This electronic thesis or dissertation has been downloaded from the King’s Research Portal at https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/ Britain's 1981 defence review. Boren, David K The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it may be published without proper acknowledgement. END USER LICENCE AGREEMENT Unless another licence is stated on the immediately following page this work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ You are free to copy, distribute and transmit the work Under the following conditions: Attribution: You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author (but not in any way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work). Non Commercial: You may not use this work for commercial purposes. No Derivative Works - You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work. Any of these conditions can be waived if you receive permission from the author. Your fair dealings and other rights are in no way affected by the above. Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact [email protected] providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. Download date: 09. Oct. 2021 BRITAIN'S 1981 DEFENCE REVIEW David K. Boren Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of War Studies University of London, King's College September 1992 BtL. LOI4DIN. UNIV. ABSTRACT The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the origins, conduct and implementation of Britain's 1981 defence review. Detailed analysis of both the substance of defence policy and decision-making within the Ministry of Defence make this a unique study. No such in-depth analysis of a contemporary decision in British defence has been written, largely due to the culture of secrecy in British government. However, documentation of the 1981 review through interviews with virtually all the participants demonstrates what can now be accomplished in the field of contemporary history, even in the sensitive area of defence. The 1981 review took place during a major shift of influence within the ministry away from the Service Departments and toward the central staffs. Previously the Chiefs of Staff had assessed Britain's strategic priorities, but in 1981 this was done by the central staffs. This informal shift in responsibility took place due to growing economic constraints which created pressure for deep cuts in the defence budget. The Chiefs of Staff Committee, prone to compromise, was unable to agree which area of the programme should be cut. Conducting a 'strategic' review, in which cuts reflected defence priorities rather than the principle of 'equal misery' among the services, required that the grip of the Chiefs of Staff on defence planning be broken. The implications for the review were significant. Economic and international political considerations were paramount. Existing priorities were reaffirmed but current trends were accelerated, leading to radical cuts in the Royal Navy. The Navy was vulnerable for a variety of reasons: its programme was overloaded, there were powerful arguments against its prevailing operational concept, and its approach to the review was perceived as unhelpful. In contrast, Army and Royal Air Force programmes were closely linked to NATO'S Central Region and thereby shielded from radical cuts due to the international political importance of British Forces Germany. The 1982 Falklands War reopened the debate over defence priorities and led to modification of the 1981 review. Financial pressures on the defence programme remained great throughout the 1980s, but the 1981 review had been a painful exercise and the government proved unwilling to undertake another fundamental assessment of British defence. The 1981 White Paper, as amended in 1982, remained the basic statement of British defence priorities throughout the decade. Contents Page ABSTRACT i ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iv ABBREVIATIONS vii CHAPTER ONE: Introduction 1 CHAPTER TWO: The Defence Review in Postwar 24 Britain CHAPTER THREE: Defence and National Priorities, 67 1974-79 CHAPTER FOUR: Conventional Defence Priorities, 112 1975-80 CHAPTER FIVE: Polaris Replacement: The Trident 173 Decision, 1979-80 CHAPTER SIX: Politics and Defence Budgeting, 225 1979-8 1 CHAPTER SEVEN: Conduct of the 1981 Defence Review 266 CHAPTER EIGHT: Implementing The Wa y Forward 339 CHAPTER NINE: The Falkiands War 383 CHAPTER TEN: Conclusion 426 BIBLIOGRAPHY 438 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS In completing this thesis I have acquired many debts of gratitude. Above all, I would like to thank Professor Lawrence D. Freedman for his advice, encouragement, and example, all of which contributed enormously to this enterprise. I would also like to thank all those within Whitehall and elsewhere whose oral testimony enabled me to study events for which no official records are available. To the extent that I have accurately documented the 1981 defence review this thesis testifies to the openness and helpfulness of ministers, civil servants, and the armed services. Initially, my research was facilitated by a grant from the Overseas Research Council. In the latter stages I have benefitted from involvement in the Leverhulme project on Defence of the Realm based at Southampton University and King's College London. Several libraries proved invaluable to my research, particularly at the International Institute of Strategic Studies, the Royal International Institute of International Affairs, the Royal United Services Institute, and the Royal Naval College at Greenwich. I am grateful to my parents, Ben and Jan Boren, for their unflagging support and enthusiasm for my academic endeavours. I would also like to thank Winston and Sallie Kratz for their interest and generosity. To my Sons, Zachary and Dominic, both born while this project was underway, and to my wife, Deborah E. Davies, I express my deepest appreciation for sharing my sacrifices and magnifying my joys. While my debts are great I remain solely responsible for any errors of fact, interpretation or argument. To the memory of my mother ABBREVIATIONS ACE Allied Command Europe AEW Airborne Early Warning ASW Anti-Submarine Warfare AWRE Atomic Weapons Research Establishment BAOR British Army on the Rhine BBC British Broadcasting Corporation CAS Chief of Air Staff CDP Chief of Defence Procurement CDS Chief of Defence Staff CGS Chief of General Staff CINCFLEET Commander-in-Chief Fleet CNS Chief of Naval Staff CSA Chief Scientific Adviser DEPC Defence Equipment Policy Committee DM0 Director of Military Operations (Army) DOAE Defence Operational Analysis Establishment DPWP Defence Programme Working Party DSWP Defence Studies Working Party DS1 Defence Secretariat 1 DUS (P) Deputy Under Secretary for Policy FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office FPMG Financial Planning and Management Group GDP Gross Domestic Product GNP Gross National Product IMF International Monetary Fund ITO Individual Training Organisation KNAG Knock About Group LPD Landing Platform Dock LRMPT Long-Range Maritime Patrol Aircraft LTC Long-Term Costing LTDP Long-Term Defence Programme MOl Military Operations 1 (Army) MoD Ministry of Defence MIRV Multiple Independently-Targeted Re-entry Vehicle MRCA Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (Tornado) NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization OECD Organization for Economic Development ORC Operational Requirements Committee PESC Public Expenditure Survey Committee PUS Permanent Under Secretary RAP Royal Air Force SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander SACLANT Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic SLBM Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile S LM Submarine-Launched Cruise Missile SLOCs Sea Lines of Communication Sosus Sound Surveillance System TA Territorial Army TAP Tactical Air Force UKADGE United Kingdom Air Defence Ground Environment UF United Kingdom Land Forces WASG Way Ahead Study Group CHAPTER ONE Introduction Broad strategic concepts have rarely been at the heart of defence planning in postwar Britain. Their absence has been due, at least in part, to the structure and nature of influence within the Ministry of Defence. The need to balance commitments and priorities has prompted numerous long-range planning exercises, defence reviews, but conflicting political, economic, and strategic imperatives have consistently constrained defence plans. Despite undergoing what amounts to perpetual review, Britain's defence effort has evolved incrementally, not radically, and without the detailed articulation of an overarching national strategy. In 1981 reshaping Britain's defence posture hinged on fundamental changes in civil-military relations. The Salisbury report of 1920 had formally given the Service Chiefs, working together as the Chiefs of Staff Committee, authority for developing strategic concepts) Despite the creation of the Ministry of Defence in 1946 and subsequent centralisation of authority in the hands of the Secretary of State for Defence, the Service Departments continued to play the vital role in defence planning. None of the subsequent reorganisations of the ministry diminished this Cmnd 2029, Report of the Sub-Committee of the Committee of ImDerial Defence on National and Im perial Defence, 1924, (The Salisbury Report), para 51 (1). 2 authority. However, the difficulty of arriving at strategic concepts acceptable to all three services inhibited the emergence of a unified 'defence view' of priorities, in contrast to a three-way