free Will ..............................................................................................32 The Case for Agent-Causation from Moral Responsibility ...........................................................................36 The Case Against Agent-Causation....................................................................................................37 Explanation and Control..................................................................................................................................37 Origination and Control...................................................................................................................................38 Origination and Moral Responsibility ............................................................................................................41 Conclusion...........................................................................................................................................43 THE METAPHYSICS OF AGENCY ...............................................................................................................44 Volitionism...........................................................................................................................................46 The Non-Reducible Self.......................................................................................................................49 Kantian Psychology ............................................................................................................................52 Emergentism........................................................................................................................................54 CHAPTER TWO: REASONS AND CAUSES........................................................................................58 TWO KINDS OF CAUSALISM, REASONS AND MENTAL ATTITUDES .........................................................58 Anomalous Monism.............................................................................................................................60 Externalism About Content.................................................................................................................64 Externalism About Reasons ................................................................................................................67 THE CASE FOR CAUSALISM ......................................................................................................................73 Davidson’s Challenge.........................................................................................................................73 Two Aspects of Reason-Explanations ............................................................................................................75 A First Alternative...............................................................................................................................78 A Second Alternative...........................................................................................................................84 A Third Alternative..............................................................................................................................86 Agreement between Causalists and Non-Causalist? .........................................................................89 Reasons and Causes............................................................................................................................91