DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 2059 II. THE PRESIDENT’S ROLE IN THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS ...................................... 2068 A. Rise of the Signing Statement: A Structural Explanation ................................. 2070 B. The Rise of Signing Statements: Presidential Practice from Reagan to Obama ................................................................................................. 2072 1. The Reagan Administration: Clarifying Legislative Meaning.............................. 2072 2. The George H.W. Bush Administration: Inserting “Authoritative Guidance” ... 2075 3. The Clinton Administration: Institutionalizing the Signing Statement ....................................................... 2077 4. The George W. Bush Administration: Expanding the Scope of Executive Power ..................................................... 2079 5. The Obama Administration: Reining in the Use of Signing Statements ..................................................... 2082 C. The Public’s Role in Reining in the Use of Signing Statements ...................... 2084 D. Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 2089 III. PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL .......................... 2090 A. White House Influence on the Office of Legal Counsel ....................................... 2092 1. An Overview of OLC ............................................................................................... 2092 2. The White House as Client ...................................................................................... 2093 B. How OLC Safeguards Its Independence ................................................................. 2094 1. OLC’s Internal Safeguards ...................................................................................... 2095 2. The Case for Independence from the White House ............................................. 2097 C. The Consequences of White House Influence: Lessons from the Realm of Foreign Policy ............................................................. 2100 1. Threats to OLC’s Independence ............................................................................. 2101 (a) Pressure on OLC .................................................................................................. 2101 (b) The OLC’s Deviation from Its Formal Procedures ........................................ 2105 (c) The Rise of the White House Counsel’s Office ............................................... 2107 2. Why OLC Is Threatened Despite the Benefits of Independence ....................... 2108 D. Responses to the Threats ............................................................................................ 2109 E. Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 2113 IV. PRESIDENTIAL INVOLVEMENT IN DEFENDING CONGRESSIONAL STATUTES ........................................................................................... 2113 A. The Solicitor General’s Role Within the Executive Branch ...................................... 2115 1. Background ................................................................................................................ 2115 2057 2058 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 125:2057 2. The Solicitor General’s Client ................................................................................. 2115 3. The Solicitor General’s Independence from the President .................................. 2116 B. The Evolution of the Duty to Defend Statutes ........................................................... 2118 1. Phase I (1926–1977): Rare Nondefense, Little Presidential Interference ........... 2118 (a) Early Decisions Not to Defend ........................................................................... 2118 (b) Defense of Statutes Against Interests of the President ..................................... 2120 2. Phase II (1977–1989): The President as the Solicitor General’s Client ............... 2121 3. Phase III (1989–Present): The Increasing Involvement of the President in Decisions Not to Defend Statutes ............................................ 2127 C. Implications of the President as Decisionmaker in Nondefense Cases ................... 2132 D. Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 2134 V. E XECUTIVE APPOINTMENTS ......................................................................................... 2135 A. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 2135 B. The Rise of the Administrative State ........................................................................... 2138 1. The Legislative Power Delegated .................................................................... 2139 2. The Unitary Executive and Separation of Powers ................................................. 2141 C. Conflict over Executive Appointments ......................................................................... 2144 1. Establishing a Baseline: Executive Appointments in Historical Perspective ................................... 2144 2. Today’s Escalating Appointments Battle ................................................................ 2146 (a) Filibusters of Qualified Candidates: The Experience of Dawn Johnsen ....... 2147 (b) Congressional Oversight as a Response: U.S. Attorneys’ Firings ................... 2149 (c) The President Reasserts His Power: The Appointment of Richard Cordray .............................................................. 2152 D. Conclusion: The Courts to Settle This Fight ............................................................... 2155 2012] DEVELOPMENTS — PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY 2059 Taking it for granted, therefore, that all men of sense will agree in the ne- cessity of an energetic executive, it will only remain to inquire, what are the ingredients which constitute this energy? How far can they be com- bined with those other ingredients which constitute safety in the republi- can sense? And how far does this combination characterize the plan which has been reported by the convention? — The Federalist Papers1 I. INTRODUCTION Over two hundred years after the ratification of the U.S. Constitu- tion created the nation’s first federal executive,2 the precise scope of the President’s authority remains contested. No one doubts that the President’s power has expanded dramatically since George Washington took the first oath of office in 1789,3 and nearly everyone would accept that this transformation reflects to some extent a necessary accommo- dation to the new challenges posed by a growing federal government and a changing world. But the appropriate extent of authority for a twenty-first century presidency is the subject of fierce debate both inside Washington, D.C., and across the nation. This Development traces four of the most significant battles from the past several decades regarding the President’s authority. Together, these Parts demonstrate that, despite the internal executive branch incentives to expand the scope of its own authority, the power to define the nature of the presi- dency ultimately resides where it first began — in the American people. Perhaps the most striking feature of the four Parts that follow is the consistency with which Presidents of both parties have sought to expand their authority. Yet different Presidents have taken different approaches toward broadening executive power; the battle’s legal landscape often determines the President’s strategy against the legisla- tive branch. When faced with statutory enactments burdening execu- tive Appointment Clause authority, Presidents George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush all issued signing statements deeming the legislation unconstitutional and refusing to comply fully.4 Presi- ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 1 THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 422 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003). 2 The United States’s initial national government organized under the Articles of Confedera- tion lacked an executive branch. See 1 BRADFORD PERKINS, THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 55 (1993). 3 See generally, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND (2010); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973). 4 See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Dayton Aviation Heritage Preservation Act of 1992, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1848 (Oct. 16, 1992); Statement on Signing the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 1996, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1869 (Oct. 19, 1996); Statement on Signing the Transportation, Treasury, 2060 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 125:2057 dent Barack Obama responded to the Senate’s use of congressional procedure to block his recess appointments by asserting an inherent constitutional authority to make those appointments unilaterally.5 Presidents have also attempted to expand their authority within the executive branch itself. These attempts have led to controversy, which has not been clearly resolved — for instance, some legal commentators condemned the exercise of presidential influence over the Office of Le- gal Counsel6 but advocated for increased presidential authority over the Solicitor General.7