Knowledge, Justice, and Subjects with Cognitive or Developmental Disability by Catherine Klausen A thesis presented to the University of Waterloo in fulfillment of the thesis requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 2019 c Catherine Klausen 2019 Examining Committee Membership The following served on the Examining Committee for this thesis. The decision of the Examining Committee is by majority vote. External Examiner: Jerome Bickenbach Professor, Dept. of Health Sciences and Health Policy; Co-Director, Center for Rehabilitation in Global Health Systems, University of Lucerne Supervisor: David DeVidi Professor, Dept. of Philosophy; Associate Vice President, Academic, University of Waterloo Internal Member: Shannon Dea Professor, Dept. of Philosophy, University of Waterloo Internal Member: Tim Kenyon Professor, Dept. of Philosophy, University of Waterloo; Vice President, Research, Brock University Internal-External Member: Ellen MacEachen Associate Professor, School of Public Health, University of Waterloo ii Author's Declaration I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners. I understand that my thesis may be made electronically available to the public. iii Abstract This thesis includes four research papers, each devoted to a topic in philosophy of cognitive disability and its intersection with other areas of philosophy. Three focus on issues of cognitive or developmental disability and epistemic injustice, drawing from theories by Miranda Fricker, Rebecca Mason, and Jos`eMedina. The fourth argues that attention to people with communication disability has important implications for our understanding of human rights. Specifically, distinguishing one's right to communicate from one's right to freedom of expression. Lessons are drawn along the way for our understanding of philosophically difficult concepts like identity, decision making, social capital, inclusion, and ignorance. Throughout, the philosophical approach involves attending to the lived experience of people with communication, cognitive, or developmental disability as a way to test the suitability of philosophical theories developed with other people in mind, and as such can be described as a project in Applied Philosophy. iv Acknowledgements I am grateful for my supervisor, Dr. David DeVidi, whose support has been an ideal mixture of challenge, encouragement, and wit. I have benefited greatly from his philo- sophical expertise and professional wisdom. I am also thankful that he introduced me to members of Facilitation Wellington Dufferin and Bridges Over Barriers, two groups whose exceptional work in the community has been (and continues to be) immensely instructive for me. My sincere thanks and appreciation are owed to Dr. Shannon Dea, and Dr. Tim Kenyon for their insightful feedback and thoughtful engagement with my work. Each offered perspectives and expertise that were invaluable to the success of my project. I feel fortunate to have had Dr. Ellen MacEachen and Dr. Jerome Bickenbach on my examination committee, and I am grateful to have had the opportunity to benefit from their respective areas of expertise. I would also like to express my thanks to Dr. Miranda Fricker, for her feedback on some of the ideas featured in this project. Thank you to my fellow philosophy students, who provided philosophical discussions and lunch room banter of the highest quality. And thank you to Angela and Tawnessa, for their exceptional administrative support and inexhaustible kindness. I would also like to express my gratitude for the financial support I received from the Social Science and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC), Mitacs, the University of Waterloo, and the Philosophy Department. And finally, thank you to my family and friends for their encouragement through the many years of this project. v Dedication To Paul, the giver of countless pep talks, the master of comma use, and my ever-patient sounding board. vi Table of Contents 1 Introduction1 2 Epistemic Asymmetry and Group Support: Expanding Fricker's Trustful Conversations7 2.1 Introduction...................................7 2.2 Overview..................................... 10 2.2.1 A Look at Fricker............................ 10 2.2.2 A Look at Williams........................... 11 2.2.3 Where the Two Meet.......................... 16 2.3 Indications of a Problem............................ 18 2.3.1 Exclusion from what?.......................... 18 2.3.2 Hidden Barriers............................. 21 2.4 What did Williams really say? Fixing Fricker's characterization...... 24 2.5 Carrying it through............................... 27 2.6 Conclusion.................................... 33 3 Segregation and Hermeneutical Injustice: Another step away from insti- tutionalization 36 3.1 Introduction................................... 36 3.2 Setting the Stage................................ 38 3.2.1 The Rise of Institutions........................ 38 vii 3.2.2 The End of an Era........................... 40 3.2.3 Ongoing Separation........................... 42 3.2.4 Fears of Re-institutionalization.................... 44 3.3 Lack of Social Integration as Friction..................... 45 3.3.1 Friction in a Post-Institutional Era.................. 49 3.4 Hermeneutical Injustice............................. 51 3.4.1 According to Fricker.......................... 52 3.4.2 According to Mason.......................... 55 3.4.3 Complementary Ideas.......................... 58 3.5 Hermeneutical Injustice and Hermeneutical Friction............. 60 3.5.1 According to Mason.......................... 61 3.5.2 According to Fricker.......................... 62 3.6 Hermeneutical Friction............................. 63 3.7 What Can We Do?............................... 66 3.8 Conclusion.................................... 67 4 Communication as a Supportive Right 69 4.1 Introduction................................... 69 4.2 An Overview.................................. 72 4.3 What Does This Right Entail?......................... 76 4.3.1 Procedural Rights in Legal Proceedings................ 77 4.3.2 Procedural Rights and Communication................ 78 4.3.3 What Kind of Right?.......................... 79 4.4 What Duties?.................................. 82 4.5 On the Ground................................. 86 4.5.1 Original Intent for Lundy's Concepts................. 87 4.6 Next Steps.................................... 93 4.6.1 Method (Voice)............................. 93 viii 4.6.2 Interpretation (Voice).......................... 94 4.6.3 Trajectory of Development (Space/Audience)............ 95 4.6.4 Uptake (Influence)........................... 97 4.7 Residual Concerns............................... 98 4.8 Conclusion.................................... 101 5 Filling Out Medina's Cognitive Minimums: Role Sensitivity and Prox- imity to Information 103 5.1 Introduction................................... 103 5.2 Summary of Medina.............................. 106 5.3 Using Medina's Ideas.............................. 114 5.4 A Case Study: The Canadian Down Syndrome Society Campaign..... 118 5.4.1 \Endangered Syndrome"........................ 118 5.5 Medina Case?.................................. 124 5.6 Who is to Blame?................................ 126 5.6.1 First Lesson: The Role of the Subject................. 128 5.7 A Second Misstep?............................... 129 5.7.1 Species Hierarchy............................ 130 5.7.2 Second Lesson: The Subject's Proximity to Information....... 133 5.8 In the Meantime................................ 138 5.9 Conclusion.................................... 140 6 Concluding Remarks and Open Questions 142 Bibliography 146 ix Chapter 1 Introduction Each of the four chapters of my dissertation is strongly united by theme, and exemplifies a common philosophical approach. However, each is intended to be a standalone argument, self-contained, and in a format sometimes referred to as a \sandwich thesis." Thematically, each chapter addresses issues of epistemic injustice in connection with the lived experiences of agents who are atypical in certain ways, i.e., those considered to have communication, cognitive, or developmental disability. Each of the chapters involves an in-depth interaction with different important aspects of the theories of epistemic injustice developed by Miranda Fricker (2007), Rebecca Mason (2011), and Jos´eMedina (2013), while also complementing these theories, where appropriate, with concepts from other research literatures (e.g., segregation, speech language pathology). The unifying approach might be described by saying the chapters are all exercises in Applied Philosophy, provided that phrase is properly understood. Each chapter focuses on philosophical issues and challenges involved in treating atypical agents as knowers and sharers of that knowledge. I use the theories of epistemic injustice already in the literature as a starting point to gain more nuanced understanding of issues facing citizens with communication, cognitive, or developmental disability and, by doing so, reveal new avenues for redress. Conversely, though, by bringing philosophical theories to bear on practical issues that confront a disadvantaged group other than the ones the authors of the original theories had in the fronts of their minds as they wrote | issues such as exclusion, securing means to communicate, and public representation