AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR CONTEMPORARY GERMAN STUDIES n THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY AICGSISSUEBRIEF FEBRUARY 2015 Presidential Elections in Turkey Erdogan’s “New Turkey” and “New Challenges” 48BY M. MURAT ERDOGAN What are the implications Turkey’s election on 10 August 2014 was historic. After victories in three general elections of Turkey’s historic 2014 (2002, 2007, 2011), three local elections (2004, 2009, 2014), and two referenda (2007, elections for the future of 2010), Recep Tayyip Erdogan, leader of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), won the the country? country’s first direct presidential election, receiving 51.79 percent of the vote in the first round. After twelve years as prime minister, Erdogan will spend the next five years as the pres- ident of Turkey. Combining the prestige of being elected by popular vote and his political style, How will Erdogan’s Erdogan’s presidency is expected to exceed the symbolic borders of the classical parlia- political style and mentary system and usher in a de facto presidential/semi-presidential system. Thus, the elec- leadership shape the tion was not simply a presidential election but, rather, a selection of the regime that eventually role of the presidency? will have a significant impact on both domestic and foreign policies in Turkey. A direct presidential election is unusual in parliamentary democracies. In Turkey, however, the election is the result of democratic resistance to the political control exercised by the military- civilian bureaucracy established in the 1960s. The natural consequence of this was to control democracy via the state; in other words, the establishment of political tutelage. The Turkish constitution grants the president symbolic and limited authority and the position acts as the “protector of the republic and secularism.” The office was long controlled by the military bureaucrats until 2007, when the majority AKP proposed Abdullah Gul as its candidate for the presidency. Gul, along with Erdogan and Bülent Arinc, was one of the most prominent founders of the AKP and widely recognized for his calm political temperament. However, Gul was opposed by the military in part because his wife wore a headscarf; it has since become a political issue. The success of the Justice and Development Party—and Erdogan—is in large part due to its resistance to the military’s reaction to Gul. On 27 April 2007, with only a few days until the election, the Turkish General Staff declared its desire for a fully secular president and threat- ened ramifications if this went unfulfilled. The Constitutional Court weighed the declaration and, four days later, made the contentious decision to block Gul’s selection. The AKP, under the leadership of Erdogan, immediately condemned the declaration and the Court’s decision and pushed for an early general election, in which the AKP would go on to gain an additional 13 percent of the vote (34 perent in 2002 to 47 percent in 2007). Following the AKP’s victory, Gul was appointed president and the AKP proposed a consti- the will of the people to emerge. In his victory speech on 10 tutional amendment to allow for the direct election of the pres- August 2014, Erdogan tied the party’s victory in 2002 to the ident, thereby limiting the influence of military-civilian democratic gains made in 2014, saying that “now the strains bureaucrats and judicial elites. The amendment passed in a between Çankaya [the presidential office in Ankara] and the 2007 referendum and became law. The directly-elected pres- people are lifted.”1 The real question for now and for the future ident, whose office would have the same authority as before, is: how will Erdogan’s political style and leadership shape the would be eligible for two five-year terms. At the time, Erdogan role of the presidency? and the AKP praised the referendum for having finally allowed Twelve Years of AKP Leadership: From “Political Tutelage” to “Majority Democracy” During the twelve years in which Erdogan has lead the AKP and its accompanying restrictions on citizens—in Turkish while having an absolute majority in parliament, the party’s poli- democratic history. Indeed, ignorance and arrogance on the cies have differed between two specific time periods. Between part of military leaders led to the AKP’s original success. The 2002 and 2009, the AKP performed well on topics such as AKP, therefore, emphasized the legitimacy of the 2004 elec- economic development and integration, cooperation with the tion and rejected accusations of nondemocratic interference. EU and its neighbors, and ethnic and regional differences However, the opposition parties are increasingly restless on the within the country; it enacted reforms; and it supported liberal issue of pluralism. democracy and human rights. Following the 2010 constitu- tional amendment and the AKP’s third victory in the 2011 elec- The moves of “reconstructing society,” which has a natural tions, we can see a notable change in the agenda. After this religious-Muslim “identity,” in both domestic and foreign poli- time, the AKP eliminated all institutions that might rival it, cies gave rise to the polarization within that society. Rhetoric allowing it to conduct a policy that gives priority to the Islamic- intended to appeal to religious-conservative voters isolated conservative identity in domestic and foreign affairs rather than many groups that had no link to the AKP’s “identity” policies a policy of coalitions. The AKP’s shift toward identity politics but, rather, admired its pragmatism and social policies. Among instead of pragmatic policies had a negative impact on rela- all governments that have been in power in Turkey, the AKP is tions with the EU. Additionally, the discourse on the economy the one that developed and successfully implemented the most changed—which was the main strength of the AKP—such that, social policies on health, education, poverty, and disabilities. for instance, “interest-rate” policy was often treated through a Putting aside the emphasis on religion and conservatism, it is religious lens. even possible to define the AKP as a “Social Democrat-Leftist Party” in a universal sense. In a country where large income There is no doubt that the AKP fought for the establishment of inequalities are evident, the AKP won widespraed acclaim as democracy in Turkey, but it was not alone in this struggle. a party that directly supported larger masses of poor people Democrats, leftists, liberals, and young people have supported (with food, coal, clothes, etc.); put women with children or the AKP in the struggle for a Turkey both pluralist and demo- involved in elder care on salary; provided free health care and cratic. The AKP argued that it reflects the national will: that the medication; and made education almost free of charge at all people’s choice should have priority in a democracy, not an levels, including higher education. It is obvious that these poli- elitist state and tutelage regime. However, as it gained more cies played a part in the AKP growing to 9.5 million members power and other obstructions to democratic rule have been since 2001. removed, the AKP’s grasp of democracy took the form of obedience to the rule of the majority. Particularly after 2010, the Still, the AKP’s religious-conservative and occasionally populist AKP’s understanding of democracy shifted from one of rhetoric appealed to many. The absence of a viable opposi- populism (i.e., claiming to represent the people) to one of tion—one with the capability to put forward either a leader or entrenched interests that opponents say only respects majority a policy in a time of crisis—further helped Erdogan to gain the rule. Minorities and opponents are increasingly sidelined. This support of those frightened by instability and disorder. In May- was a period in which ideological-identity politics were often June 2013, the “Gezi Park” protests demonstrated the ongoing emphasized vis-à-vis the pragmatic-pluralist democratic social, rather than political, unrest. Millions of young people approach. From there on, the AKP began to talk about an era who saw the AKP’s regulations on issues such as alcohol, of “construction” and began a project of social engineering abortion, single sex dormitories, or religious education as “iden- characterized by religious references. This “identity-based” tity politics”—and as an intervention in their lives—took to the policy of the AKP with references to “Sunni Islam” had an streets. This is an important factor that causes polarization and effect on foreign policy as well.2 disintegration within the society. It was an unexpected chal- lenge to the AKP government, originating as it did from society This debate is reminiscent of earlier reactions to military rule— rather than from the weak opposition parties. The situation was 2 difficult for the government to control. Thus, the AKP preferred have fallen, and Erdogan himself could have been accused. to call the Gezi protests a “rebellion” or an “attempt at a coup Despite the investigation, the love of and satisfaction with d’etat” led by domestic enemies and foreign interests. Erdogan was apparent immediately after this scandal, when Ultimately, the opposition from urban and “partyless” Turkish local election results in March 2014 demonstrated that the youth gave rise to a longer-term “Geziphobia” within the AKP.3 pictures, documents, and allegations did not influence over half of the country’s population. Erdogan had turned the March On 17 and 24 December 2013, an investigation was launched 2014 election into a referendum on himself and the results into the possibly corrupt actions of the AKP—another impor- showed that he had the open support of society. These elec- tant crisis in the twelve years of AKP governance. Erdogan, tion results were also telling for the August presidential elec- who labelled the operation as an attempted coup d’etat and tion.