SSC09-XII-03 The Promise of Innovation from University Space Systems: Are We Meeting It? Michael Swartwout St. Louis University 3450 Lindell Boulevard St. Louis, Missouri 63103; (314) 977-8240 [email protected] ABSTRACT A popular notion among universities is that we are innovation-drivers in the staid, risk-adverse spacecraft industry – we are to professional small satellites what small satellites are to the “battlestars”. By contrast, professional industry takes a much different perspective on university-class spacecraft; these programs are good for attracting students to space and providing valuable pre-career training, but the actual flight missions are ancillary, even unimportant. Which opinion is correct? Both are correct. The vast majority of the 111 student-built spacecraft that have flown have made no innovative contributions. That is not to say that they have been without contribution. In addition to the inarguable benefits to education, many have served as radio Amateur communications, science experiments and even technological demonstrations. But “innovative”? Not so much. However, there have been two innovative contributors, whose contributions are large enough to settle the question: the University of Surrey begat SSTL, which helped create the COTS-based small satellite industry. Stanford and Cal Poly begat CubeSats, whose contributions are still being created today. This paper provides an update to our earlier submissions on the history of student-built spacecraft. Major trends identified in previous years will be re-examined with new data -- especially the bifurcation between larger-scale, larger-scope "flagship" programs and small-scale, reduced-mission "independents". In particular, we will demonstrate that the general history of student-built spacecraft has not been one of innovation, nor of development of new space systems -- with those few, extremely noteworthy, exceptions. We will assess why these innovations have not surfaced, and what can be done to change that situation -- if indeed it can (or should) be changed. INTRODUCTION opinion (one shared by many) student experiments, are If one were to pick up past proceedings of this “nice”, but a “luxury” that must give way to other conference and read the papers covering university- NASA priorities. class missions, one could not help but notice the Which set of beliefs are true? Are student-built pervading sense of optimism. Student authors often spacecraft valuable because of the technological believe that their work will lead to breakthroughs for innovation they provide, or because of the invaluable small satellites, because student projects can afford to training they offer for future spacecraft professionals? be more innovative and ambitious.1 This author speaks from experience, having co-written several of these 2-5 We cannot hope to settle this matter in one conference ambitious, innovative student papers . paper, but we will attempt to bring rational tools to the discussion. Specifically, we will draw upon the If, instead, one were to canvass the exhibit booths of database of student-built spacecraft developed for industry representatives at the conference, a different 7-9 previous conferences to attach numbers and specific consensus would emerge. The value of student-built examples to the debate. spacecraft is not in the hardware, but in the experience developed by students. Former NASA Administrator Secondary Objective: Review the Flight Data Mike Griffin expressed a form of this view at the 2006 conference, when he stated, “As students you need to In fact, updating the database will be a useful exercise learn science and engineering and those disciplines, and in itself. As we noted in earlier papers, this is a “golden then you need to get out among companies or age” of student-built spacecraft. Since 1981, one laboratories and continue to learn your trade.”6 In his hundred eleven student spacecraft have launched, with Swartwout 1 23rd Annual AIAA/USU Conference on Small Satellites nearly half (54) coming in the past five years. Twenty Next, we have identified two broad categories of more are already scheduled to launch in the next nine schools building flight hardware: flagship schools and months. independent schools. We define a flagship university as one designated by its government as a national center Unfortunately, other trends noted in earlier papers have for spacecraft engineering research and development. continued, too. While there are more first-time Independent schools are all the remaining universities. university programs flying spacecraft than ever before (26 since 2005), only the government-sponsored By definition, flagships enjoy financial sponsorship, “flagship” schools tend to have two or more spacecraft access to facilities and launch opportunities that the (twelve active flagships with multiple spacecraft, independent schools do not. And these differences compared to only three active independents). The have a profound effect: as will be shown there is a flagship schools also have a disproportionate advantage disparity in both launch rates and mission success in mission success and mission value. between the two classes; generally speaking, flagship schools build bigger satellites with more “useful” Overview of the Paper payloads, and tend to have sustained programs with For this paper, we will begin by updating the tables and multiple launches over many years. By contrast, the figures from previous papers, identifying changes or satellites built by independent schools are three times emerging trends in terms of size, performance or the more likely to fail, and for most of these programs, their balance of flagship and independent schools. From first-ever spacecraft in orbit is also their last, i.e., the there, we will focus our attention on innovation from financial, administrative and student resources that university-class missions. We will show that were gathered together to built the first satellite are not universities have been responsible for one significant available for the second. innovation – the CubeSat standard – which alone is probably sufficient to consider universities to be Disclaimers innovators. We will also show that, apart from the This information was compiled from online sources, CubeSat, universities have not delivered innovative past conference proceedings and author interviews with technologies or missions, but rather their value has been students and faculty at many universities, as noted in in training students. the references. The opinions expressed in this paper are just that, opinions, reflecting the author’s experience as But first, we need to define our terms. both student project manager and faculty advisor to university-class projects. The author accepts sole Definitions responsibility for any factual (or interpretative) errors As discussed in a previous paper, 1 we restrict our study found in this paper and welcomes any corrections. to university-class satellites , which we narrowly require to have three distinct features: UNIVERSITY-CLASS MANIFEST, UPDATED A list of university-class spacecraft launched from 1981 1. It is a functional spacecraft, rather than a payload until the submission of this paper (June 2009) are split instrument or component. To fit the definition, the between in Table 1 and Table 2, including the eight that device must operate in space with its own are on “official” manifests for 2009. Because the independent means of communications and inclusion or omission of a spacecraft from this list may command. However, self-contained objects that are prove to be a contentious issue – not to mention the attached to other vehicles are allowed under this designation of whether a vehicle failed prematurely, it definition (e.g. PCSat-2, Pehuensat-1). is worth repeating an explanation of the process for 2. Untrained personnel (i.e. students) performed a creating these tables. significant fraction of key design decisions, integration & testing, and flight operations. First, using launch logs, the author’s knowledge and 3. The training of these people was as important as (if several satellite databases, a list was created of all not more important) the nominal “mission” of the university-class small satellites that were placed on a spacecraft itself. rocket. 10-14 These remaining spacecraft were researched Again, exclusion from the “university class” category regarding mission duration, mass and mission does not imply a lack of educational value on a categories, with information derived from published project’s part; it simply indicates that other factors were reports and project websites as indicated. A T-class more important than student education (e.g., schedule (technology) mission flight-tests a component or or on-orbit performance). subsystem that is new to the satellite industry (not just new to the university). An S–class (science) mission creates science data relevant to that particular field of Swartwout 2 23 rd Annual AIAA/USU Conference on Small Satellites study (including remote sensing). A C-class spacecraft is indicated to have failed prematurely when (communications) mission provides communications its operational lifetime was significantly less than services to some part of the world (often in the Amateur published reports predicted and/or if the university who radio service). While every university-class mission created the spacecraft indicates that it failed. When in is by definition educational, those spacecraft listed as doubt, the database from the