Conservation and Causation in Avicenna’s Metaphysics Emann Allebban Department of Philosophy McGill University, Montreal May 2018 A thesis submitted to McGill University in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of doctorate in philosophy. © Emann Allebban 2018 TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction……………………………………………………………………………...….........1 Chapter 1: The Efficient Cause in Metaphysics………………………………………………...10 1.1. The argument of Shifāʾ Metaphysics VI 1………………………………………… …..11 1.2. The argument of Shifāʾ Metaphysics VI 2………………………………………… …..34 1.3. The argument of Shifāʾ Metaphysics VI 3………………………………………… …..44 Chapter 2: The Generation of Individuals of a Species: A Causal Division of Labor………….54 2.1. Causes of animal generation in Aristotle’s Generation of Animals…………………....57 2.2. Avicenna’s biological account in Shifāʾ Kitāb al-Ḥayawān………………………...…61 2.3. Avicenna’s account in Shifāʾ Kitāb al-Nafs………………………………………...….79 Chapter 3: The Metaphysical Efficient Cause in Avicenna’s Emanative Cosmology…………105 3.1. Creation (ibdāʿ) and generation (iḥdāth) in Shifāʾ Metaphysics VI 2…………………106 3.2. The essential ends of nature in Shifāʾ Metaphysics VI 5 and Physics I 7…………......120 3.3. A passage on God’s knowledge and causation in Shifāʾ Metaphysics VIII 6…………140 Chapter 4: The Proof for the Necessary Being and the Metaphysical Efficient Cause………...145 4.1. Establishing the full text of the proof………………………………………………….152 4.2. The argument of Najāt Metaphysics II 12……………………………………………..165 4.3. The argument of Najāt Metaphysics II 13……………………………………………..173 4.4. The argument of Najāt Metaphysics II 14……………………………………………..174 4.5. Explanatory adequacy and the proof…………………………………………………..194 4.6. Infinite regress and the proof ………………………………………………………….211 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………...216 Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………………225 ABSTRACT This dissertation examines Avicenna’s theory of efficient causation in light of his approach to central problems in metaphysics, from the proof of the Necessary Existent to his emanative cosmology. Avicenna provides an internally coherent metaphysical account of efficient causation. A metaphysical account of the efficient cause explains the existence of the effect or essence in a way that is not explained by the causes of motion, as investigated in physics. That is, a full explanation of the cause of the existence of an essence is not found in the four causes of natural change and motion. Avicenna aims to clarify what the explanatory division of labor is between the account of the natural philosopher and that of the metaphysician. In so doing, Avicenna develops a theory of causation that ties his innovative concepts of the contingent in itself and necessary in itself to the concept of efficient causation. A central distinction that Avicenna advances in relation to the efficient cause is that between the cause of the effect qua species (nawʿ) and the cause of the effect qua individual (shakhṣ). The distinction is relevant to understanding his view of the role of the causes of the essence, including the Active Intellect. Drawing on the above theory of efficient causation, the study reexamines Avicenna’s famous proof for the Necessary Existent. The analysis shows that his metaphysical account of efficient causation is at the heart of his proof for a Necessary Existent. The “cause of persistence” (ʿillat al-thabāt), in particular, is argued to have a more critical role than previously acknowledged, and is explicated in the context of his theory of efficient causation in metaphysics. RÉSUMÉ Cette étude porte sur la théorie de la causalité efficiente chez Avicenne, au regard de son approche des questions fondamentales de la métaphysique, telles que l’Être Nécessaire ou la cosmologie d’émanation. Avicenne propose une théorie métaphysique de la causalité efficiente qui présente une cohérence interne et qui ne dépend pas des causes du mouvement, telles qu’elles sont traitées dans la physique, pour rendre raison à l’existence, autrement dit à l’essence, de l’effet. En effet, chez Avicenne, la justification de la cause de l’existence d’une essence ne tire pas sa légitimité des quatre causes du changement et du mouvement naturels. Il divise ainsi les tâches du philosophe naturel et du métaphysicien. Avicenne développe alors une théorie de la causalité qui relie ses concepts innovateurs du contingent en soi et du nécessaire en soi à son concept de la causalité efficiente. Il distingue entre la cause de l’effet en tant qu’espèce (nawʿ) et la cause de l’effet en tant qu’individu (shakhṣ), ce qui permet de comprendre le rôle des causes de l’essence, y compris de celui de l’intellect agent. En nous appuyant sur cette théorie de la causalité efficiente, nous voulions réexaminer sa célèbre preuve de l’Être Nécessaire. Nos analyses visent à démontrer que sa théorie métaphysique de la causalité efficiente est au cœur de sa preuve d’un Existent Nécéssaire. En particulier, nous soutenons que, chez Avicenne, la « cause de la persistance » (ʿillat al-thabāt) est plus essentielle que généralement admis et que cette cause s’explique dans le contexte de sa théorie de la causalité efficiente en métaphysique. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I have incurred many debts throughout my graduate career and the following cannot acknowledge all of them and everyone. I owe my sincerest gratitude to Professor Stephen Menn, for his generous and constant support over the years. I was fortunate to have had such an erudite guide through the daunting terrain of ancient and medieval philosophy. He provided invaluable advice throughout the progression of the dissertation and encouraged me to explore new avenues of inquiry. The dissertation, and my graduate education in general, owe a great debt to his teaching, advice, and support. I thank him especially for his corrections to various versions of the dissertation. I would like to deeply and sincerely thank Professor Robert Wisnovsky for all his guidance, patience, and generosity. I am especially indebted to him for his invaluable direction over the years, and for continuously steering me away from errors. He provided help beyond measure throughout my graduate degree, and I owe a heavy intellectual debt to his scholarship. He generously and kindly read versions of this dissertation and provided important comments and insights, without which this project could not have been brought to completion. I sincerely thank Professor Calvin Normore for his unfailing generosity and kindly attention. His keen insights never failed to stimulate me and served as an endless source of exploration. I owe a great deal to my discussions with him and his engaging questions and comments, and especially on early drafts of the dissertation. I am most fortunate for having had his guidance and attention over the course of my graduate education. I would also like to express my gratitude to Professor Alison Laywine who provided important guidance and advice during my graduate education. The project would not have been possible without generous support from the Jack Kent Cooke Foundation throughout my graduate career, as well as a dissertation completion fellowship from the Shīʿah Institute. I sincerely thank Professor Asad Q. Ahmad for his support and conversation in the year I spent working on my dissertation at the University of California, Berkeley. I would also like to thank the external and internal examiners for their meticulous and useful suggestions. I would like to thank everyone at the Department of Philosophy and the Institute of Islamic Studies, including all my colleagues for their help and support. In no particular order, I express my heartfelt thanks to Aun Hasan Ali, Amanie Antar, Shirin Radjavi, Julien Villeneuve, Junaid Quadri, Heather Empey, Angela Fotopoulos, Rizwan Mohammed, Sana Saeed, Michael Nafi and Anna Ezekiel. I would finally and especially like to express my deepest and sincerest gratitude to my family who have supported me over the years: to my mother Huda, for her unconditional love and sacrifice; to my father Zuhair, for his pride and faith in me; to my brothers Zayd and Hayder, for their encouragement in their own ways; and to my partner in life Bilal, for everything. INTRODUCTION It is now well-known to scholarship that Avicenna aims to advance a sophisticated approach to Aristotelian causal theory that aims to resolve central problems in Aristotle’s texts. In doing so, Avicenna critically engages the interpretive projects of earlier thinkers, including the commentarial tradition of Late Antique philosophers.1 In this work, building on current scholarship, I explore central aims of Avicenna’s interpretation of Aristotelian causal theory, focusing on what it means to provide a “metaphysical” account of causes. I will focus chiefly on his interpretation of efficient causation. Most generally, Avicenna’s approach to efficient causation in metaphysics, I argue, involves the following methodological concern: he aims to fulfill Aristotle’s promise of applying the principles of demonstrative science to metaphysics.2 In so doing, Avicenna not only sharpens received definitions of efficient causation and related concepts, but he aims to distinguish more fully causal accounts that are studied in physics from those that are properly investigated in the science of metaphysics. While physical causes aim to 1 The seminal work in this regard is Robert Wisnovsky’s study of Avicenna’s approach to metaphysics and causation, which engages central distinctions developed in the late antique tradition aimed at resolving interpretive problems to the four causes in the texts of Aristotle. See his Avicenna’s Metaphysics in Context (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003). See discussion below for further sources relevant to this study. Another important aspect of Wisnovsky’s study is Avicenna’s contemporary or “Islamic” context. As will be seen, Avicenna argues against the thesis of separate forms of some late antique philosophers, on the one hand. On the other, he is very concerned to highlight and argue against non-demonstrative concepts of causation offered by mutakallimūn that preclude a proper metaphysical analysis of causing existence.