DAVID PETER GILROY MEANING THEORY AND THE PROBLEM OF THE ACQUISITION OF A FIRST LANGUAGE Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of London Institute of Education Meaning Theory and First Language Acquisition ABSTRACT The thesis begins by making two distinctions which are central to its methodology. The first is that between valid and invalid criticism, the second between philosophy of language and meaning theory. These distinctions combine to produce the methodology which informs the thesis, namely that a theory of meaning can be validly criticised in terms of its account, implicit or explicit, of first language acquisition and, conversely, an account of first language acquisition can be validly criticised in terms of its theory, implicit or explicit, of meaning. The thesis continues by testing the appropriateness of the methodology against the classical empiricist and rationalist accounts of meaning expressed in terms of Ideas, arguing that the majority of criticisms of these accounts misfire as they do not operate within the framework of the positions they purport to criticise. Such invalid criticism is replaced with that argued for here, the conclusion being that the classical accounts of meaning are to be rejected on the grounds that they make use of a phenomenon, language, whose acquisition they cannot, within the terms of their own position, explain. Modern, post-Fregean, empiricist and rationalist positions, those of Quine and Chomsky respectively, are then subjected to similar treatment. Both of these positions have explicit accounts of first language Meaning Theory and First Language Acquisition - p.ii- acquisition and so the conclusion to this section of the thesis reverses that reached when discussing the classical positions, in that the explanations of first language acquisition given by modern empiricists and rationalists are based on meaning theories which, for a variety of reasons, do not justify their explanations of the phenomenon of first language acquisition. In an attempt to move towards a more positive position two alternative accounts of meaning theory, the formal and the descriptive, are then examined. The formal account, Davidson's, is defended against those critics who produce attacks centering upon its meaning theory as being, in the sense described above, invalid. However, as it is then shown not to be able to account for first language acquisition, it is eventually rejected. The descriptivist account is identified by tracing the development of Wittgenstein's philosophy to support a particular interpretation of his later account of meaning as being a descriptive one and a defence is offered to a number of criticisms of that position. A poorly worked out experiential account of first language acquisition is then identified, and this is developed further by introducing the area of non-linguistics, where meaning can be given without words. The thesis concludes by suggesting that this area's account of first language acquisition, although having a number of difficulties with its implied meaning theory, can Meaning Theory and First Language Acquisition - p.iii- be combined with the later work of Wittgenstein to produce what is at least a descriptively adequate account of both meaning and first language acquisition. Moreover, it points to an area of enquiry where philosophical techniques can be utilised to great effect so as to add new dimensions to work in the fields of both philosophy and linguistics. Meaning Theory and First Language Acquisition - p.iv- ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to take this opportunity to thank my supervisor, John White, my examiners, David Cooper and Graham Haydon, and also David Aspin for their varied contributions to my thinking on the problems examined here. Although I am sure that they would not necessarily agree with all that I have argued, they have added immeasurably to the quality of this thesis. Whatever misunderstandings and errors remain are, of course, my own. Finally, without the constant support and encouragement of my wife, Jenny, my ideas on the philosophical implications of the phenomenon of first language acquisition would never have seen the light of day. This thesis is for her. DPG Sheffield, January 1991 TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION I - Introduction pp.1-6 SECTION II - The Chains of Empiricisim and Rationalism pp.7-43 SECTION III - Modern Empiricism pp.44-86 SECTION IV - Modern Rationalism pp.87-130 SECTION V - Alternative Theories: SECTION Va - Davidson pp.131-172 SECTION Vb - Wittgenstein pp.173-265 SECTION VI - Meaning Without Words pp.266-310 SECTION VII - CONCLUSIONS pp.311-328 NOTES pp.329-339 BIBLIOGRAPHY pp.340-379 Meaning Theory and First Language Acquisition - p.1 - SECTION I - INTRODUCTION Meaning Theory and First Language Acquisition - p.2 - By far the majority of work published in the field of first language acquisition is non-philosophical or, at best, indicates that there may be minor philosophical problems in the area which are of such little significance that they can safely be ignored. Thus a recent collection of papers on language acquisition has not one contribution by a philosopher, an omission made especially clear in the preface: During the last ten years the human infant has become a major focus for scientific investigation. Psychologists, linguists, psycholinguists, speech pathologists and educators have been expanding the boundaries of their respective disciplines to include the study of the basic processes and structures of the human infant (Schiefelbusch and Bricker 1981, p.ix), whilst another collection opens with the identification of the epistemological dimension of language acquisition and then quickly moves away from examining this dimension in any detail (Levelt et al. 1978, pp.5-6). Perhaps one reason for this strange omission is that the shift in emphasis in modern philosophy from mere linguistic analysis to descriptive metaphysics has not been taken sufficient note of in areas such as those listed by Schiefelbusch and Bricker. Indeed, Firth's definition of descriptive linguistics as "an autonomous group of related disciplines - such as phonetics, phonology, grammar, Meaning Theory and First Language Acquisition - p.3 - lexicography, semantics and ... the sociology of language" (Firth 1950, p.37) is not too far from Strawson's conception of descriptive metaphysics as describing the actual structure of our thoughts about our world (Strawson 1959, p.9). The parallel can, of course, be taken further in that Strawson's rejection of revisionary metaphysics (a metaphysics which attempts to produce a better structure with which to explain our thoughts about our world) finds an echo in Firth's rejection of what might be called revisionary linguistics, although in the latter's case this is couched in terms of avoiding the reification of systematics (ib. p.42). Another, and probably more important, reason for philosophy's absence from this area of inquiry is the fact that the problems of first language acquisition have, in the main, been seen in terms of "why and ... how" (Stork and Widdowson 1974, p.144), which assumes that philosophical problems concerning the nature of what it is that is acquired are of little or no relevance. The literature shows a clear and consistent bias towards the problem of acquisition itself, rather than to what this thesis will argue are logically prior problems, problems which cluster around assumptions about what it is that is acquired. This bias involves the important assumption that language is synonymous with the spoken word, which results in non-verbalized "language" being made unavailable, either as simple data or, more importantly, as a possible resolution Meaning Theory and First Language Acquisition - p.4 - to problems concerning both the what and the how of first language acquisition. This is more than a matter of mere definition as to whether or not "language" should be narrowly defined as being only verbal communication or as something more. Young, for example, produces a very wide definition of language as being "any species-specific system of intentional communication" (Young 1978, p.177). Then, however, he proceeds to talk of the problems of language acquisition only in the much more narrow terms of "encoding and decoding" the spoken sound (ib.), although he does qualify this in places (for example, pp.184-185), even though his original definition would allow for much more than just the spoken word. Another assumption which stems directly from this bias is the view that only linguistics, in particular that of Chomsky and his followers, can best deal with the field of first language acquisition. Thus, although Falk, for example, does see the central problem of this field as being the "what" of language, he rejects as directly relevant the first ten months of a child's communicating life as playing any "significant role in the acquisition of language" (Falk 1973, p.319), because his implicit definition of language is in terms of the spoken word, a definition which to a certain extent is forced upon him by his acceptance of Chomsky's transformational grammar. A similar move is made by Derwing and Baker who shift from using the wider definition of language, when they talk of children communicating by means Meaning Theory and First Language Acquisition - p.5 - of "any device, linguistic or otherwise" (Derwing and Baker 1977, p.86), to the narrower definition, when they talk of the problems of identifying linguistic stages as being "the primary goal of language acquisition research" (ib. p.94), seen in terms of the structure of words (ib.). This thesis, then, will take as its central problem the nature of what is acquired in first language acquisition; which is to say that meaning theory has much of importance to contribute to the field of first language acquisition. The relationship between these seemingly discrete areas of enquiry will be shown as being in the form of a two-way interaction, in that the fact that language is acquired is a piece of empirical evidence that philosophical theories about the nature of meaning have to accommodate, and a failure to do so adequately must throw grave doubts on their validity.