1 AL-MANAR REVISITED The “lighthouse” of the Islamic revival Kosugi Yasushi The intellectual map of the Islamic world has experienced a number of rather drastic changes during the twentieth century, continuing on from the turbulent years of the previous century. Various trends of thought and sociopolitical ideas stemming from the West, such as modernism, liberalism, nationalism, socialism, and communism, among others, appeared in Muslim societies, and all of these cast serious doubts on traditional Islamic thought and institutions. Especially modernism, often associated with Westernization, and nationalism, more often secular than not, were undermining traditional Islamic values, while profound socioeconomic transformation was undermining the basis upon which traditional Islamic societies, as well as their intellectual leaders, used to stand. Against this backdrop, a new Islamic trend calling for a reform of Muslim societies appeared. As this trend voiced the aspiration to revive the Islamic world, or the Islamic umma (community), to use their own terms, we may call this trend Islamic revivalism. The journal of al-Manar (Majalla al-Manar),1 the main subject of this article, was the major mouthpiece for this trend. It was published regularly between 1898 and 1935, and its intellectual heritage was maintained by later popular movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Association of Algerian ‘Ulama’ in Algeria. The trend, however, seemed to have lost its momentum by the early 1950s, when Arab nationalism and other secular trends started to overshadow the previous Islamic trends. Accordingly, the contri- butions of al-Manar appeared obsolete. “Manar” in Arabic means a “lighthouse,” or a “beacon.” The journal tried to be a lighthouse in a turbulent ocean where all Islamic ships were suffering the awful storm of the modern world, metaphorically speaking. Many intellectuals in the Islamic world sought other solutions for their societies differing from that which Muhammad Rashid Rida (Muhammad Ramid Rida, 1865–1935), al-Manar’s founder and editor in chief, and his colleagues strove to formulate. For others, al-Manar’s orientation looked anachronistic, as it called for a return to the original purity of Islam. It was judged natural that it had failed by the 1950s. 3 KOSUGI YASUSHI After seeing the phenomena of Islamic revival in various parts of the world over the last three decades of the twentieth century, however, we can no longer subscribe to this view. This article offers an invitation to reevaluate al-Manar as a major platform of modern Islam, and to present an overview of its intellectual contributions.2 Re-evaluating Islam in the modern age Scholarly inquiries into the nature of vitality of Islam in the political domains of the Middle Eastern countries started in 1978–1979, when specialists and observers of the region were surprised and perplexed to see an “Islamic revolution” in Iran. Since the revolutionary high times in the region had already passed with the decline of radical Arab nationalism,3 a revolution alone, against what was considered the most mighty monarchy in the Gulf region, was a surprise. Furthermore, it was under an Islamic banner with many Islamic symbols, such as jihad (struggle) against taghut (illegitimate power) led by faqih (jurist) or vali amr (holder of authority), revolution by the oppressed who will become martyrs willingly, and the like.4 Although the present author had already noticed the beginning of an Islamic revival in Egypt in the latter half of the 1970s,5 it was still on a lesser level, and the revolution in Iran came as a startling event, as was the case for other students of Middle East studies. Retrospectively, there were many signs of an Islamic revival in various parts of the region during the decade. For example, an Islamic bank was established in Dubai in 1975, starting a new initiative to reinstitute Islam in the eco- nomic domain, followed later by many other banks.6 However, these signs were not well-noticed, and arguments over the Islamic revolution in Iran in academic circles, let alone the mass media, were mostly skeptical about its durability, and therefore tried to explain it in terms of its regional specifics and historical contingencies. The events of the following years in the Middle East and elsewhere, however, proved that there was something more generally Islamic than regional or sectarian in these phenomena.7 To cite just a few politically serious cases,8 we had observed an armed revolt in Mecca, the most holy city of Islam, in November 1979, nine months after the revolution in Iran. This was the very first armed struggle against the Saudi kingdom since its establishment in 1932, and a popular revolt in the Eastern region of the kingdom followed the next month. Then, in the same month the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan occurred, sparkling Islamic resistance move- ments, or Afghan mujahidin guerrillas. In October 1981, President Sadat was assassinated in Egypt for his peace-treaty with Israel, as a part of a failed rebel- lion by Islamic radicals, while Bahrain, a conservative monarchy in the Gulf, experienced a failed coup by an Islamic liberation front in the same year. Revolutionary and opposition groups taking an Islamic color were becoming the rule, not the exception.9 The reasons why Islamic dimensions had been ignored or underestimated lay in the question of paradigms and analytical frameworks of our studies. Until that 4 AL-MANAR REVISITED time, the predominant paradigms were modernization and nationalism. They were major paradigms for studies related to developing countries, not only in the Middle East but also in other regions of Asia and Africa, as well as in Latin America. This was occurring during the Cold War, and neither modernization studies nor nation- alism studies were completely free from the reality of West–East bipolarity.10 Both paradigms shared tendencies of secularism, and presupposed the tacit understanding that a modern society is a secular one, be it capitalist or socialist, where Islam continuously loses its sociopolitical significance. Malcolm Kerr, the author of an authoritative book on the Islamic reformism of Muhammad 2Abduh (Muhammad 2Abduh 1849–1905) and Rashid Rida,11 wrote in 1960 that “Rashid Rida and others of his school, whatever their intentions may have been, have facilitated the accomplishment of a great undertaking of secular reform in Islamic countries,” thus concluding the failure of Rida and al-Manar.12 Modernization and/or nationalism were well-rooted in the Middle East by then, or at least, seemed so to many, with their secularizing tendencies. Once this premise came under serious doubt, studies in the field started to provide more accurate information on the Islamic revival. There were, and are today, grassroot activities which either produced Islamic revival or were produced themselves under Islamic revival. Islamic revival can be defined a reorientation of a Muslim society at mass level toward Islam (re-Islamization) after a significant degree of de-Islamization13 has occurred, and that is accompanied by revitalization or reformulation of Islamic institutions, as well as Islamic discourses and symbols among Muslims in contemporary contexts. This means that Islamic revival is far from anything “traditional.” The term “traditional” indicates continuity from the past. The “revival” apparently presumes a discontinuity, as it is to revive something that ceased to be vital or functional. Hence, Muslims themselves sometimes refer to revival as an “awakening” from negligence or illness.14 To illustrate this point, let us take the example of zakat (zakat), an obligatory charity for Muslims through payment of a prescribed portion of one’s possessions. It is a part of the well-established Islamic tenets, and therefore the concept itself seems traditional. However, while collection of zakat was considered a duty of the state during premodern (Islamic) periods, it was suspended or left for private ini- tiatives in the modern era, especially under national governments of the twentieth century. Revitalization of this institution is often called for as remedy for poverty, as a part of Islamic revival.15 It involves reformulation of how and who should collect zakat, and how and for what it should be spent. Revived Zakat in a modern society is completely different from that of traditional society. Even though its religio-legal sanctions look identical because of the continuity of the legal codes related to it, the socioeconomic significance is quite different. As collecting zakat cannot be done individually, and while modern states do not perform the duty of collection, an aspiration to activate zakat involves social organization. So, local “zakat committees” were organized in many places to fill the gap. The same can be said about building mosques. Mosques, or prayer halls, 5 KOSUGI YASUSHI are crucially important for a Muslim district if one wants to perform his obligation of prayers. In new suburban districts or underdeveloped districts, there may not be a sufficient number of mosques, if any. Once its inhabitants aspire to have a mosque, they have to organize themselves for that purpose. When a mosque is built, its management or an organizational administration will be needed. Thus, activating Islamic teachings and institutions in a modern society necessitates collective social works, hence, what we may call “Islamic revival movements.”16 Why should Islam, then, be revived? That was one of the most basic themes for al-Manar and its writers and associates, the Manarists.17 For one, Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi (2Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi, 1854–1902), an Islamic thinker originally from Aleppo, argued the major causes of the decline of the Islamic umma in his Umm al-Qura [The Mother of Cities, that is, Mecca] (Meccan Conference)18 through the tongues of participants in a secret international conference in Mecca, supposedly held in 1316 AH [1898]19 The beginning of the 14th century A.H.