The Solyndra Failurex Majority Staff Report Prepared for the Use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce Fred Upton, Chairman U.S. House of Representatives 112th Congress August 2, 2012 TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................................................... ii TABLE OF NAMES .......................................................................................................... v I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 1 II. HISTORY OF THE COMMITTEE’S INVESTIGATION .................................... 5 III. DOE’S REVIEW OF THE SOLYNDRA LOAN APPLICATION AND CONDITIONAL COMMITMENT ........................................................................ 9 A. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 and The Establishment of the Loan Guarantee Program at DOE .............................................................................................................................. 9 B. Solyndra’s Application ................................................................................................... 10 C. Solyndra Loan Application Begins Due Diligence and Is Remanded by the First DOE Credit Committee (2008 and 2009) ................................................................................ 12 D. The Stimulus and Other Changes to the DOE Loan Guarantee Program Under the Obama Administration ................................................................................................... 16 E. Review of the Solyndra Application Leading to the March 2009 Conditional Commitment ................................................................................................................... 17 F. March 2009 DOE Credit Committee and Credit Review Board Meetings .................... 21 G. DOE’s Consultation With the Department of the Treasury Pursuant to Title XVII of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 ............................................................................................. 23 H. The Involvement of the Office of Management and Budget Prior to Conditional Commitment ................................................................................................................... 30 IV. THE CLOSING OF THE SOLYNDRA LOAN GUARANTEE ......................... 31 A. DOE Prepares to Submit the Solyndra Application to OMB for Review ...................... 32 B. White House and DOE Schedule Solyndra Closing Announcement Event Prior to OMB’s Review and Approval of the Solyndra Loan Guarantee .................................... 35 C. White House and DOE Pressure OMB to Complete Its Review of the Solyndra Loan Guarantee in Time for the September Closing Event ..................................................... 41 V. DOE’S MONITORING OF THE SOLYNDRA LOAN GUARANTEE AND THE COMPANY’S EFFORTS TO OBTAIN ADDITIONAL CAPITAL (2010) 47 A. DOE’s Monitoring of Solyndra’s Financial Condition .................................................. 48 B. Solyndra’s Planned IPO and Second Loan Guarantee Application ................................ 49 C. President Obama’s Visit to Solyndra in May 2010 ........................................................ 55 D. Solyndra’s Efforts to Secure Additional Government Assistance .................................. 57 ii E. Solyndra Runs Out of Cash ............................................................................................ 64 VI. DOE’S DECISION TO RESTRUCTURE THE SOLYNDRA LOAN GUARANTEE ...................................................................................................... 70 A. DOE’s Negotiations with Argonaut to Restructure the Solyndra Loan Guarantee ........ 72 B. The Terms of the Solyndra Restructuring ...................................................................... 79 C. DOE’s Analysis of the Decision to Subordinate Its Interest to Solyndra’s Investors .... 80 VII. OMB REVIEW OF THE SOLYNDRA RESTRUCTURING ............................. 85 A. OMB’s Role in Reviewing the Solyndra Restructuring ................................................. 85 B. OMB’s Review of DOE’s Financial Analysis and Model of the Solyndra Restructuring Submitted in December 2010 ......................................................................................... 86 C. DOE Submits Its Legal Opinion on the Subordination to OMB .................................... 93 D. OMB’s Review of DOE’s Financial Analysis and Determination that the Restructuring Was a Modification ........................................................................................................ 96 E. After DOE Objects to OMB’s Decision that the Restructuring Is a Modification, OMB Changes Its Position and Determines that the Restructuring Is a Workout ................. 100 VIII. ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY IN THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE SOLYNDRA LOAN GUARANTEE ................ 103 IX. THE ROLE OF THE WHITE HOUSE IN THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE SOLYNDRA LOAN GUARANTEE ................................................................. 105 X. SOLYNDRA’S FINANCIAL STATUS AFTER RESTRUCTURING ............. 107 A. Issues with Working Capital Remain ........................................................................... 107 B. DOE Begins Negotiating a Second Restructuring with Solyndra’s Investors .............. 109 C. OMB, Treasury, and the White House Join the Negotiations About a Second Solyndra Restructuring ................................................................................................................ 111 D. The Lazard Proposal for a Second Restructuring ......................................................... 113 E. The Relationship Between Project Amp and Solyndra ................................................ 116 F. DOE Decides Not to Fund Solyndra and the Company Files for Bankruptcy ............. 120 XI. FINDINGS .......................................................................................................... 128 A. The timing of the Solyndra Conditional Commitment was coordinated with the White House, and scheduled before DOE had reached an agreement with the company on key terms. ............................................................................................................................ 128 B. DOE failed to consult with the Department of the Treasury during the course of it review of Solyndra’s application, as required by the Energy Policy Act of 2005, and the consultation that did occur was rushed. ........................................................................ 129 iii C. The Department of Energy should have better anticipated the market challenges that contributed to Solyndra’s financial condition. ............................................................. 130 D. The Department of Energy ignored critical red flags about Solyndra’s financial condition prior to closing the loan guarantee in September 2009. ............................... 132 E. The White House and the Department of Energy scheduled a public announcement event to commemorate the closing of the Solyndra loan guarantee before OMB had reviewed the transaction, impacting the length and quality of OMB’s review. ........... 133 F. DOE closed the Solyndra loan guarantee and moved forward with Solyndra’s second loan guarantee application before DOE had the capability to monitor the first loan guarantee. ..................................................................................................................... 134 G. Solyndra’s financial strategy was dependent on additional government support in the form of sales contracts and a second loan guarantee. ................................................... 136 H. DOE agreed to subordinate its interest to Solyndra’s investors in the restructuring before determining whether the Energy Policy Act permitted subordination. ............. 137 I. DOE’s financial analysis of the restructuring was flawed. ........................................... 139 J. OMB’s oversight and review of restructuring failed. ................................................... 141 K. DOE approved the conditional commitment for Project Amp while knowing Solyndra—the sole supplier for the project’s first phase—was in desperate financial shape. The relationship between Solyndra and Project Amp was understood by the White House and became a critical bargaining piece of the second restructuring negotiations with Solyndra and its investors. ............................................................... 143 L. George Kaiser was closely involved in important decisions related to Solyndra throughout the life of the loan guarantee. ..................................................................... 144 XII. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................... 146 iv TABLE OF NAMES Department of Energy Steven Chu Secretary of Energy David Frantz Director, Loan Programs Office (2007-2011); Acting Director (2011-present) Daniel Poneman Deputy Secretary (2009-present) Jonathan Silver Executive Director (2009-2011) Matt Rogers Senior Advisor to the Secretary of Energy for Recovery Act Implementation (2009-2011) Rod O’Connor Chief of Staff to Secretary Chu (2009-2011) Brandon Hurlbut Chief of Staff to Secretary Chu (2011-present); Deputy Chief of Staff to Secretary Chu (2009-2011) Missy Owens Deputy Chief of Staff to Secretary Chu (2009-present) Scott Blake Harris General Counsel (2009-2011) Eric Fygi Acting General Counsel (2011-present) Steven Isakowitz Chief