Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement http://journals.cambridge.org/PHS Additional services for Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement: Email alerts: Click here Subscriptions: Click here Commercial reprints: Click here Terms of use : Click here Materialism and the First Person Geoffrey Madell Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement / Volume 53 / September 2003, pp 123 - 139 DOI: 10.1017/S1358246100008304, Published online: 08 January 2010 Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/ abstract_S1358246100008304 How to cite this article: Geoffrey Madell (2003). Materialism and the First Person. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 53, pp 123-139 doi:10.1017/S1358246100008304 Request Permissions : Click here Downloaded from http://journals.cambridge.org/PHS, IP address: 128.115.190.38 on 19 May 2014 Materialism and the First Person GEOFFREY MADELL Here are some sentences from Fred Dretske's book Naturalising the Mind: For a materialist there are no facts that are accessible to only one person... If the subjective life of another being, what it is like to be that creature, seems inaccessible, this must be because we fail to understand what we are talking about when we talk about its subjective states. If S feels some way, and its feeling some way is a material state, how can it be impossible for us to know how S feels? Though each of us has direct information about our own experiences, there is no privileged access. If you know where to look, you can get the same information I have about the charac- ter of my experiences. This is a result of thinking about the mind in naturalistic terms. Subjectivity becomes part of the objective order. For materialists, this is as it should be.1 I think Dretske is right: for the materialist, there can be no such thing as privileged access. But the denial of privileged access looks wildly implausible. A being incapable of feeling pain can have access to all the physical facts relating to pain, but not have the faintest idea what pain feels like; and so for all sensations. No amount of knowledge of the physical facts will allow one to under- stand what the experience feels like, a fact that has become known as 'the explanatory gap'. What I want to look at is an approach shared by a number of materialists which argues that knowledge which is essentially perspectival, first-personal, and of that which is inaccessible to the observer, can be accommodated in a materialist position. This is an approach which is shared by Michael Tye, William Lycan, Owen Flanagan, Brian Loar, Scott Sturgeon, and others. The essence of it goes like this: Fred, in Frank Jackson's well-known story, has superfine colour discrimination.2 He distinguishes between two shades of red where 1 F. Dretske, Naturalising the Mind (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1997), 65. 2 See F. Jackson, 'Epiphenomenal Qualia', reprinted in W. G. Lycan (ed.), Mind and Cognition (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), 470-2. 123 Geoffrey Madell the rest of us only see one shade. We can see that there is some phys- ical basis for this, both in Fred's cranium and in the red part of the colour spectrum. But we have no idea what Fred's experience is like. Why not? Because, Flanagan points out, we are not connected up either internally or to the outside world as Fred is (though he doesn't actually mention Fred by name).3 If introspection is a form of self-scanning, as Lycan claims, then the explanatory gap, the lack of tracings and explanations of the sort demanded, is just what you would expect. I know my own pain by introspection, and no one else can know the same fact by being in the same functional state. Only I can scan my own internal states.4 Tye also sees the essential point to be that phenomenally conscious states are 'perspectivally subjective in the following way: each phenomenal state S, is such that fully comprehending 5 as it is essentially in itself, requires adopting one particular point of view or perspective namely that provided by undergoing S'. A phenomenal concept such as RED 'is exercised when one becomes aware by introspection of what it is like to experience red'5; and: 'no amount of a priori reflection on phenomenal concepts alone will reveal phenomenal-physical connections, even of a contingent type'.6 According to this approach, then, the phenomenal character of experience, the 'explanatory gap' presented by the evident failure of physical description and explanation to account for that phenome- nal character, and the fact that this character is something to which the subject has privileged and private access, are all matters to be accounted for by the perspectival nature of phenomenal concepts. 'The inexplicable nature of qualia-based subjectivity', says Scott Sturgeon, 'is best explained by epistemic features for our qualitative concepts. Nothing ontologically funny is required... From the fact that no explanation is possible for qualia-based subjectivity it sim- ply does not follow that the properties captured by our qualitative concepts are distinct from those captured by other concepts'.7 Lycan connects all this explicitly with the irreducibility of first person reference. 'My mental reference to a first-order 3 O. Flanagan, Consciousness Reconsidered (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1992), 91, 116. 4 W. G. Lycan, Consciousness and Experience (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1996), 54-68. 5 M. Tye, 'Phenomenal Consciousness: The Explanatory Gap as a Cognitive Illusion', Mind 108, No. 432 (October 1999), 710. 6 Tye, 713. 7 S. Sturgeon, 'The Epistemic View of Subjectivity', Journal of Philosophy 91, No. 5 (May 1994), 235. 124 Materialism and the First Person psychological state of my own is a tokening of a semantically prim- itive Mentalese lexeme. My mental word is functionally nothing like any of the complex expressions of English that in fact refer to the same (neural) state of affairs... And since no one else can use that mental word... to designate that state of affairs, of course no one can explain... why that state of affairs feels like [that or semantha] to me. Introspection involves a very special mode of presentation, primitive and private' (Lycan's brackets).8 The subjectivity of experience, and, in particular, the fact that no physical description can explain the phenomenal character of sen- sation, is thus taken to be fully accounted for by the perspectival nature of phenomenal concepts, and by the nature of self- monitoring and self reference. II I think this position is totally untenable. There is, I shall argue, no way in which phenomenal, or perspectival, or first-person aware- ness can be accommodated in a materialist framework. Materialists do not understand what first-person knowledge is, and they do not understand what the first person is. Before I continue, let me point out that the position outlined is one of 'robust' physicalism, as Tye calls it. That is, we are wholly composed of physical elements whose nature is pretty well known. There are no mysterious inscrutable properties of the physical, nor any mystery about the connection between the mental and the phys- ical; and we don't have to wait on some fundamental revolution in our understanding of the physical. We are, Lycan tells us, rather large collections of small physical objects.9 The first question we must ask is prompted by Dretske's com- ment. How is it possible to accommodate a private realm, inaccessi- ble to the observer, in a wholly material world? Whatever the phys- ical is, there can surely be no aspect of it which is in principle closed to public scrutiny. If its feeling like that to me is something in prin- ciple inaccessible to public scrutiny, then it can't be physical, or so one would suppose. To suggest otherwise leaves one without an understanding of what it could mean to call anything physical. What has gone wrong here? Part of it, I suggest, is a disposition to suppose that the question reduces to one about ownership. My Lycan, 64. Lycan, 45. 125 Geoffrey Madell mode of access to the posited neural states is se//-scrutiny, or self- monitoring. No one else can have that mode of access to the posit- ed neural state. But then, no one else can have my smiles or frowns, or undergo my death. So, Tye tells us, 'The fact that you cannot undergo my pains... [is] no more mysterious... than the fact that you cannot undergo my death'.10 But this cannot be the answer. The issue is not about necessary ownership, nor even about necessary ownership of a mode of access, but about privileged access. My frowns, smiles or death are items in the public world. My phenomenal states are not. That my scrutiny or monitoring of some posited state is self- monitoring goes no way towards accounting for the necessary privacy of what is being monitored. The refrigerator monitors its own temperature, but no one supposes that what it monitors is necessarily private to that refrigerator, that it has privileged access to its own temperature, even though nothing else can monitor that refrigerator's temperature in the way that that refrigerator does. There is nothing about self-monitoring, or about what is thus monitored, that is necessarily hidden from the observer. What needs to be explained is how a self-monitoring, admittedly vastly more complex than that of the refrigerator, can be such as to result in, or have as an aspect, something in principle inaccessible to the observer. That looks to be simply incompatible with physicalism, as Dretske observed. But the need for an explanation of the required sort can never be satisfied.