Chaim Herzog. The War of Atonement: The Inside Story of the Yom Kippur War. London: Greenhill Books/Lionel Leventhal, 2003. xx + 300 pp. $19.95, paper, ISBN 978-1-85367-569-0. Reviewed by Eyal Ben-Ari Published on H-War (July, 2004) This volume is a reprinted edition of a book Issued on the thirtieth anniversary of this originally published in 1975. In it, Chaim Herzog, conflict, the book includes a new introduction an Israeli general and later President of the State written by Brigadier General Michael Herzog, the of Israel, provides what is still very much the au‐ author?s son and a serving officer in the IDF. This thoritative account of what Israelis call the Yom introduction provides some insights about the au‐ Kippur War of 1973 and the Arabs call the War of thor, emphasizes the importance of the book, and Ramadan. The coordinated attack that began on draws some of the wider lessons it bears for mod‐ the sixth of October in 1973 (Yom Kippur--the holi‐ ern military adventures. The book itself is based est day in the Jewish calendar) was initiated and on interviews with Israeli leaders and IDF officers carried out by Egypt and Syria in the Sinai Penin‐ and soldiers (although there is no comprehensive sula and the Golan Heights respectively. The at‐ list of them), tours of battlefields, and studies and tack, which took the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) publications (including a small number of Egyp‐ totally by surprise, was the outcome of a grave in‐ tian ones) already published by the mid-seventies. telligence mistake that almost caused the destruc‐ It contains a number of maps and illustrations tion of Israel. The war lasted for three weeks and that trace out the strategic situation of Israel and represents one of the largest and most intense ar‐ the tactical moves of the different armed forces. It mor, infantry and air battles in modern history. also contains photographs that portray the main Its outcome was a turning point in Middle East actors and some of the battlefields of the conflict. history since it demonstrated Israel?s vulnerabili‐ Throughout the book the author?s vast experi‐ ty, proved Syria and Egypt?s military power, and ence as a military commander and political com‐ set the base for the peace accords later signed be‐ mentator are used in order to illuminate the expe‐ tween Israel and Egypt, and the peace talks that rience of the war. Herzog strives to provide a bal‐ were held between Israel and Syria. anced view of the war by using material not only from Israeli records but also from Arab reports and commentary. Given that the author had very H-Net Reviews good access to Israeli material and given the later a long line of scholars and commentators) rather secretive nature of the Egyptian and (espe‐ contends, this failure lay in the extraordinary mil‐ cially) Syrian regimes, the book provides more de‐ itary success of the Israelis in the Six Days' War of tails about the Israeli side of the conflict. 1967 and the ways in which they explained away Herzog?s analysis begins by tracing out the the developing power of Egypt and Syria. The in‐ broad geo-political situation in the Middle-East telligence failure has not only fueled debates over and the build-up of the Egyptian and Syrian forces the years but been at the base of the complete re‐ before the war. Along these lines, the frst chap‐ vamping of Israel?s military intelligence services. ters trace out the process that Egyptian President The following chapters of the book then show Anwar Sadat began in 1971 when he raised the how, when thrust into defensive operations in two possibility of a peace agreement with Israel theaters, Israel mobilized its reserves and eventu‐ should it return all the territories it had occupied ally repulsed the invaders. After providing rivet‐ in the 1967 Six Days' War. When no progress was ing accounts of the war?s major battles Herzog ex‐ made, Sadat threatened war which did not mate‐ plains how the fghting was subsequently carried rialize that year or in the subsequent year and a into Syrian and Egyptian territory. During the sec‐ half. During 1972 and 1973 Sadat initiated a con‐ ond and third weeks of the war, the two Arab certed diplomatic offensive among a number of states began to be supplied by sea and air by the states around the world to win support for his Soviet Union which rejected U.S. suggestions for cause. At the same time, he petitioned the Soviet an immediate ceasefire and hoped for a decisive Union to pressure the United States and provide Arab victory. As a result, however, the United his country with more offensive weapons and mil‐ States belatedly began its own airlift to Israel. At itary wares with which to cross the Suez Canal. the end of the war, Egypt and Syria were saved Since the Soviet leadership was more interested from defeat through the intervention of the Unit‐ in detente with the United States than in con‐ ed Nations. The achievements of Syria and Egypt frontation in the Middle East, it rejected Sadat's led to a restoration of national pride and to the demands. In response, he expelled approximately peace accords signed between Israel and Egypt a 20,000 (mainly military) Soviet advisers from few years later. As Herzog explains, the full scale Egypt. military excursion into the Sinai Peninsula was While this was going on, as Herzog shows, the planned by Sadat to proceed only a few kilome‐ Arab forces studied Israel?s weaknesses and even‐ ters into the Sinai and thus to provide a ?prod? to‐ tually surprised it by making it divide its forces wards the beginning of diplomatic efforts. between two theaters (the Sinai Peninsula and the To what kind of readership does the volume Golan Heights). Syria and Egypt also devoted re‐ appeal? Written in a clear and fowing style, Her‐ sources to developing (on the basis of Soviet mili‐ zog has produced a book that will be of interest to tary advice) anti-aircraft and anti-tank umbrellas anyone concerned with Middle-East affairs. Be‐ which were designed to force Israel to commit to cause it successfully mixes analyses of tactical an extended battle that would wear down its and strategic issues, it provides an excellent intro‐ forces. The volume also shows the profound sur‐ duction to the war and its long-term ramifica‐ prise that Israel?s leadership faced upon the be‐ tions. Readers more interested in the tactical as‐ ginning of the hostilities, and underscores Israel?s pects of the conflict will enjoy the detailed de‐ intelligence failure that was the outcome of smug‐ scriptions of tank battles in the Sinai and Golan ness and underestimation of the Arab enemy and Heights, as well as the methods used by Arab its capabilities and goals. Indeed, as Herzog (and forces to counter Israel's advantage in rapid mo‐ 2 H-Net Reviews bile armor. The book also discusses stories of indi‐ command for the ground forces. Second, and this vidual Israeli commanders and gives a frsthand is a point made by Michael Herzog in his intro‐ account of several of their personal experiences. duction, the ultimate success of the IDF in the Intelligence specialists will fnd a valuable lesson Yom Kippur War and the growing gap between Is‐ regardiing how to interpret indications and warn‐ rael and its Arab neighbors in military terms in‐ ings, understanding the elaborate deception plan tensified the search for what may be termed the ? concocted by the Egyptians and Syrians prior to power of the weak.? This power now expresses it‐ the start of hostilities and the weaknesses of what self in such low-tech means as suicide bombers or Israelis call the ?conception?: the erroneous un‐ guerrilla warfare in order to counter Israel?s un‐ derstanding of the Arab states and their capabili‐ questioned military superiority. Third, within Is‐ ties and intentions. rael, the October 1973 war intensified the debate Does the book stand the test of time? My an‐ about the future of Israel's control over the 1967 swer is that it most certainly does. Herzog?s territories. Some groups interpreted the war as sketch of the broad contours of the war has not further evidence of the need to populate and been superseded. No less importantly, the lessons strengthen these areas for security and strategic that Herzog?s account raises about more general reasons, and as a result, Israeli settlements in the aspects of contemporary militaries still hold. areas occupied by Israel in 1967 increased. While I have mentioned Israel?s intelligence fail‐ How does the book compare with more re‐ ure that led to the complete overhaul of Israel?s cent volumes published about the war? A variety military intelligence services, the book carries of works have developed our understanding of other lessons. First, the Yom Kippur War provides the Yom Kippur War in diferent directions. First a an important warning about the power of ?weak‐ plethora of much more focused memoirs and bi‐ er? parties to a conflict to utilize the strengths of ographies--on both the Israeli and Egyptian sides-- the stronger parties. It is in this light, for instance, has been published regarding the war.[1] These that one may understand how Syria and Egypt re‐ volumes present individual perspectives on the alized the effectiveness of Israel?s Air Force and war and inclusively provide a detailed picture of began to emphasize the development of air de‐ the various issues that Herzog analyzes or raises fense systems and ground-to-ground missiles.