FREE WILL AND RATIONALITY A DEFENSE OF THE VIEW THAT FREE AND RESPONSIBLE AGENTS CAN PERFORM ONLY THE RIGHT ACTIONS FOR THE RIGHT REASONS by Damir Cicic Submitted to Central European University Department of Philosophy In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy Supervisor: Professor Ferenc Huoranszki Budapest, Hungary CEU eTD Collection 2015 Abstract This dissertation offers an unorthodox answer to the two main questions in the free will debate – the question how is free will as a condition of moral responsibility possible, and the question whether we actually have it. It suggests that free will is possible and that we have it only if it consists in the ability to do right things for the right reasons and if that ability cannot be unexercised. In other words, this dissertation suggests that the only free actions are the right actions performed for the right reasons. This suggestion is based on considerations of the main the main skeptical challenges to free will and on Susan Wolf’s account of free will. The first chapter, deals with the main challenge to the claim that ability to do otherwise exist if determinism is true - the so called Consequence Argument - and concludes that the argument is very plausible. In the second chapter, an argument suggested by Harry Frankfurt to the effect that the Consequence Argument is irrelevant because free will does not involve ability to do otherwise is considered and rejected. The third chapter focuses on two objections to libertarian theories of free will - the objection that indeterminism undermines free will by undermining control, and objection that indeterminism is irrelevant because it does not provide more space for control than determinism. These objections are rejected but it is shown that the only version of libertarianism which avoids them is not very attractive. The fourth chapter defends Susan Wolf’s view and the thesis that free will is asymmetric which her view entails. In addition, it suggests that her view can be defended more easily if the possibility of misuse of free will is excluded. The final chapter shows that the proponent of Wolf’s view must exclude this possibility in order to defend compatibilism about free will CEU eTD Collection and determinism from the ‘manipulation arguments.’ It also shows that impossibility of free wrongdoing follows from the acceptance of asymmetry of Wolf’s view and incompatibilism about the ability to do otherwise and determinism. i Acknowledgements I would like to express my gratitude to my advisor Professor Ferenc Huoranszki for many conversations which deepened my interest in free will and comments which helped me to develop my own view. I would also like to thank Professor Gary Watson for encouraging me to pursue my own interests and for being very gracious with his time in discussing the problem of free will with me. I want to thank also Professor Hanoch Ben-Yami and Professor Michael Griffin for their continuous support during my studies, as well as my friends from PhD program Hywel Griffiths, Anton Markoc, Mojca Kuplen, Isik Sarihan, and my friends from undergraduate studies in Belgrade Arandjel Bojanovic, Goran Boroja, Bozidar Maslac and Dusko Majkic for spending a lot of time discussing free will with me and for showing interest in my ideas. Finally, I would like to thank my mother Ljiljana Rebronja and my father Behudin Cicic for their loving support and my grandparents Budimir and Franciska Djordjevic and for giving me the opportunity to focus on my dissertation. CEU eTD Collection ii Contents INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................................... 1 CHAPTER 1: DETERMINISM AND ABILITY TO DO OTHERWISE ................................................................ 8 1.1 The Modal Argument ...................................................................................................................... 10 1.1.1 Validity of Beta and Different Interpretations of Operator N ................................................. 13 1.1.1.2 Weakening of the Notion of Ability .................................................................................. 17 1.1.1.3 Restricting the Scope of Beta and Agglomeration ............................................................ 20 1.2 Van Inwagen’s ‘Non-modal’ Argument ........................................................................................... 22 1.2.1 Why the Consequence Argument Does not Beg the Question................................................ 29 1.2.1.1 A problem with the Local Miracle Compatibilism ............................................................. 29 1.2.1.2 The Problem with the Different Past Compatibilism ........................................................ 36 1.3 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................... 41 CHAPTER 2: MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITIES .............................................. 43 2.1 Frankfurt’s Challenge to PAP .......................................................................................................... 45 2.2 The ‘Locked Room’ .......................................................................................................................... 50 2.3 The Compatibilists’ Answer to Frankfurt’s Argument .................................................................... 52 2.4 The ‘Flicker of Freedom’ Strategy ................................................................................................... 55 2.5 The ‘Dilemma Defense’ ................................................................................................................... 59 2.5.1 Stump’s Example ...................................................................................................................... 61 2.5.2 Hunt’s Example ........................................................................................................................ 63 2.5.3 Mele and Robb’s example ........................................................................................................ 66 2.5.4 Pereboom’s example ............................................................................................................... 70 2.6 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................... 76 CEU eTD Collection CHAPTER 3: LIBERTARIAN THEORIES OF FREE WILL ............................................................................. 78 3.2 Types of Libertarian Theories.......................................................................................................... 81 3.2 The Problem of Control ................................................................................................................... 85 3.2.1 The No Choice Argument ......................................................................................................... 86 iii 3.2.2 The Luck Argument .................................................................................................................. 90 3.2.2.1 Kane’s Event-Causal Response to the Luck Argument ...................................................... 92 3.2.2.2 Agent-Causal Libertarianism and the Luck Argument ...................................................... 96 3.2.2.3 The Leibnizian Objection to Agent-Causal Libertarianism ................................................ 98 3.3 The Problem of Value .................................................................................................................... 101 3.4 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 104 CHAPTER 4: SUSAN WOLF’S REASON VIEW ........................................................................................ 106 4.1 The Rational for Asymmetry ......................................................................................................... 107 4.1.1 Reason View and Real Self View(s) ........................................................................................ 111 4.1.2 Reason View and Reason-Responsiveness View ................................................................... 114 4.1.3 Reason View and Wallace’s View........................................................................................... 116 4.2 Ability to do otherwise and responsibility for the right actions ................................................... 121 4.2.1 Van Inwagen’s Argument ....................................................................................................... 124 4.2.2 The Value of Ability to Do Otherwise..................................................................................... 127 4.2.2.1 Ability to Do Otherwise and the Value of Alternatives ................................................... 129 4.2.2.2 Ability to Act Irrationally and Ability to Act Crazily ......................................................... 132 4.2.2.3 Powers and Dispositions ............................................................................................... 133 4.2.2.4 Ability to Do Otherwise and Self-Determination ............................................................ 137 4.2.2.5 Free versus Automatic Action ........................................................................................