China, Cambodia, and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence: Principles and Foreign Policy Sophie Diamant Richardson Old Chatham, New York Bachelor of Arts, Oberlin College, 1992 Master of Arts, University of Virginia, 2001 A Dissertation presented to the Graduate Faculty of the University of Virginia in Candidacy for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Politics University of Virginia May, 2005 !, 11 !K::;=::: .' P I / j ;/"'" G 2 © Copyright by Sophie Diamant Richardson All Rights Reserved May 2005 3 ABSTRACT Most international relations scholarship concentrates exclusively on cooperation or aggression and dismisses non-conforming behavior as anomalous. Consequently, Chinese foreign policy towards small states is deemed either irrelevant or deviant. Yet an inquiry into the full range of choices available to policymakers shows that a particular set of beliefs – the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence – determined options, thus demonstrating the validity of an alternative rationality that standard approaches cannot apprehend. In theoretical terms, a belief-based explanation suggests that international relations and individual states’ foreign policies are not necessarily determined by a uniformly offensive or defensive posture, and that states can pursue more peaceful security strategies than an “anarchic” system has previously allowed. “Security” is not the one-dimensional, militarized state of being most international relations theory implies. Rather, it is a highly subjective, experience-based construct, such that those with different experiences will pursue different means of trying to create their own security. By examining one detailed longitudinal case, which draws on extensive archival research in China, and three shorter cases, it is shown that Chinese foreign policy makers rarely pursued options outside the Five Principles. Four chapters on Chinese foreign policy towards Cambodia show that policies that neorealism and others would consider logical were considered in Beijing and consistently rejected. In the 1950s and 1960s, the communist giant made diplomatic and financial efforts on behalf of the tiny monarchy and did not cultivate a relationship with Cambodia’s communists. China’s support for an exiled Sihanoukist government and the 4 subsequent Democratic Kampuchea regime in the 1970s illustrated its commitment to sovereignty, a belief also reflected in China’s assistance to the Cambodian resistance coalition of the 1980s. Although Cambodia regained its independence in the 1990s, China continued to perceive it as vulnerable to foreign economic and political encroachment, such that it opted to pursue a close relationship with a regime dominated by its former enemies. Similarly principled choices are seen in abbreviated cases on India, Albania, and Afghanistan. Understanding the Five Principles and their application render Chinese foreign policy not only comprehensible but also predictable. 5 TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction………………………………………………………………………………..1 Chapter One: China and Cambodia, 1954-March 1970………………………………….37 Chapter Two: China and Cambodia, March 1970-January 1979………………………..97 Chapter Three: China and Cambodia, 1979-1991…………………………………..….164 Chapter Four: China and Cambodia, 1991-2002……………………………………….236 Chapter Five: Comparisons to India, Albania, and Afghanistan………………….……303 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………...355 Notes…………………………………………………………………………………....377 Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………415 6 ABBREVIATIONS APL Albanian Labor Party ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations CCFA Chinese-Cambodian Friendship Association CGDK Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea CIA Central Intelligence Agency CCP Chinese Communist Party CMC Central Military Commission COMECON Council for Mutual Economic Cooperation CPP Cambodian People’s Party CPPCC Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference CPK Communist Party of Kampuchea CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union DK Democratic Kampuchea DRV Democratic Republic of Vietnam FUNCINPEC National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia FUNK National United Front of Kampuchea GMD Guomindang GPCR Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution GRUNK Royal National Union Government of Kampuchea IFI International financial institution KPNLF Khmer People’s National Liberation Front KPRP Kampuchean People’s Revolutionary Party KOC Kingdom of Cambodia KR Khmer Rouge MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs NAM Non-Aligned Movement NATO North American Treaty Organization NEFA North Eastern Frontier Agency NPC National People’s Congress PLA People’s Liberation Army PPA Paris Peace Accords PRC People’s Republic of China PRG Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam PRK People’s Republic of Kampuchea RCAF Royal Cambodian Armed Forces RVN Republic of Vietnam SEATO Southeast Asian Treaty Organization SNC Supreme National Council SOC State of Cambodia SRV Socialist Republic of Vietnam UNTAC United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia 7 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Although there are times when writing a dissertation feels like being in solitary confinement, one is reminded at the end just how many people are involved in bringing it to fruition. My deepest thanks go to Brantly Womack, without whose encouragement, criticism, and challenges the project would not have happened. His own efforts to understand the complexities of internal and external Chinese politics in part inspired my work, and it has been a pleasure and an honor to work with him. Jeff Legro’s multiple readings of chapters and discussions in Beijing not only helped me get my arms around the theoretical issues at stake but also helped me keep my feet on the ground while conducting the research. Thanks also to Chen Jian and Dale Copeland, whose guidance certainly improved the project. I am also grateful to David Waldner, whose many lessons are never far from my mind. David Chandler and Steve Heder have been extraordinarily generous in their interest and encouragement. I hope someday to be able to repay that debt. My time in China was measurably improved by the assistance of four individuals. I am particularly grateful to Zhang Xizhen at Beijing University’s School of International Studies, who made my months of research there possible. Wang Xiaoyan was instrumental in making those months productive, and I wish her all the best as she pursues her own graduate studies. Gu Xiaosong, of the Guangxi Academy of Social Sciences, kindly hosted a memorable research visit to Nanning. And the now decade-old friendship of Chen Yimei certainly helped take the sting out of a Beijing winter. 8 The project would not have been possible without the cooperation of dozens of patient interviewees in Australia, Cambodia, China, Thailand, and the United States. I am grateful for your willingness to share your thoughts and memories, and I hope I have represented them accurately. Financial support for this project came from the Fulbright-Hays Doctoral Dissertation Abroad Program, and from the University of Virginia’s Woodrow Wilson Department of Politics, Office of the Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences, and Ellen Bayard Weedon Foundation. I am grateful to the Beijing University Library, the Chinese National Archives (Beijing Library), the Cambodian National Archives, and Monash University’s Asia and Rare Book Collections for the use of their materials. Without the delightful, sanity-preserving company of Suzanne Gigante, Yaprak Gursoy, Ryan Saylor, and Rachel Vanderhill – in and out of Charlottesville – it is likely I would not have made it past my coursework, let alone through teaching assistantships, comps, and the other dramas of graduate school. A special thanks to Karen Carney and Victoria McHallick, who themselves know the loneliness of the long-distance writer. Ellen Bork, Anita Crofts, Janet Lewis Muth, and Leslie Shubert encouraged me to take on the challenge of a dissertation, and they did more than their fair share of work seeing me through it over several years and thousands of miles. This final paragraph has quite literally eluded me for months, and I remain speechless with love and gratitude for my parents, Robert and Cynthia Richardson, and my husband, Peter Sainsbury. They made this undertaking both desirable and possible. Because these pages simply would not have come to pass without them, the work is as much theirs as mine. 9 INTRODUCTION I. Introduction Why would a large, poor state strategically devote resources – billions of dollars of aid, diplomatic support, military equipment and training – to a far smaller state? Particularly when the smaller state could never provide a comparable “return,” and when those choices actually compromised the larger state’s security? For more than half a century, China’s relationship with Cambodia has at various points contributed to dramatically worsened ties with the United States, the former Soviet Union, Vietnam, and most of the rest of Southeast Asia, has cost approximately US$2 billion1, and has earned China international notoriety for its support to the genocidal Khmer Rouge. Beijing2 had every compelling reason to relinquish its relationship to Phnom Penh, yet it never did so. Why? In the simplest sense, China chose what it did because it believed that these choices were not only right, but also that this kind of relationship was, in and of itself, a means of ensuring security for all states. China has described its foreign policy towards all countries as shaped by the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.