Critical Thinking: A Neo-Aristotelian Perspective Gerry Dunne 02151529 A thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Dublin Trinity College 2019 Declaration I declare that this thesis has not been submitted as an exercise for a degree at this or any other university and is entirely my own work. I agree to deposit this thesis in the University’s open access institutional repository or allow the Library to do so on my behalf, subject to Irish Copyright Legislation and Trinity College Library conditions of use and acknowledgement. ii Summary Critical thinking is commonly marketed as being one of the most desirable outcomes of higher education (Bailin & Battersby, 2009; Facione, 1990; Scheffler 1973; Siegel, 1988; 1997; 2017). Given its exalted prominence within educational discourse, theorists might reasonably expect a certain degree of conceptual uniformity in the literature. This is, however, not the case (Lau, 2015; McPeck, 1981). Though several extant expositions exist, there is still no clear agreement concerning the “referent of the term” (Siegel, 1988, p.5). This lack of conceptual clarity is arguably cause for concern, given that, “critical thinking is one of the defining concepts of western education, which enjoys widespread endorsement” (Barnett, 1997, p.1). Against this backdrop of conceptual elusiveness and imprecision, this dissertation seeks to establish, and subsequently defend, a neo-Aristotelian account of the phenomenon. The central thesis of the project posits that, until such time as theorists have a clear understanding of what critical thinking is, including, how it works, educators will remain unclear as to what sort of educational accomplishments are required if one is to be rightly considered a critical thinker, and what pedagogical means are likely to be successful in teaching people to think critically. To better understand the conceptual richness of critical thought, this project suggests that one must, in the first instance, fully understand the evolution of critical thought, from its early incarnation as formal and informal logic, to Aristotle’s account of practical judgment, right up until its influential role in shaping social critical theory, and from here, its present incarnation in philosophy of education as a “critical spirit” and “reasons-assessment” framework (Siegel, 1988, p.23). I then turn to one of the necessary conditions of critical thought in the form of argumentation, focusing on the normative principles of appraising deductive, inductive, causal, evidentialist and probabilistic arguments. This chapter then appraises the pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation, before briefly examining two key principles often used by interlocutors to obfuscate rational discourse, namely the burden of proof and the appeal to ignorance. iii From here I argue that determining the probative reasons supporting one’s claims to knowledge is the principal duty animating a critical thinker’s enquiries. This undertaking necessitates an evaluative phronetic judgment, a judgment based on reasons that must satisfy specific standards or thresholds of sufficiency and acceptability (Bailin, Case, Coombs & Daniels, 1999b; Siegel, 1988, 2017; Gilbert, 2014). To make an informed and defensible critical judgment about what one ought to believe, accept or do, this project argues for the importance of critical thinkers personifying the prototypical phronimos, or person of practical judgment. This project argues that, only a phronimos can accurately discern, which rules (and which reasons), if any, should be regarded as decisive in a given situation (Dunne, 1993). Further still, only a phronimos is disposed to, and capable of, appropriately stress-testing the strength of an individual’s reasons supporting their beliefs and actions (Dunne, 2015b). Accurately understanding the nature and probative force of reasons is key to critical reasoning, argumentation, and judgment (Audi, 2015; Siegel, 1998; 1997; 2017). On this basis, I argue for the inclusion of a specific typology of probative normative reasons with which critical thinkers ought to concern themselves in the practical domain. These reasons comprise: (i) evidential force and relevance; (ii) reason defeaters and undefeated reasons, and (iii) motivating and explanatory reasons. To conclude, this project critically examines four of the main barriers to the effective deployment of critical thought. The argument is made that, individually and collectively, ‘bounded rationality’ (Simon, 1957, p.198), System I and System II thinking (Kahneman, 2011), cognitive biases, and finally, unwarranted assumptions, namely, paradigmatic, prescriptive and causal (Brookfield, 1995), significantly impede the quality of critical reasoning and judgment. iv Acknowledgements There are known unknowns; there are things that we know that we do not know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say, we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns-the ones we do not know we do not know. (Donald Rumsfeld, 2002, quoted in du Sautoy, 2016, p.11). This Ph.D. has certainly been a tour de force. As a labour of love, it would not have been possible without the love, support and encouragement of so many people. Firstly, thanks to my supervisor, Dr. Aidan Seery for his forbearance and support. Thank you to my wonderful wife Áine, without whom this project would surely have driven me to despair. Thank you to my family and to my friends Emma, Marielle, Áine, Alison, Maja, Jillian, Patricia, Paula and Michael for keeping me grounded over the last few years. To my beloved girls - Róisín and Aisling - this is for you! You bring an unparalleled joy to my life, for which words betray understanding. v Abstract This dissertation seeks to cultivate a deeper conceptual understanding of critical thinking within the philosophy of education tradition. For until such time as theorists understand what critical thinking is, including, how it works, educators will remain unclear as to what sort of educational accomplishments are required if one is to be rightly considered a critical thinker, and what means are likely to be successful in teaching people to think critically. Within this context, the dissertation argues for a neo-Aristotelian conceptualization of critical thought based on Harvey Siegel’s (1988, p.23) “reasons-assessment” criteria. Here I argue for the importance of critical thought embodying the prototypical phronimos, where habituated deliberative excellence accurately determines undefeated or decisive reasons for normatively- calibrated actions in the practical domain. This judgment (proairesis) is based on stress- testing the strength of normatively-calibrated reasons supporting a given course of action. Drawing on theorists such as, Dunne (1993), Paul & Elder (2002; 2005; 2007; 2009), and Siegel (1988; 1997; 2017), I proffer a new conceptual explication of criticality, one which integrates phronetic deliberation and judgment with a deep sensitivity and responsiveness to the probative force of reasons-normativity in accurately determining undefeated reasons for “knowing what one should do” in the practical domain (Anscombe, 1957, p13). vi Table of Contents Declaration .............................................................................................................................ii Summary .............................................................................................................................. iii Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................ v Abstract ................................................................................................................................ vi List of Figures ........................................................................................................................ x Chapter One: Introduction ...................................................................................................... 1 1.0 Introduction .............................................................................................................. 1 1.1 Research Inspiration ................................................................................................. 1 1.2 Why a Conceptual Study? ......................................................................................... 3 1.3 Research Questions ................................................................................................... 4 Chapter Two: Literature Review ............................................................................................. 8 2.0 Introduction .............................................................................................................. 8 2.1 A Very Brief Conceptual-Historical Overview of Critical Thinking .......................... 9 2.2 Why is Critical Thinking Important? The Empirical Argument ............................... 15 2.3 The Importance of Critical Thinking in Education................................................... 18 2.4 Critical Thinking as Dispositions ............................................................................ 25 2.5 The Abilities of a Critical Thinker ........................................................................... 27 2.6 Critical Thinking in Philosophy .............................................................................. 31 2.6.1 Defining Critical Thinking .....................................................................................